4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 FREDERICK WAYNE SMITH, Case No. 1:22-cv-01580-SAB (PC) 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT 9 TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT v. JUDGE TO THIS ACTION 10 KATHLEEN ALLISON, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 RECOMMENDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION Defendants. FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BE 12 DENIED
13 (ECF No. 2)
15 Plaintiff Frederick Wayne Smith is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed 16 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 17 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and/or 18 temporary restraining order, filed December 9, 2022. (ECF No. 2.) In his motion, Plaintiff seeks 19 an answer as to why he was illegally transferred to a new prison despite his enemy concerns. (Id. 20 at 2.) 21 I. 22 LEGAL STANDARD 23 The primary purpose of a preliminary injunction is preservation of the status quo. See, 24 e.g., Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872, 887 (9th Cir. 2020). More specifically, the purpose of 25 a preliminary injunction is preservation the Court's power to render a meaningful decision after 26 a trial on the merits. See Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); Barth v. 27 Montejo, No. 2:19-cv-1874-DB-P, 2021 WL 1291962, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2021). It is meant 1 to maintain the relative positions of the parties and prevent irreparable loss of rights before a trial 2 and final judgment. See, e.g., Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395; Ramos, 975 F.3d at 887; Doe #1 v. 3 Trump, 957 F.3d 1050, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020). A preliminary injunction may assume two 4 forms. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 5 2009). Prohibitory injunctions prevent a party from acting, thus maintaining the status quo. Id. A 6 mandatory injunction directs some responsible party to act. Id. at 879. 7 The legal principles applicable to requests for injunctive relief, such as a temporary 8 restraining order or preliminary injunction, are well-established. To prevail, the moving party 9 must show that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction. See Stormans, Inc. v. 10 Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 11 U.S. 7, 20– 22 (2008)); see also Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 12 (9th Cir. 2011). To the extent that prior Ninth Circuit cases suggest a lesser standard by focusing 13 solely on the possibility of irreparable harm, such cases are “no longer controlling, or even 14 viable.” Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 15 2009); see also Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1131–32; Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1127. Instead, the proper 16 test requires a party to demonstrate: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to 17 suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction; (3) the balance of hardships tips in his 18 favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Cottrell, 632 F.3d 19 at 1131; Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1127. 20 The Ninth Circuit evaluates the above factors under a sliding scale. Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 21 1131–35. A stronger showing on one factor may offset a weaker showing on another. Id. at 1132. 22 But a plaintiff must make some showing on all four factors. Id. at 1135. Under the scale, if the 23 balance of the hardships tips sharply towards the plaintiff, the plaintiff need only show “serious 24 questions going to the merits” provided that the plaintiff also satisfies the other two factors. Id. at 25 1131–35. Thus, when there are serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships 26 tips sharply towards the plaintiff, a preliminary injunction may issue if the plaintiff also shows 27 that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest. Id. 1 A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that is not awarded as of right. Winter, 2 555 U.S. at 24; Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1131. The burden to achieve injunctive relief is particularly 3 high when a party seeks a mandatory injunction. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 4 (9th Cir. 2015). Mandatory injunctions go beyond an injunction preventing a party from acting, 5 and thus beyond mere maintenance of the status quo. See id. They require a party to 6 act. Id. District courts must deny requests for mandatory injunctions unless the law and facts 7 clearly favor a moving party. Id. The Court will not grant such requests in doubtful cases. Id. 8 II. 9 DISCUSSION 10 First, the Court notes Plaintiff's case is still in its preliminary screening stage, the 11 United States Marshal has yet to effect service on his behalf, and Defendants have no actual 12 notice. Therefore, the Court has no personal jurisdiction over any Defendant at this 13 time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2); Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 14 344, 350 (1999); Zepeda v. U.S. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1983). 15 Second, even if the Court had personal jurisdiction over defendants, Robinson has failed 16 to establish the imminent irreparable harm required to support a preliminary injunction. See 17 Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1131. “The fact that plaintiff has met the pleading 18 requirements allowing him to proceed with the complaint does not, ipso facto, entitle him to 19 a preliminary injunction.” Claiborne v. Blauser, No. CIV S-10-2427 LKK, 2011 WL 3875892, 20 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV S-10-2427 LKK, 21 2011 WL 4765000 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011). Instead, to meet the “irreparable harm” 22 requirement, Plaintiff must do more than plausibly allege imminent harm; he must demonstrate 23 it. Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). This 24 requires Plaintiff to demonstrate by specific facts that there is a credible threat of immediate and 25 irreparable harm. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). “Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury 26 sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Id. at 674-75. 27 Here, Plaintiff requests to know why he was transferred to California Correctional 1 Institution where he has known known enemies. Plaintiff’s allegations of potential harm and risk 2 of injury are speculative, see Caribbean Marine, 844 F.2d at 674–75, and while Plaintiff may fear 3 for his future safety as a result of the transfer, he has failed to establish that he faces the immediate 4 and credible threat of irreparable harm necessary to justify injunctive relief at this stage of the 5 case. City of Los Angeles v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 FREDERICK WAYNE SMITH, Case No. 1:22-cv-01580-SAB (PC) 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT 9 TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT v. JUDGE TO THIS ACTION 10 KATHLEEN ALLISON, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 RECOMMENDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION Defendants. FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BE 12 DENIED
13 (ECF No. 2)
15 Plaintiff Frederick Wayne Smith is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed 16 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 17 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and/or 18 temporary restraining order, filed December 9, 2022. (ECF No. 2.) In his motion, Plaintiff seeks 19 an answer as to why he was illegally transferred to a new prison despite his enemy concerns. (Id. 20 at 2.) 21 I. 22 LEGAL STANDARD 23 The primary purpose of a preliminary injunction is preservation of the status quo. See, 24 e.g., Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872, 887 (9th Cir. 2020). More specifically, the purpose of 25 a preliminary injunction is preservation the Court's power to render a meaningful decision after 26 a trial on the merits. See Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); Barth v. 27 Montejo, No. 2:19-cv-1874-DB-P, 2021 WL 1291962, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2021). It is meant 1 to maintain the relative positions of the parties and prevent irreparable loss of rights before a trial 2 and final judgment. See, e.g., Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395; Ramos, 975 F.3d at 887; Doe #1 v. 3 Trump, 957 F.3d 1050, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020). A preliminary injunction may assume two 4 forms. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 5 2009). Prohibitory injunctions prevent a party from acting, thus maintaining the status quo. Id. A 6 mandatory injunction directs some responsible party to act. Id. at 879. 7 The legal principles applicable to requests for injunctive relief, such as a temporary 8 restraining order or preliminary injunction, are well-established. To prevail, the moving party 9 must show that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction. See Stormans, Inc. v. 10 Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 11 U.S. 7, 20– 22 (2008)); see also Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 12 (9th Cir. 2011). To the extent that prior Ninth Circuit cases suggest a lesser standard by focusing 13 solely on the possibility of irreparable harm, such cases are “no longer controlling, or even 14 viable.” Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 15 2009); see also Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1131–32; Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1127. Instead, the proper 16 test requires a party to demonstrate: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to 17 suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction; (3) the balance of hardships tips in his 18 favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Cottrell, 632 F.3d 19 at 1131; Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1127. 20 The Ninth Circuit evaluates the above factors under a sliding scale. Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 21 1131–35. A stronger showing on one factor may offset a weaker showing on another. Id. at 1132. 22 But a plaintiff must make some showing on all four factors. Id. at 1135. Under the scale, if the 23 balance of the hardships tips sharply towards the plaintiff, the plaintiff need only show “serious 24 questions going to the merits” provided that the plaintiff also satisfies the other two factors. Id. at 25 1131–35. Thus, when there are serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships 26 tips sharply towards the plaintiff, a preliminary injunction may issue if the plaintiff also shows 27 that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest. Id. 1 A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that is not awarded as of right. Winter, 2 555 U.S. at 24; Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1131. The burden to achieve injunctive relief is particularly 3 high when a party seeks a mandatory injunction. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 4 (9th Cir. 2015). Mandatory injunctions go beyond an injunction preventing a party from acting, 5 and thus beyond mere maintenance of the status quo. See id. They require a party to 6 act. Id. District courts must deny requests for mandatory injunctions unless the law and facts 7 clearly favor a moving party. Id. The Court will not grant such requests in doubtful cases. Id. 8 II. 9 DISCUSSION 10 First, the Court notes Plaintiff's case is still in its preliminary screening stage, the 11 United States Marshal has yet to effect service on his behalf, and Defendants have no actual 12 notice. Therefore, the Court has no personal jurisdiction over any Defendant at this 13 time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2); Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 14 344, 350 (1999); Zepeda v. U.S. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1983). 15 Second, even if the Court had personal jurisdiction over defendants, Robinson has failed 16 to establish the imminent irreparable harm required to support a preliminary injunction. See 17 Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1131. “The fact that plaintiff has met the pleading 18 requirements allowing him to proceed with the complaint does not, ipso facto, entitle him to 19 a preliminary injunction.” Claiborne v. Blauser, No. CIV S-10-2427 LKK, 2011 WL 3875892, 20 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV S-10-2427 LKK, 21 2011 WL 4765000 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011). Instead, to meet the “irreparable harm” 22 requirement, Plaintiff must do more than plausibly allege imminent harm; he must demonstrate 23 it. Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). This 24 requires Plaintiff to demonstrate by specific facts that there is a credible threat of immediate and 25 irreparable harm. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). “Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury 26 sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Id. at 674-75. 27 Here, Plaintiff requests to know why he was transferred to California Correctional 1 Institution where he has known known enemies. Plaintiff’s allegations of potential harm and risk 2 of injury are speculative, see Caribbean Marine, 844 F.2d at 674–75, and while Plaintiff may fear 3 for his future safety as a result of the transfer, he has failed to establish that he faces the immediate 4 and credible threat of irreparable harm necessary to justify injunctive relief at this stage of the 5 case. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Goldie's Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior 6 Court of State of Cal., 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Speculative injury does not constitute 7 irreparable injury.”); Rigsby v. State, No. CV 11-1696-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1283778, at *5 (D. 8 Ariz. Mar. 28, 2013) (denying prisoner’s TRO based on fear of potential future injury based on 9 past assaults); Chappell v. Stankorb, No. 1:11-CV-01425-LJO, 2012 WL 1413889, at *2 (E.D. 10 Cal. Apr. 23, 2012) (denying injunctive relief where prisoner’s claims of injury based on current 11 or future housing decisions were nothing “more than speculative.”), report and recommendation 12 adopted, No. 1:11-CV-01425-LJO, 2012 WL 2839816 (E.D. Cal. July 9, 2012). Plaintiff has not 13 identified any immediate threat to his safety and has not submitted evidence suggesting that there 14 are inadequate safeguards in place to protect Plaintiff at California Correctional 15 Institution. See Perez v. Diaz, No. 2:19-cv-1295 KJN P, 2019 WL 3229622, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 16 18, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3986657 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2019) 17 (“Generalized allegations of past incidents of violence fail to show that plaintiff ... faces imminent 18 harm.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and/or temporary 19 restraining order should be denied. 20 III. 21 ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION 22 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall randomly 23 assign a District Judge to this action. 24 Further, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary 25 injunction and/or temporary restraining order (ECF No. 2) be denied. 26 This Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 27 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 1 |days after being served with this Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written 2 | objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 3 Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 4 | specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 5 | 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 6 7 IS SO ORDERED. Zl Se g Pated: _February 15, 2023 _ _PAA ee 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28