(PC) Smith v. Clendenin

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: May 5, 2025
• Docket: 1:24-cv-00791
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DAVID JUNIOR SMITH, Case No.: 1:24-cv-00791-JLT-SKO 12 Plaintiff, FIRST SCREENING ORDER

13 v.

14 STEPHANIE CLENDENIN, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff David Junior Smith, a civil detainee, is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in 18 this civil rights action. 19 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners, or civil detainees, 21 seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 22 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the complaint is 23 frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary 24 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should 25 dismiss a complaint if it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to 26 support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 27 Cir. 1990). 1 II. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS 2 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 3 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 4 exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain 5 “a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 6 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 7 plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal 8 quotation marks & citation omitted). 9 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 10 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 11 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 12 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 13 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal 14 conclusions are not. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 15 The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of 16 any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the 17 liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal 18 theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation 19 of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 20 pled,” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal 21 quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted 22 inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 23 marks & citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not 24 sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 25 liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). 26 B. Linkage and Causation 27 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 1 section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the 2 defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 3 423 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the 4 deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative 5 act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legal required 6 to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 7 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). 8 C. Supervisory Liability 9 Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of 10 their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; see e.g., 11 Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff required to 12 adduce evidence the named supervisory defendants “themselves acted or failed to act 13 unconstitutionally, not merely that subordinate did”), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. 14 Cnty of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 15 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under section 16 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation: there is 17 no respondeat superior liability under section 1983”). 18 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or 19 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 20 Cir. 1989). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a 21 ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to 22 inflict’ constitutional harms.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Accord 23 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011) (supervisory liability may be based on 24 inaction in the training and supervision of subordinates). 25 Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the official 26 implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional 27 rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 1 grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970). 2 To prove liability for an action or policy, the plaintiff “must ... demonstrate that his 3 deprivation resulted from an official policy or custom established by a ... policymaker possessed 4 with final authority to establish that policy.” Waggy v. Spokane County Washington, 594 F.3d 5 707, 713 (9th Cir.2010). When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between 6 such defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 7 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the 8 involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. 9 Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 A. Plaintiff’s Complaint 12 Plaintiff names Stephanie Clendenin, Director of California Department of State 13 Hospitals, and Brandon Price, Executive Director of Coalinga State Hospital, in their individual 14 capacities, as defendants in this action. (Doc. 1 at 1, 5.) He seeks monetary damages, the 15 appointment of counsel,1 and “any other injunction the court determines is appropriate ….” (Id. at 16 13.) 17 B. The Factual Allegations 18 Plaintiff states that while housed at Atascadero State Hospital in 2003, Drs. Goldberg and 19 Hirsch performed certain evaluations; Goldberg found Plaintiff appeared to be “someone who has 20 developmental disabilities” and Hirsch found Plaintiff “was at least mildly mentally retarded.” 21 (Doc. 1 at 5.) In March 2004, Dr. McCabe determined Plaintiff was “mentally retarded” 22 following an evaluation. (Id. at 5-6.) In April 2004, further assessments were performed to 23 determine the extent of Plaintiff’s mental state after he expressed an interest in the Sex Offender 24 Treatment Program (SOTP). (Id. at 6.) Dr. Bolin diagnosed Plaintiff with borderline intellectual 25 functioning. (Id. at 6-8.) Plaintiff states that in August 2004, he was sentenced to six years in 26

27 1 Plaintiff may seek the appointment of counsel by filing the appropriate motion. Plaintiff is advised that a pro se plaintiff must meet the applicable legal standards provided for in Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997). 1 state prison following a conviction for resisting an executive officer. (Doc. 1 at 7.) 2 In December 2008, Dr. Arnold performed a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) evaluation, 3 noting Plaintiff’s low scores in reading, math and language. (Doc. 1 at 7.) Dr. Finnberg also noted 4 Plaintiff’s borderline intellectual functioning and need for a specialized SOTP. (Id.) 5 In May 2009, Plaintiff was admitted to Department of State Hospitals-Coalinga (DSH-C) 6 following his civil commitment as an SVP, and immediately enrolled in the SOTP. (Doc. 1 at 7.) 7 Plaintiff was enrolled in a tutorial version of the program but struggled with reading and 8 comprehension. (Id. at 8.) He advised his facilitators of the need for specialized tutoring or 9 special education classes but was ignored. (Id.) 10 In an April 2010 annual evaluation, Dr. Starrett reiterated Plaintiff’s borderline intellectual 11 functioning but make no further recommendation for treatment modification. (Doc. 1 at 8.) A year 12 later, Dr. Starrett noted Plaintiff’s difficulties with reading and writing and found Plaintiff 13 “should be assigned to PSR Mall groups” appropriate for individuals who struggle like Plaintiff. 14 (Id.) Plaintiff contends his treatment team did not implement the recommendation. (Id.) 15 In late 2014, Plaintiff asserts “the SOTP model changed from the Phase(s) to The Good 16 Life Model.” (Doc. 1 at 9.) 17 In December 2015, Dr. Busby performed an SVP evaluation, noting Plaintiff had made 18 little progress in the SOTP. (Doc. 1 at 8-9.) While Plaintiff exhibited “more stable behavior traits” 19 after entering a domestic partnership, he still had trouble understanding concepts in the program 20 materials and required assistance from his partner. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff contends a review of 21 “random chapters” in the SOTP materials reveals the grade levels assigned to those chapters 22 exceed his capabilities. (Id.) 23 Plaintiff next contends that although treatment team conferences occur monthly, his team 24 encouraged him to attend only quarterly. (Doc. 1 at 9-10.) A full treatment team includes a 25 psychologist, social worker, registered nurse, rehabilitation therapist, and a treatment plan 26 recorder (id. at 10), with the purpose of assessing a patient’s program and “map[ping] out the 27 subsequent quarters treatment plan.” (Id.) Treatment plans are broken into focuses like 1 accordingly. (Id.) 2 Plaintiff states that although he advised his treatment team that he was struggling to 3 understand the SOTP materials, he was never referred to any special education or adult basic 4 education classes to improve his reading and comprehension skills. (Doc. 1 at 10.) He contends 5 the treatment team was unwilling to explain their reports in a manner he could understand. (Id.) 6 In 2017 or 2018, due to his frustration “with the inaction” of his treatment team and his 7 inability to progress, Plaintiff dropped out of the SOTP and stopped attending the treatment team 8 conferences. (Doc. 1 at 10.) Plaintiff contends his treatment team never inquired into his reasons 9 for doing so. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that due to his intellectual disability, he “employed the 10 assistance of another patient at DSH-C” to present his claims. (Id.) 11 C. Plaintiff’s Claims 12 Plaintiff asserts Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims against Defendant 13 Clendenin (claim one) and Defendant Price (claim two). (Doc. 1 at 10-11.) He maintains 14 Defendants departed from professional standards and abandoned their responsibilities by denying 15 Plaintiff adequate treatment and failing to implement educational classes required by statute. (Id.) 16 As a result, Plaintiff’s liberty interest “in being cured and subsequently released” were 17 “dramatically impaired.” (Id.) 18 Fourteenth Amendment: Legal Standards 19 Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, states are required to 20 provide civilly committed individuals with access to mental health treatment that gives them a 21 realistic opportunity to be cured and released. Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 22 1980)); Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Ohlinger). “Because the 23 purpose of confinement is not punitive, the state must also provide the civilly-committed with 24 ‘more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of 25 confinement are designed to punish.’” Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1172 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 26 457 U.S. 307, 233 (1982)). “Lack of funds, staff or facilities cannot justify the State’s failure to 27 provide [such persons] with [the] treatment necessary for rehabilitation.” Oregon Advocacy 1 652 F.2d at 779). 2 Fourteenth Amendment: Analysis 3 Liberally construing the complaint and accepting all facts as true, Plaintiff alleges 4 cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants Clendenin and Price. He contends 5 Defendants violated his constitutional right to access mental health treatment that gives him a 6 realistic opportunity to be cured and released because DSH-C’s programming does not allow for 7 Plaintiff’s participation given his intellectual needs. Ohlinger, 652 F.2d at 778; Sharp, 233 F.3d at 8 1172. 9 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 10 Plaintiff’s complaint states cognizable Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against 11 Defendants Clendenin and Price. The Court will issue a separate order regarding service of 12 process in due course. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14

15 Dated: May 2, 2025 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16

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