(PC) Singleton Perkins v. Pfeiffer

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedJuly 7, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-00025
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Singleton Perkins v. Pfeiffer ((PC) Singleton Perkins v. Pfeiffer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Singleton Perkins v. Pfeiffer, (E.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 DEVON SAMUEL JAMES SINGLETON ) Case No.: 1:21-cv-00025-SAB (PC) PERKINS, ) 9 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 10 RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE TO v. ) THIS ACTION 11 ) C. PFEIFFER, et al., ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 ) RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION Defendants. ) 13 ) (ECF No. 12) ) 14 )

15 Plaintiff Devon Samuel James Singleton Perkins is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 16 this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United States 17 Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 18 Plaintiff filed the instant action January 7, 2021. 19 On February 10, 2021, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint, found that no cognizable 20 claims were stated, and granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 7.) 21 Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on March 18, 2021. (ECF No. 9.) 22 On April 30, 2021, the Court screened the first amended complaint, found no cognizable 23 claims were stated, and granted Plaintiff one final opportunity to file a second amended complaint 24 within thirty days. (ECF No. 11.) 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 1 Plaintiff failed to file a second amended complaint. Therefore, on June 9, 2021, the Court 2 ordered Plaintiff to show cause within fourteen days why the action should not be dismissed. (ECF 3 No. 12.) Plaintiff has failed to respond to the order to show cause or otherwise communicated with the 4 Court and the time to do so has now passed. Accordingly, dismissal is warranted. 5 I. 6 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 7 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 8 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 9 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 10 “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] 11 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see 12 also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 13 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 14 entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 15 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 16 do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 17 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally 18 participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 19 2002). 20 Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally 21 construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 22 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, 23 which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named 24 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 25 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not 26 sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying 27 the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 28 /// 1 II. 2 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 3 The Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of the sua 4 sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 5 Shortly after the Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP) memorandum on COVID-19 operational 6 guidelines, Plaintiff began requesting cleaning supplies, such as face masks, etc. 7 Immediately after Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance, officer Dean began telling other inmates 8 that Plaintiff was causing trouble and would be the reason their privileges would be temporarily 9 suspended. 10 On March 6, 2021, Plaintiff was beaten by 21 officers while he was in body restraints. 11 Officers Figueroa and Prieto targeted Plaintiff by searching his cell and reading documents. 12 Plaintiff was rehoused in the administrative segregation unit at KVSP for battery on a peace 13 officer when it was the officers who battered Plaintiff. 14 III. 15 DISCUSSION 16 A. Retaliation 17 “Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials and to be free 18 from retaliation for doing so.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Brodheim 19 v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009)). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First 20 Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse 21 action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) 22 chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably 23 advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). To 24 state a cognizable retaliation claim, Plaintiff must establish a nexus between the retaliatory act and the 25 protected activity. Grenning v. Klemme, 34 F.Supp.3d 1144, 1153 (E.D. Wash. 2014). 26 Here, Plaintiff contends that after he filed a grievance, officer Dean began telling other 27 inmates that Plaintiff was causing trouble and he would be the reason their privileges were suspended. 28 However, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to demonstrate any “adverse action.” In addition, 1 Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that he was targeted by officers Figueroa and Prieto and his cell was 2 searched in which documents were read is insufficient to demonstrate retaliatory action because 3 Plaintiff filed a grievance or that their actions did not serve a legitimate penological purpose. 4 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable retaliation claim. 5 B. Excessive Force 6 The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 7 Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (citations omitted). For 8 claims arising out of the use of excessive physical force, the issue is “whether force was applied in a 9 good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” 10 Wilkins v.

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Bluebook (online)
(PC) Singleton Perkins v. Pfeiffer, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-singleton-perkins-v-pfeiffer-caed-2021.