(PC) Singh v. Blizzard

Opinion

Raghvendra Singh, No. 2:23-cv-00024-KJM-DB Plaintiff, ORDER v. Thadd A. Blizzard, et al., 1S Defendants. Plaintiff Raghvendra Singh is proceeding in this action without an attorney. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21). In response to Singh’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the Magistrate Judge screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and issued findings and recommendations that the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. See generally F&Rs, ECF No. 3. Plaintiff objected to the findings and recommendations. See generally Objs., ECF No. 4. According to Singh’s complaint, the defendants are state court judges who presided over cases in which he was named as a defendant. See Compl. at 1-2, ECF No. 1. He alleges he never received copies of the complaints in these cases and could not defend his interests, and as a result, his properties were “taken away.” See id. The Magistrate Judge recommends dismissing these claims as barred by the Rooker—Feldman doctrine, which prohibits federal district courts from hearing de facto appeals from state court judgments. See F&Rs at 3-5, ECF No. 3; see also

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). That is, more precisely, “[i]f a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision, Rooker–Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court. If, on the other hand, a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker–Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). The Rooker–Feldman doctrine requires federal district courts to draw careful distinctions between the actions and omissions of adverse parties on the one hand and erroneous decisions by state courts on the other; plaintiffs can pursue federal claims about an adversary’s wrongdoing, but not a state court’s legal errors. See id. A “corollary” follows from this distinction: the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not bar a federal district court from hearing a plaintiff’s claim that he was the victim of an “extrinsic fraud.” See Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2004). An “extrinsic fraud” is “conduct which prevents a party from presenting his claim in court.” Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1140 (quoting Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1981)). “Extrinsic fraud on a court is, by definition, not an error by that court. It is, rather, a wrongful act committed by the party or parties who engaged in the fraud.” Id. at 1141. Some of Singh’s allegations appear to target the wrongs of his adversaries, not legal errors by the state court. He alleges, for example, that he never received service of the complaint and could not defend his interests even though “every party knew Singh [was] the real owner.” See Compl. at 1–2. This allegation suggests an extrinsic fraud on the state court. Cf., e.g., Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1143–44 (no advance notice of medical examination); Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1140 (last-minute declaration and refusals to submit to deposition). This court can hear those claims. Other allegations in his complaint suggest he is challenging the state court’s legal decisions. See, Compl. at 1 (alleging state courts lacked jurisdiction over properties in other counties); id. at 2 (alleging state court wrongly lowered the priority of an IRS lien). This court cannot hear those claims. They are forbidden de facto appeals. When a lawsuit “is, in part, a forbidden de facto appeal from a judicial decision of a state court,” the federal court “must refuse to hear the forbidden appeal.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158. “As part of that refusal, it must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.” Id. An issue is “inextricably intertwined” if, for example, it is “closely related” to the barred claims, Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1142, if it appears to be an attempted “end run” around the Rooker–Feldman bar, id., or if it is “contingent upon a finding that the state court decision was in error,” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012). Singh’s claim that he was never served and could not defend his interests are not related to his claims that the state court lacked jurisdiction or wrongly reduced the priority of an IRS lien. That claim is not barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The Magistrate Judge also recommends dismissing Singh’s complaint because the defendants are state court judges who enjoy judicial absolute immunity. See F&Rs at 5. The court agrees Singh cannot pursue claims against state court judges. See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per curiam) (collecting authority). “[T]he immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances. First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 11. The allegations in Singh’s complaint do not permit the court to infer that the defendant judges were not acting in a judicial capacity or were acting in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. He alleges they misinterpreted the law and issued orders beyond their authority. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 n.7 (1978) (“[I]f a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune.”). The court therefore adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss the complaint based on the defendants’ judicial absolute immunity. It is possible Singh could assert valid claims against different defendants if he is permitted to amend his complaint. The Court therefore declines to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss without leave to amend. The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. The Magistrate Judge recommends denying Singh’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis based on her conclusion that Singh could not pursue a viable claim. See F&Rs at 2, 6. For the reasons above, the court declines to adopt that recommendation. In conclusion, the court orders as follows: (1) The findings and recommendations (ECF No. 3) are adopted in part as explained above. (2) The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. Any amended complaint must be filed within thirty days. (3) This matter is referred back to the assigned Magistrate Judge for all further pretrial proceedings, including the pending motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), which remains pending. 1] IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: August 18, 2023. CHIEF ED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE