(PC) Sekona v. Custino

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedSeptember 10, 2020
Docket2:16-cv-00517
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Sekona v. Custino ((PC) Sekona v. Custino) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Sekona v. Custino, (E.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ETUATE SEKONA, No. 2:16-CV-0517-JAM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 F. CUSTINO, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings 19 (ECF No. 154). 20 / / / 21 / / / 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 This action proceeds on plaintiff’s first amended complaint. See ECF No. 55. 3 Following various dismissals, plaintiff’s sole surviving claim is an Eighth Amendment safety 4 claim against defendant Custino. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that on June 27, 2014, correctional 5 officer Custino ignored plaintiff’s safety concerns during a cell exchange. As a result, plaintiff 6 was moved to a cell with a fellow inmate which plaintiff claimed to be dangerous. After the 7 transfer, the fellow inmate allegedly attacked plaintiff while he was asleep. Plaintiff suffered lost 8 teeth and received brain damage. 9 On February 27, 2020, defendant submitted a motion for judgment on the 10 pleadings, arguing that plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See ECF No. 11 154. On March 23, 2020, plaintiff submitted an opposition to defendant’s motion. See ECF No. 12 158, 159. On March 25, 2020, defendant submitted a reply to plaintiff’s opposition. See ECF No. 13 160. On April 6, 2020, plaintiff submitted an unauthorized sur-reply to defendant’s reply. See 14 ECF No. 162. The Court now reviews defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. 15 16 II. STANDARD FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 17 "After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may 18 move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "Judgment on the pleadings is 19 properly granted when, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, there is no issue 20 of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 21 law." Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (brackets and internal 22 quotation marks omitted). Like a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion under Rule 23 12(c) challenges the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. See id. Indeed, 24 a Rule 12(c) motion is "functionally identical" to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and courts apply the 25 "same standard." Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 26 1989) (explaining that the "principal difference" between Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) "is the 27 timing of filing"); see also U.S. ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 28 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). 1 Judgment on the pleadings should thus be entered when a complaint does not plead 2 "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 3 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 4 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 5 misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is 6 not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 7 has acted unlawfully." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 8 12(c) motion, the Court "accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the 9 pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & 10 Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 11 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 Defendant argues that plaintiff’s claims should be barred because plaintiff has 14 raised his 2014 claims of failure to protect against defendant Custino in a different lawsuit, and 15 the claims were screened out. The Court disagrees with defendant’s argument. 16 Two related doctrines of preclusion are grouped under the term “res judicata.” See 17 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171 (2008). One of these doctrines – claim 18 preclusion – forecloses “successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation 19 of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit.” Id. Stated another way, “[c]laim 20 preclusion. . . bars any subsequent suit on claims that were raised or could have been raised in a 21 prior action.” Cell Therapeutics, Inc. v. Lash Group, Inc., 586 F.3d 1204, 1212 (9th Cir. 2009). 22 “Newly articulated claims based on the same nucleus of facts are also subject to a res judicata 23 finding if the claims could have been brought in the earlier action.” Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 24 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, claim preclusion prevents a plaintiff from later presenting 25 any legal theories arising from the “same transactional nucleus of facts.” Hells Canyon 26 Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 403 F.3d 683, 686 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005). 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 The party seeking to apply claim preclusion bears the burden of establishing the 2 following: (1) an identity of claims; (2) the existence of a final judgment on the merits; and (3) 3 identity or privity of the parties. See Cell Therapeutics, 586 F.3d at 1212; see also Headwaters, 4 Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 399 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005). Determining whether there is an 5 identity of claims involves consideration of four factors: (1) whether the two suits arise out of the 6 same transactional nucleus of facts; (2) whether rights or interests established in the prior 7 judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (3) whether the 8 two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether substantially the same evidence 9 is presented in the two actions. See ProShipLine, Inc. v. Aspen Infrastructure Ltd., 609 F.3d 960, 10 968 (9th Cir. 2010). Reliance on the first factor is especially appropriate because the factor is 11 “outcome determinative.” Id. (quoting Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 12 (9th Cir. 2005)). As to privity of the parties, “privity . . . [arises] from a limited number of legal 13 relationships in which two parties have identical or transferred rights with respect to a particular 14 legal interest.” Headwaters, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005). 15 Here, defendant argues that plaintiff has previously raised his 2014 claims of 16 failure to protect against defendant Custino in different lawsuits. Specially, defendant states:

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