(PC) Sanchez v. Deochoa

District Court, E.D. California·Decided November 15, 2024·No. 1:19-cv-00354·Unknown

Opinion

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6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PEDRO SANCHEZ, Case No. 1:19-cv-00354-KES-HBK (PC)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S CONSTRUED MOTION TO ALTER OR 13 v. AMEND A JUDGMENT

14 ROY DEOCHOA, (Doc. No. 70)

15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff’s construed motion to alter or amend the 19 Court’s November 8, 2024 Order granting Defendant’s continued Motion to Stay this case 20 pending resolution of Plaintiff’s parallel criminal proceeding. (Doc. No. 70). Plaintiff contends 21 that his right to due process and speedy trial are being violated by the continued stay of his civil 22 action against Defendant, and that the stay “is based on a speculative and otherwise fictitious so 23 called Heck issue.” (Id. at 1-2). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s 24 construed Motion. 25 BACKGROUND 26 Plaintiff proceeds on his Eighth Amendment excessive use of force claim against 27 Defendant Roy Deochoa. (Doc. Nos. 1, 6, 10). Plaintiff is facing a criminal trial in relation to the 28 same facts giving rise to the instant § 1983 Complaint. (See Doc. No. 61 at 1). Thus, Defendant 1 has repeatedly requested to stay the action because a disposition of the criminal matter may moot 2 this civil action, requests which this Court has granted. (See Doc. Nos. 24, 31, 43, 45, 47 50, 57, 3 59, 66). Most recently, on March 12, 2024, the Court extended the stay until further order, and 4 directed Defendant to file a status report no later than November 15, 2024. (See Doc. No. 66). 5 On November 8, 2024, Defendant filed a status report indicating that on November 1, 2024, 6 Tulare County Superior Court continued the pretrial conference in Plaintiff’s criminal matter until 7 January 10, 2025. (Doc. No. 68 at 2). Defendant notes that the parallel criminal proceeding is 8 trailing another criminal matter against Plaintiff, and estimates that trial on Plaintiff’s criminal 9 matters is likely to occur in August 2025. (Id.). The Court accordingly granted Defendant’s 10 construed Motion to continue the stay until further order and directed Defendant to file a status 11 report no later than June 29, 2025. (Doc. No. 69). 12 On November 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to a further stay, asserting that 13 Defendant’s request is based on a false legal premise and that no further extension of the stay is 14 warranted. (See generally Doc. No. 70). Plaintiff contends that he is being prejudiced by the 15 extensive delays, including “dim[m]ing of memories or loss of evidence.” (Id. at 1). He also 16 contends “[t]here is no general constitutional, statutory, or common law prohibition against the 17 prosecution of parallel criminal and civil action [sic] even when such actions proceed 18 simultaneously.” (Id.) (citing S.E.C. vs. First Financial Group of Texas, Inc., 659 F.2d 660, 666- 19 67 (5th Cir. 1981). Because Plaintiff’s opposition was filed after the Court granted Defendant’s 20 construed Motion to Stay, but within 28 days of the order granting the motion, the Court 21 construes Plaintiff’s filing as a Motion to Alter Amend a Judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the 22 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend a 23 judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment”). 24 APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS 25 A. Legal Standard 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) permits a party to move a court to alter or amend its 27 judgment. “A district court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion if it ‘is presented with newly 28 discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling 1 law.’” Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) 2 (quoting McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)) (emphasis in 3 original). Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 4 finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 5 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Ultimately, whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is in 6 the “sound discretion” of the district court. Navajo Nation v. Norris, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th 7 Cir. 2003) (citing Kona, 229 F.3d at 883). A Rule 59(e) motion “may not be used to relitigate old 8 matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of 9 judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n. 5 (2008) (internal quotation marks 10 omitted). 11 Here, Plaintiff does not present any new evidence, an intervening change in the law, nor 12 set forth any facts or argument from which the Court can infer that it committed clear error in 13 granting Defendant’s continued motion to stay. The arguments Plaintiff asserts are largely those 14 the Court has previously considered and rejected in addressing prior motions to stay. (See 15 generally Doc. Nos. 41, 51, 63). 16 As the Court previously noted, it is “common practice” when the plaintiff in a civil suit 17 implying the invalidity of an anticipated future action “to stay the civil action until the criminal 18 case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007); 19 see also Jones v. Whisenand, 8 Cal. App. 5th 543, 559 (2017) (citing Wallace and finding stay of 20 civil action warranted pending resolution of related criminal case). Whether a stay is prudent 21 requires the court to balance whether “the [criminal] defendant’s fifth amendment rights are 22 implicated” and whether the interest of the civil plaintiff, the public, and the court favor a stay. 23 Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 902–03 (9th Cir. 1989). This interest is 24 calculated by examining the “particular circumstances and competing interests involved in the 25 case.” Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal 26 quotations omitted). 27 Plaintiff is correct that there is no prohibition on civil and criminal prosecutions 28 proceeding simultaneously. Plaintiff cites for support First Financial Group of Texas, LLC, 1 which involved parallel civil and criminal enforcement actions against the same corporate 2 defendant. In that case, the court held that “simultaneous prosecution of separate civil and 3 criminal actions by different federal agencies against the same defendant involving the same 4 transactions” was permissible, inter alia, because of the important public interests to be 5 vindicated by public agencies in each of the prosecutions. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. First Fin. 6 Grp. of Texas, Inc., 659 F.2d 660, 666 (5th Cir. 1981).