1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 BENITO JOSE SARAGOZA, Case No. 1:23-cv-00355-BAM (PC) 7 Plaintiff, ORDER DISCHARGING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY ACTION SHOULD NOT BE 8 v. DISMISSED AS BARRED BY THE 9 JOHN DOE NO. 1, et al., STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (ECF No. 11) 10 Defendants. SCREENING ORDER GRANTING 11 PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY COURT OF 12 WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED ON 13 COGNIZABLE CLAIMS (ECF No. 1) 14 THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE 15 16 17 Plaintiff Benito Jose Saragoza (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 18 forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 19 I. Order to Show Cause Regarding Statute of Limitations 20 On May 23, 2023, the Court issued an order for Plaintiff to show cause why this action 21 should not be dismissed, without prejudice, as barred by the statute of limitations. (ECF No. 11.) 22 Following an extension of time, Plaintiff filed a response to the order to show cause on June 23, 23 2023.1 (ECF No. 12.) 24 In his response, Plaintiff argues that he was within the statute of limitations for filing this 25 case because he was deemed insane and admitted to the state hospital for a mental illness, during 26 1 The Court notes that the response references Case No. 1:23-cv-00496-CDB (PC), which is a 27 different case Plaintiff filed with this Court, Saragoza v. Doe, which may be duplicative of the instant action. Plaintiff is advised that he should include the correct case number on all of his 28 filings to ensure they are filed in the correct action. 1 that situation and until the present. (ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff alleges that for the last few years he 2 has been in and out of various mental hospitals, was deemed insane, was under a court order to be 3 on medication for schizophrenia, was on the streets, and was also in different jails for different 4 criminal charges and violations. During the time of the incident at issue in the complaint, which 5 he believes was on May 21, 2014 and May 22, 2014, he was going through so much, was 6 threatened with harm if he reported anything, and didn’t know how to read or write. (Id.) 7 Based on a review of Plaintiff’s response to the order to show cause and the allegations 8 therein, the Court finds that Plaintiff provides a plausible basis to assert that he may be entitled to 9 equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 10 With respect to mental incapacity, California law specifies that equitable tolling may be 11 appropriate during the time the party “lacked the legal capacity to make decisions.” Cal. Code 12 Civ. Proc. § 352(a). The fact that a plaintiff was mentally impaired is not, by itself, sufficient to 13 warrant tolling. Lang v. Sacramento Sheriff Dep’t, No. 2:14-cv-0777 EFB P, 2017 WL 1093838, 14 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2017). Rather, the provision only applies where the individual is 15 “incapable of caring for [his] property or transacting business or understanding the nature or 16 effects of [his] acts.” Estate of Stern v. Tuscan Retreat, Inc., 725 F. App’x 518, 521 (9th Cir. 17 2018) (citation omitted). This lack of legal capacity must have been present at the time the 18 plaintiff’s claim accrued. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 354(a). “A claim accrues when the plaintiff 19 knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” TwoRivers v. Lewis, 20 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). 21 Equitable tolling is typically a “fact-intensive” inquiry that “is more appropriately 22 [considered] at the summary judgment or trial stage of litigation.” Cervantes v. City of San 23 Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Therefore, at this time the Court 24 finds that Plaintiff has presented allegations which, if proved, could establish that he is entitled to 25 equitable tolling and that this claim is not barred by the statute of limitations.2 Accordingly, the 26 order to show cause is discharged, and Plaintiff’s complaint is before the Court for screening. 27 2 This does not preclude the filing of a later motion for summary judgment on the ground that 28 Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 1 II. Screening Requirement and Standard 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 3 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 5 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 6 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 7 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 8 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 9 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 10 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 11 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 12 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 13 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 14 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 15 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 16 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 17 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 18 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 19 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 20 III. Plaintiff’s Allegations 21 Plaintiff is currently housed at California State Prison, Los Angeles, California. Plaintiff 22 alleges the events in this action arose while Plaintiff was housed at California State Prison in 23 Corcoran, California (“Corcoran”). Plaintiff names as defendants: (1) Correctional Officer John 24 Doe #1; (2) Correctional Officer John Doe #2; (3) Correctional Officer Jane Doe #3; 25 (4) Correctional Sergeant John Doe #4; and (5) Correctional Sergeant John Doe #5. 26 Plaintiff alleges that each John Doe was “unprofessional, willing to wrong, 27 disrespectfully, hatred.” Plaintiff alleges that in “the year of 2014,” three unknown officers came 28 to his cell and told Plaintiff that Plaintiff was moving. He was told to get naked so Plaintiff could 1 be searched, and Plaintiff refused. The officer said he would make Plaintiff, so Plaintiff 2 complied. The officers were Mexican, two males and one female. When they got to the cell, the 3 female officer slammed the door and said “this our politick bitch.” In the cell, a cellie was in the 4 dark.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 BENITO JOSE SARAGOZA, Case No. 1:23-cv-00355-BAM (PC) 7 Plaintiff, ORDER DISCHARGING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY ACTION SHOULD NOT BE 8 v. DISMISSED AS BARRED BY THE 9 JOHN DOE NO. 1, et al., STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (ECF No. 11) 10 Defendants. SCREENING ORDER GRANTING 11 PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY COURT OF 12 WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED ON 13 COGNIZABLE CLAIMS (ECF No. 1) 14 THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE 15 16 17 Plaintiff Benito Jose Saragoza (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 18 forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 19 I. Order to Show Cause Regarding Statute of Limitations 20 On May 23, 2023, the Court issued an order for Plaintiff to show cause why this action 21 should not be dismissed, without prejudice, as barred by the statute of limitations. (ECF No. 11.) 22 Following an extension of time, Plaintiff filed a response to the order to show cause on June 23, 23 2023.1 (ECF No. 12.) 24 In his response, Plaintiff argues that he was within the statute of limitations for filing this 25 case because he was deemed insane and admitted to the state hospital for a mental illness, during 26 1 The Court notes that the response references Case No. 1:23-cv-00496-CDB (PC), which is a 27 different case Plaintiff filed with this Court, Saragoza v. Doe, which may be duplicative of the instant action. Plaintiff is advised that he should include the correct case number on all of his 28 filings to ensure they are filed in the correct action. 1 that situation and until the present. (ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff alleges that for the last few years he 2 has been in and out of various mental hospitals, was deemed insane, was under a court order to be 3 on medication for schizophrenia, was on the streets, and was also in different jails for different 4 criminal charges and violations. During the time of the incident at issue in the complaint, which 5 he believes was on May 21, 2014 and May 22, 2014, he was going through so much, was 6 threatened with harm if he reported anything, and didn’t know how to read or write. (Id.) 7 Based on a review of Plaintiff’s response to the order to show cause and the allegations 8 therein, the Court finds that Plaintiff provides a plausible basis to assert that he may be entitled to 9 equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 10 With respect to mental incapacity, California law specifies that equitable tolling may be 11 appropriate during the time the party “lacked the legal capacity to make decisions.” Cal. Code 12 Civ. Proc. § 352(a). The fact that a plaintiff was mentally impaired is not, by itself, sufficient to 13 warrant tolling. Lang v. Sacramento Sheriff Dep’t, No. 2:14-cv-0777 EFB P, 2017 WL 1093838, 14 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2017). Rather, the provision only applies where the individual is 15 “incapable of caring for [his] property or transacting business or understanding the nature or 16 effects of [his] acts.” Estate of Stern v. Tuscan Retreat, Inc., 725 F. App’x 518, 521 (9th Cir. 17 2018) (citation omitted). This lack of legal capacity must have been present at the time the 18 plaintiff’s claim accrued. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 354(a). “A claim accrues when the plaintiff 19 knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” TwoRivers v. Lewis, 20 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). 21 Equitable tolling is typically a “fact-intensive” inquiry that “is more appropriately 22 [considered] at the summary judgment or trial stage of litigation.” Cervantes v. City of San 23 Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Therefore, at this time the Court 24 finds that Plaintiff has presented allegations which, if proved, could establish that he is entitled to 25 equitable tolling and that this claim is not barred by the statute of limitations.2 Accordingly, the 26 order to show cause is discharged, and Plaintiff’s complaint is before the Court for screening. 27 2 This does not preclude the filing of a later motion for summary judgment on the ground that 28 Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 1 II. Screening Requirement and Standard 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 3 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 5 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 6 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 7 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 8 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 9 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 10 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 11 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 12 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 13 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 14 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 15 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 16 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 17 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 18 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 19 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 20 III. Plaintiff’s Allegations 21 Plaintiff is currently housed at California State Prison, Los Angeles, California. Plaintiff 22 alleges the events in this action arose while Plaintiff was housed at California State Prison in 23 Corcoran, California (“Corcoran”). Plaintiff names as defendants: (1) Correctional Officer John 24 Doe #1; (2) Correctional Officer John Doe #2; (3) Correctional Officer Jane Doe #3; 25 (4) Correctional Sergeant John Doe #4; and (5) Correctional Sergeant John Doe #5. 26 Plaintiff alleges that each John Doe was “unprofessional, willing to wrong, 27 disrespectfully, hatred.” Plaintiff alleges that in “the year of 2014,” three unknown officers came 28 to his cell and told Plaintiff that Plaintiff was moving. He was told to get naked so Plaintiff could 1 be searched, and Plaintiff refused. The officer said he would make Plaintiff, so Plaintiff 2 complied. The officers were Mexican, two males and one female. When they got to the cell, the 3 female officer slammed the door and said “this our politick bitch.” In the cell, a cellie was in the 4 dark. The cellie got mad, said he was single celled and told Plaintiff to get out of my cell. The 5 cellie slapped Plaintiff in the back of his head. The next day, the cellie grabbed Plaintiff’s penis 6 and the cellie beat Plaintiff badly. 7 John Doe #1 asked Plaintiff get naked to search Plaintiff “knowing [Plaintiff] would be 8 assaulted.” John Doe #1 said he would force the search. John Doe #2 and Jane Doe #3 allowed 9 the first officer to search Plaintiff “with the knowledge of assault.” Sergeant John Doe #4 10 approved the move. Jane Doe #3 stated “this our politick bitch.” Inmate Robison assaulted 11 Plaintiff on day one and day two. John Does #1 and #2 allowed the assault and PREA violation. 12 The day it happened, Sergeant John Doe #5 never sent Plaintiff to ASU or started PREA 13 investigation. Plaintiff went to the nurse and alleged PREA and they knew already. 14 Plaintiff suffered pain and injury and mental distress. Plaintiff seeks $70,000 for physical 15 and mental pain. Plaintiff alleges that he continues to suffer pain in his back, neck, and pain; 16 something is sticking from his neck; his spine is not straight; he suffers from mental stress and 17 emotional distress; he has dreams about being raped; and he has been feeling not right. Plaintiff 18 believes he was not treated as a person who was raped, and the investigation was not completely 19 done. 20 IV. Discussion 21 A. Supervisory Liability 22 Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to sue Defendants Correctional Sergeants John Doe #4 23 and #5 based on their supervisory roles, he may not do so. Liability may not be imposed on 24 supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of 25 respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 26 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir.2009); Jones v. 27 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 28 /// 1 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or 2 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 3 Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 4 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal 5 participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a 6 repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” 7 Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations 8 marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970). 9 Plaintiff states only that John Doe #4 approved the move, and John Doe #5 did not send 10 Plaintiff to ASU or start a PREA investigation. However, Plaintiff does not allege that John Doe 11 #4 had knowledge that the move place Plaintiff in any danger, or that John Doe #5 knew that 12 Plaintiff had been assaulted or raped by his cellmate after the move. Plaintiff has failed to 13 establish that either defendant participated in or directed any constitutional violation or that he 14 implemented a policy so deficient that it was the moving force of any constitutional violation. 15 B. Eighth Amendment – Failure to Protect 16 The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 17 from inhumane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Morgan v. 18 Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, no matter where they are housed, prison 19 officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, 20 sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 21 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted). To establish a violation of the Eighth 22 Amendment, the prisoner must “show that the officials acted with deliberate indifference . . .” 23 Labatad v. Corrs. Corp. of Amer., 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Gibson v. Cty. of 24 Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002)). 25 Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to protect prisoners from 26 violence at the hands of other prisoners or others because being violently assaulted in prison is 27 simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society. 28 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833; Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir.2009); Hearns v. 1 Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). However, prison officials are liable under the 2 Eighth Amendment only if they demonstrate deliberate indifference to conditions posing a 3 substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate; and it is well settled that deliberate indifference 4 occurs when an official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious 5 harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 841; Clem, 566 F.3d at 1181; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040. 6 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants John Doe #1 and #2 and Jane Doe #3 all had knowledge 7 that he would be assaulted by his new cellmate. At the pleading stage, Plaintiff states a 8 cognizable claim for failure to protect against these defendants. 9 C. Doe Defendants 10 Plaintiff names only Doe defendants. “As a general rule, the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify 11 a defendant is not favored.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff is 12 advised that John Doe or Jane Doe defendants (i.e., unknown defendants) cannot be served by the 13 United States Marshal until Plaintiff has identified them as actual individuals and amended his 14 complaint to substitute names for John Doe or Jane Doe. 15 V. Conclusion and Order 16 Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable claim 17 against Defendants John Doe #1, John Doe #2, and Jane Doe #3 for failure to protect in violation 18 of the Eighth Amendment. However, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any other cognizable 19 claims for relief against any other defendant. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his 20 complaint to cure the identified deficiencies to the extent he is able to do so in good faith. Lopez 21 v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 22 If Plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and he is agreeable to proceeding 23 only on the cognizable claims identified by the Court, he may file a notice informing the Court 24 that he does not intend to amend, and he is willing to proceed only on his cognizable claims. The 25 Court will then recommend that the remaining claims be dismissed from this action, and then 26 initiate the process for service of the complaint. 27 If Plaintiff wishes to file an amended complaint, any such amended complaint should be 28 brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what each named defendant did that led to the 1 deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. Although accepted as 2 true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative 3 level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 4 Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated 5 claims in his first amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no 6 “buckshot” complaints). 7 Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 8 Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended 9 complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” 10 Local Rule 220. 11 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 12 1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form; 13 2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either: 14 a. File a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in 15 this order; or 16 b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file a first amended complaint 17 and he is willing to proceed only on his claims against Defendants John Doe #1, 18 John Doe #2, and Jane Doe #3 for failure to protect in violation of the Eighth 19 Amendment; and 20 3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will recommend dismissal of 21 this action, without prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and for failure to 22 prosecute. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24
25 Dated: June 28, 2023 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26
27 28