(PC) Scott v. Garcia

Opinion

ANDRE RENEE SCOTT, Case No. 1:20-cv-00317 JLT HBK (PC) Plaintiff, ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN FULL, v. GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING CHARLES EDWARDS and T. YOUNG, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DIRECTING CLERK OF Defendants. COURT TO CLOSE THE CASE (Docs. 37, 46, 64) Andre Renee Scott asserts Charles Edwards and T. Young—who provide dental care at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility—were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs related to his number 9 tooth, in violation of his rights arising under the Eighth Amendment. (See generally Doc. 28.) The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docs. 37, 46.). The magistrate judge noted Defendants submitted Plaintiff’s CDCR dental records, which were authenticated by B. Archibald, the Chief Dentist for Policy and Risk Management at CCHCS. (Doc. 64 at 2.) In addition, the magistrate judge observed that “Defendants Young and Edwards could likewise authenticate the documents attached to their declarations based on their personal knowledge from treating Plaintiff and reviewing his records in response to his health care grievances.” (Id. at 2-3.) Therefore, the magistrate judge accepted the submitted evidence “as true and correct copies of the documents as represented in each of the sworn declarations.” (Id. at 3.) The magistrate judge observed the evidence showed “[a] root canal of Plaintiff’s tooth #9 was unsuccessfully attempted in 2007 while he was incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison, and resulted in a separated instrument, an endodontic file, being retained in Plaintiff’s tooth.” (Doc. 64 at 10, citing Doc. 37 at 2-3, ¶¶ 4, 5, 7.) The magistrate judge also found treatment records dated October 18, 2007 indicated that “Dr. Garcia of Kern Valley State Prison stated the canal was calcified and the tip of an endodontic file was broken in Scott’s tooth.” (Id. at 11, citing Doc. 37-3 at 3, ¶ 7.) Two months later, Dr. Garcia indicated that she “stored the endodontic access and the “situation [was] explained to” Plaintiff.” (Id.) To the extent Plaintiff sought to state a claim based upon the failed root canal, the magistrate judge found “Plaintiff’s claim as to the broken file tip is time barred” under the applicable statute of limitations. (Doc. 64 at 14.) The magistrate judge noted Defendants acknowledged the “dental issues constituted a serious medical issue.” (Doc. 65 at 14, quoting Doc. 37 at 10.) However, the magistrate judge found “Plaintiff does not meet the second prong of medical deliberate indifference—failure to respond to a prisoner’s serious medical need—as to either Defendant.” (Id. at 15.) The magistrate judge found Edwards and Young “did not fail to properly examine, counsel, or propose reasonable treatment for Plaintiff’s dental needs.” (Id. at 17; see also id. at 15.) Rather, the magistrate judge noted “the unrefuted opinions of multiple dentists is that the proposed extraction of tooth #9”—which Young recommended and Plaintiff declined—“was medically appropriate to prevent further infection of Plaintiff’s gums and avoid other serious consequences.” (Id.) To the extent Plaintiff premised his claim upon “failure to refer him to an outside medical provider,” the magistrate judge found this also fails, because “[a] prison inmate has no independent constitutional right to outside medical care beyond that provided by the prison staff.” (Doc. 65 at 16.) The magistrate judge explained:

Only if the prison’s medical staff is not competent to examine, diagnose, and treat an inmate’s medical problems must they “refer [the inmate] to others who can.” Stocker v. Nevada, 2024 WL 4112299, at *8 (D. Nev. Aug. 12, 2024) (internal citations omitted). Here, the undisputed facts show that Defendants Young and Edwards were both competent to diagnose and treat Plaintiff’s apical infection, thus Plaintiff had no constitutional right to be referred to an outside medical specialist. (Id., modification in original.) Further, the magistrate judge found that “Plaintiff’s allegations amount at most to a difference of medical opinion.” (Id. at 15; see also id. at 15-17.) The magistrate judge found: “Ultimately, the undisputed facts establish that Plaintiff’s refusal to accept reasonable medical treatment, rather than any deliberate indifference…, was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injury.” (Id. at 16.) Finally, the magistrate judge found “the Court need not address the issue of qualified immunity,” because Plaintiff did not show either Defendant violated his constitutional rights. (Doc. 64 at 18.) Nevertheless, assuming Plaintiff established a constitutional violation, the magistrate judge found “Plaintiff has not shown the existence of binding authority or a robust consensus of persuasive authority holding that a dentist in a correctional setting is required to refer a Plaintiff for outside medical care when reasonable care is available within the institution.” (Id.) Therefore, the magistrate judge found “under the undisputed facts in this case Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s claim that he should have been referred to an outside dental specialist.” (Id. at 19.) The magistrate judge recommended the Court grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, deny Plaintiff’s motion, and enter judgment in favor of Defendants. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff filed timely objections to the Findings and Recommendations. (Doc. 69.) However, Plaintiff’s objections do not meaningfully respond to the specific findings of the magistrate judge. Plaintiff simply reiterates his belief that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by “depriving him access to treatment,” without acknowledging the undisputed medical records showing the treatment offered, recommendations Defendants made, and Plaintiff’s own refusals. (See id. at 5-6.) Although Plaintiff maintains he had a right to outside treatment (id. at 6), this also is contrary to well-established law. See Roberts v. Spalding, 783 F.2d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Amarir v. Hill, 243 Fed. Appx. 353, 354 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding a physician’s denial of the plaintiff’s “request to see an outside specialist… did not amount to deliberate indifference” because “[a] prison inmate has no independent constitutional right to outside medical care supplemental or additional to the medical care provided by the prison staff within the institution”). Finally, to the extent Plaintiff maintains Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity (see id. 5-6, 8-9), the Court need not address the issue because Plaintiff did not show a violation of his constitutional rights. See Saycuer v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (fa constitutional right is not established, “there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity”); Fouts v. County of Clark, 76 Fed. Appx. 825 (9th Cir. 2003 (the court “need not reach the issue whether the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because there has been no violation of a constitutional right”). According to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the Court performed a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, including Plaintiff's objections, the Court finds the Findings and Recommendation to be supported by the record and by proper analysis. Thus, the Court ORDERS: 1. The Findings and Recommendations dated November 20, 2024 (Doc. 64), are ADOPTED in full. 2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 37) is GRANTED. 3. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 46) is DENIED. 4. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants Young and Edwards, and against Plaintiff Andre Renee Scott, and to close this case. Dated: _Mareh 10, 2025 Charis [Tourn TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE