(PC) Sekona v. Perez

District Court, E.D. California·Decided July 29, 2025·No. 1:19-cv-00400·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ETUATE SEKONA Case No. 1:19-cv-00400-JLT-HBK

12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S CONSTRUED 13 v. MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER1 14 R. PEREZ, et al. (Doc. No. 100) 15 Defendants. CLERK TO PROVIDE PLAINTIFF WITH 16 COURTESY COPY OF DOCKET SHEET

17 FOURTEEN DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

This matter was reassigned to the undersigned on July 3, 2025. (Doc. No. 106). Pending 19 before the Court is Plaintiff’s pleading titled “Request Question the Status Schedules of This 20 Case” filed October 21, 2024. (Doc. No. 100, “Motion”). In his pleading, Plaintiff requests “an 21 emergency TRO” in addition to a status update on his case. (Id. at 2). On November 8, 2024, 22 Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO). 23 For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s request for a TRO be 24 denied and directs the Clerk to provide Plaintiff with a courtesy copy of the docket sheet. 25 //// 26 27

1 The undersigned submits these factual findings and recommendations to the District Court pursuant to 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff Etuate Sekona, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, initiated this civil rights action 3 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against multiple California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 4 (“CDCR”) officials. Following dismissal of certain defendants and claims, Plaintiff proceeds on 5 his Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), as screened, alleging Eighth Amendment failure-to- 6 protect claims against correctional officers Munoz and Sims in both their individual and official 7 capacities. (Doc. No. 39). 8 In his October 21, 2024 three-page motion, Plaintiff seeks a status update and emergency 9 TRO. (Doc. No. 100 at 1-2). Plaintiff states he needs an emergency TRO to protect “Due 10 Process” because “Defendants uses this threat to run away, to drops the law suit on them, to take 11 or effection [sic] their pay or retirement pay. Always their way.” (Id. at 2). Plaintiff alleges that 12 CDCR officials have hindered Plaintiff’s ability to prosecute his case—by obstructing service of 13 process and failing to provide case updates—it fails to seek any immediate injunctive relief 14 related to his surviving Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff complains that two Defendants have 15 either quit or retired and been dismissed because he was not able to effectuate service on them. It 16 is unclear whether Plaintiff is complaining about the fact that two other Defendants have quit or 17 retired or is seeking to enjoin the two remaining Defendants from changing jobs or retiring. 18 Defendants filed an opposition to the motion arguing that the motion for a TRO is procedurally 19 and legally deficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. (Doc. No. 101). 20 II. TRO APPLICABLE LAW 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs injunctions and restraining orders, and 22 requires that a motion for a temporary restraining order include “specific facts in an affidavit or a 23 verified complaint [that] clearly show that immediate, and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will 24 result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition,” as well as written 25 certification from the movant’s attorney stating “any efforts made to give notice and the reasons 26 why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). This court’s Local Rules also set forth 27 certain procedural mandates for a TRO to issue, including that the movant provide the following 1 affidavit to support the existence of irreparable harm; (5) an affidavit detailing the notice or 2 efforts undertaken or showing good cause why notice should not be given; (6) a proposed TRO 3 and provision for bond; and (7) a proposed order with blank for fixing time and date for a hearing. 4 Local Rule 231(c) (E.D. Cal. 2022). 5 Temporary restraining orders are governed by the same standard applicable to preliminary 6 injunctions, with the exception that preliminary injunctions require notice to the adverse party. 7 See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 181 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1126 8 (E.D. Ca. 2001); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a). Local Rule 231, however, requires notice for 9 temporary restraining orders as well, “[e]xcept in the most extraordinary of circumstances,” and 10 the court considers whether the applicant could have sought relief by motion for preliminary 11 injunction at an earlier date. L.R 231 (a)-(b) (E.D. Ca. 2019). A temporary restraining order 12 “should be restricted to serving [its] underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and 13 preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” 14 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 15 423, 439 (1974). 16 A temporary restraining order is “an extraordinary remedy” and may be issued only if 17 plaintiff establishes: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable harm in 18 the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his/her favor; (4) that an 19 injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 20 Plaintiff bears the burden of clearly satisfying all four prongs. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. 21 Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). A TRO will not issue if plaintiff merely shows 22 irreparable harm is possible – a showing of likelihood is required. Id. at 1131. 23 The injunctive relief an applicant requests must relate to the claims brought in the 24 complaint. See Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 25 2015) (“When a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief based on claims not pled in the complaint, the 26 court does not have the authority to issue an injunction.”). Absent a nexus between the injury 27 claimed in the motion and the underlying complaint, the court lacks the authority to grant plaintiff 1 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) imposes additional requirements on prisoner 2 litigants seeking preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials. In such cases, 3 “[p]reliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to 4 correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means 5 necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); Villery v. California Dep't of Corr., 6 2016 WL 70326, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2016). As the Ninth Circuit has observed, the PLRA 7 places significant limits upon a court’s power to grant preliminary injunctive relief to inmates, 8 and “operates simultaneously to restrict the equity jurisdiction of federal courts and to protect the 9 bargaining power of prison administrators—no longer may courts grant or approve relief that 10 binds prison administrators to do more than the constitutional minimum.” Gilmore v.

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