1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AUGUSTIN SALAZAR, Case No. 1:24-cv-00167-HBK (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN TO DISTRICT JUDGE 13 v. 14 FRESNO COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, F DI IN SD MI IN SSG S A A CTN ID O NR E WC IO TM HOM UE TN D PRA ET JI UO DN IS C T EO 1 15 Defendants. 14-DAY DEADLINE 16
17 18 Plaintiff Augustin Salazar is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 19 this civil rights action. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the 20 District Court dismiss this action without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court 21 order and prosecute this action. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 24 (Doc. No. 1, “Complaint”). On March 20, 2024, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A the Court issued 25 a screening order finding the Complaint failed to state a federal claim against any Defendant. 26 (See generally Doc. No. 8). The Court afforded Plaintiff three options to exercise no later than 27 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 28 (E.D. Cal. 2023). 1 April 22, 2024: (1) file an amended complaint; (2) file a notice that he intends to stand on his 2 Complaint subject to the undersigned recommending the district court dismiss for reasons stated 3 in the March 20, 2024 Screening Order; or (3) file a notice to voluntarily dismiss this action, 4 without prejudice, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) because no defendant had yet 5 been served. (Id. at 5-6). Plaintiff was required to deliver his response to the Court’s Screening 6 Order to correctional officials for mailing no later than April 22, 2024. (Id. at 6 ¶ 1). 7 The Court expressly warned Plaintiff that if he “fails to timely respond to this Court Order 8 or seek an extension of time to comply” the undersigned “will recommend that the district court 9 dismiss this case as a sanction for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order and prosecute 10 this action.” (Id. at 7 ¶ 2). As of the date of this of these Findings and Recommendations, 11 Plaintiff has failed to submit a response to the Court’s March 20, 2024 Screening Order, or 12 request a further extension of time to comply, and the time to do so has expired. (See docket.)2 13 APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS 14 A. Legal Standard 15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the court to involuntarily dismiss an action 16 when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with other Rules or with a court 17 order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 889 18 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Similarly, this Court’s Local Rules, which correspond with 19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, provide, “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with . . . 20 any order of the Court may be grounds for the imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions 21 . . . within the inherent power of the Court.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 110. “District courts have inherent 22 power to control their dockets” and, in exercising that power, may impose sanctions, including 23 dismissal of an action. Thompson v. Housing Auth., City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th 24 Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, obey 25 a court order, or comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 26 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order to amend a complaint); Malone 27
28 2 The undersigned afforded eight days for mailing before issuing these Findings and Recommendations. 1 v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with 2 a court order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for failure 3 to prosecute and to comply with local rules). In determining whether to dismiss an action, the 4 Court must consider the following factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 5 litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; 6 (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less 7 drastic sanctions. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423; Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 8 1988). 9 B. Analysis 10 After considering each of the above-stated factors, the undersigned concludes dismissal 11 without prejudice is warranted in this case. As to the first factor, the expeditious resolution of 12 litigation is deemed to be in the public interest, satisfying the first factor. Yourish v. California 13 Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1999). 14 Turning to the second factor, this Court’s need to efficiently manage its docket cannot be 15 overstated. This Court has “one of the heaviest caseloads in the nation,” and due to the delay in 16 filling judicial vacancies, which was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, operates 17 under a declared judicial emergency. See Amended Standing Order in Light of Ongoing Judicial 18 Emergency in the Eastern District of California. This Court’s time is better spent on its other 19 matters than needlessly consumed managing a case with a recalcitrant litigant. The Court cannot 20 effectively manage its docket when a litigant ceases to litigate his/her case or respond to a court 21 order. Thus, the Court finds that the second factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 22 Delays inevitably have the inherent risk that evidence will become stale or witnesses’ 23 memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a defendant, thereby satisfying the third 24 factor. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Thus, the third factor—risk of prejudice 25 to defendant—weighs in favor of dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the 26 unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 27 1976). Because Plaintiff’s inaction amounts to an unreasonable delay in prosecuting this action, 28 the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 1 The fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors the 2 disposition of cases on the merits. Pagtalunan v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AUGUSTIN SALAZAR, Case No. 1:24-cv-00167-HBK (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN TO DISTRICT JUDGE 13 v. 14 FRESNO COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, F DI IN SD MI IN SSG S A A CTN ID O NR E WC IO TM HOM UE TN D PRA ET JI UO DN IS C T EO 1 15 Defendants. 14-DAY DEADLINE 16
17 18 Plaintiff Augustin Salazar is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 19 this civil rights action. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the 20 District Court dismiss this action without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court 21 order and prosecute this action. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 24 (Doc. No. 1, “Complaint”). On March 20, 2024, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A the Court issued 25 a screening order finding the Complaint failed to state a federal claim against any Defendant. 26 (See generally Doc. No. 8). The Court afforded Plaintiff three options to exercise no later than 27 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 28 (E.D. Cal. 2023). 1 April 22, 2024: (1) file an amended complaint; (2) file a notice that he intends to stand on his 2 Complaint subject to the undersigned recommending the district court dismiss for reasons stated 3 in the March 20, 2024 Screening Order; or (3) file a notice to voluntarily dismiss this action, 4 without prejudice, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) because no defendant had yet 5 been served. (Id. at 5-6). Plaintiff was required to deliver his response to the Court’s Screening 6 Order to correctional officials for mailing no later than April 22, 2024. (Id. at 6 ¶ 1). 7 The Court expressly warned Plaintiff that if he “fails to timely respond to this Court Order 8 or seek an extension of time to comply” the undersigned “will recommend that the district court 9 dismiss this case as a sanction for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order and prosecute 10 this action.” (Id. at 7 ¶ 2). As of the date of this of these Findings and Recommendations, 11 Plaintiff has failed to submit a response to the Court’s March 20, 2024 Screening Order, or 12 request a further extension of time to comply, and the time to do so has expired. (See docket.)2 13 APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS 14 A. Legal Standard 15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the court to involuntarily dismiss an action 16 when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with other Rules or with a court 17 order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 889 18 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Similarly, this Court’s Local Rules, which correspond with 19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, provide, “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with . . . 20 any order of the Court may be grounds for the imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions 21 . . . within the inherent power of the Court.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 110. “District courts have inherent 22 power to control their dockets” and, in exercising that power, may impose sanctions, including 23 dismissal of an action. Thompson v. Housing Auth., City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th 24 Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, obey 25 a court order, or comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 26 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order to amend a complaint); Malone 27
28 2 The undersigned afforded eight days for mailing before issuing these Findings and Recommendations. 1 v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with 2 a court order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for failure 3 to prosecute and to comply with local rules). In determining whether to dismiss an action, the 4 Court must consider the following factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 5 litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; 6 (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less 7 drastic sanctions. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423; Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 8 1988). 9 B. Analysis 10 After considering each of the above-stated factors, the undersigned concludes dismissal 11 without prejudice is warranted in this case. As to the first factor, the expeditious resolution of 12 litigation is deemed to be in the public interest, satisfying the first factor. Yourish v. California 13 Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1999). 14 Turning to the second factor, this Court’s need to efficiently manage its docket cannot be 15 overstated. This Court has “one of the heaviest caseloads in the nation,” and due to the delay in 16 filling judicial vacancies, which was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, operates 17 under a declared judicial emergency. See Amended Standing Order in Light of Ongoing Judicial 18 Emergency in the Eastern District of California. This Court’s time is better spent on its other 19 matters than needlessly consumed managing a case with a recalcitrant litigant. The Court cannot 20 effectively manage its docket when a litigant ceases to litigate his/her case or respond to a court 21 order. Thus, the Court finds that the second factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 22 Delays inevitably have the inherent risk that evidence will become stale or witnesses’ 23 memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a defendant, thereby satisfying the third 24 factor. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Thus, the third factor—risk of prejudice 25 to defendant—weighs in favor of dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the 26 unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 27 1976). Because Plaintiff’s inaction amounts to an unreasonable delay in prosecuting this action, 28 the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 1 The fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors the 2 disposition of cases on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). 3 However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case 4 toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction,” which is 5 the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 6 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Indeed, “trial courts do not have time to waste on 7 multiple failures by aspiring litigants to follow the rules and requirements of our courts.” 8 Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 644 (Trott, J., concurring in affirmance of district court’s involuntary 9 dismissal with prejudice of habeas petition where petitioner failed to timely respond to court 10 order and noting “the weight of the docket-managing factor depends upon the size and load of the 11 docket, and those in the best position to know what that is are our beleaguered trial judges.”). 12 Further, as set forth in the Screening Order, the Court already determined that the Complaint, as 13 pled, failed to state a claim, so this factor does not weigh in favor of the Plaintiff. 14 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in 15 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 16 Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s March 20, 2024 Order 17 expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to respond to the Court’s Order would result in a 18 recommendation of dismissal of this action. (Doc. No. 8 at 7 ¶ 2). Thus, Plaintiff had adequate 19 warning that dismissal could result from his noncompliance. And the instant dismissal is a 20 dismissal without prejudice, which is a lesser sanction than a dismissal with prejudice, thereby 21 satisfying the fifth factor. 22 After considering the factors set forth supra and binding case law, the undersigned 23 recommends dismissal, without prejudice, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Local Rule 110. 24 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: 25 The Clerk of Court randomly assign this case to a district judge for consideration of these 26 Findings and Recommendations. 27 It is further RECOMMENDED: 28 This action be DISMISSED without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to obey court orders 1 | and failure to prosecute. 2 NOTICE TO PARTIES 3 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 4 | Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within 14 days 5 | after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written 6 | objections with the Court. /d.; Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, 7 | “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The assigned District Judge 8 | will review these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A party’s 9 | failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of certain rights on 10 || appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). 11 2 | Dated: _ April 30, 2024 Mihaw. fareh Zack 13 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA 4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28