(PC) Salas v. Allison

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 24, 2022·No. 1:21-cv-00669·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAFAEL SALAS, Case No. 1:21-cv-00669-DAD-EPG (PC)

Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING THAT DEFENDANTS’ v. MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE C. PFEIFFER, et al., 12(b)(1) BE GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART Defendants. (ECF No. 36) OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN

Rafael Salas (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action. This case proceeds on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against defendants Thomas, Cortez, and Pfeiffer; Plaintiff’s First Amendment Free Exercise Claim against defendants Thomas, Cortez, and Pfeiffer; and Plaintiff’s Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) claim against defendants Thomas, Cortez, and Pfeiffer in their official capacities. (ECF Nos. 1, 20, & 28).1 The core of Plaintiff’s complaint is that Defendants are not properly processing his marriage request, which is preventing Plaintiff from getting married.

On September 16, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 29). Defendants asked the Court to dismiss the entire case, or at a minimum, to “dismiss Salas’s individual-capacity claims and request for damages.” (Id. at 16). On November 29, 2021, the Court issued findings and recommendations, recommending that this motion to dismiss be denied. (ECF No. 35). These findings and recommendations are pending before District Judge Dale A. Drozd. On December 20, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (ECF No. 36). According to Defendants, “the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation has approved Salas’s application to marry Heather Tower. Accordingly, Salas’s demand for non-monetary relief is now moot.”2 (Id. at 5). On January 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed his opposition. (ECF No. 39). On January 21, 2022, Defendants filed their reply. (ECF No. 40). Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is now before this Court. For the reasons that follow, the Court will recommend that Defendants’ request to dismiss Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief be denied and that Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief be dismissed. a. Defendants’ Motion On December 20, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (ECF No. 36). According to Defendants, in his complaint, Plaintiff “demanded that the Court provide him with ‘an ORDER where Plaintiff is given authorization to marry his Fiancée HEATHER E. TOWER.’” (Id. at 8) (quoting Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, p. 3). After this lawsuit was filed, Plaintiff submitted a second application to marry Heather Tower, and that application was approved on December 6, 2021. (Id. at 6). Additionally, Plaintiff “does not need any further

2 Plaintiff has stated that Heather Tower has changed her name to Heather Salas. However, as the motion to dismiss and Plaintiff’s complaint refer to Heather Tower, at this time the Court will refer to Heather Salas as approvals from prison staff to marry Tower.” (Id. at 7). Based on this, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request for an injunction is now moot. Additionally, Plaintiff’s “request for a declaratory judgment [stating that CDCR must approve his marriage application] is similarly moot because nothing would be gained from having the Court declare that CDCR should approve a request it has already approved.” (Id. at 6 & 9). Defendants argue that dismissal of Plaintiff’s requests for non-monetary relief is appropriate because the Court’s duty to dismiss moot claims is mandatory; because this would leave only requests for monetary relief, which are subject to the defense of qualified immunity; and because this would narrow the scope of the case, “which would facilitate settlement discussions between the parties.” (Id. at 10). b. Plaintiff’s Opposition Plaintiff filed his opposition on January 13, 2022. (ECF No. 39). Plaintiff argues that Defendants could have raised their arguments previously, but did not do so. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff also argues that his request is not moot. (Id.). Plaintiff “seeks ‘an Order where Mr. SALAS receives authorization to marry his bashert HEATHER E. TOWER, … and [that] ensure[s] the marriage ceremony is performed within a reasonable set-ordered time frame.’” (ECF No. 39, p. 2) (quoting Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, p. 13). However, “no reasonable time frame has been set.” (Id. at 2). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request is not moot, and will not be moot until Plaintiff and Tower are married. (Id. at 3). Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the approval of his marriage application was invalid because it was not signed by the associate Warden, which is required by CDCR policy. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’ “voluntary cessation of illegal conduct does not deprive the Court of power to hear and determine this case.” (Id. at 2). Finally, Plaintiff argues that the motion should be denied because of Defendants’ \\\ \\\ misconduct. (Id. at 7).3 III. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(1) “Because standing and mootness both pertain to a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction under Article III, they are properly raised in a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), not Rule 12(b)(6).” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). “If there is no longer a possibility that an appellant can obtain relief for his claim, that claim is moot and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 521 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 1950, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1968) (“[N]o justiciable controversy is presented … when the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent developments.”). In determining whether a request for declaratory relief has become moot, the Supreme Court has held that, “basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402 (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When a party makes a factual attack4 on subject-matter jurisdiction, “the district court is not confined by the facts contained in the four corners of the complaint—it may consider [other] facts and need not assume the truthfulness of the complaint.” Americopters, LLC v. F.A.A., 441 F.3d 726, 732 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original); see also White, 227 F.3d

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