(PC) Ruiz v. Mobert

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROGELIO MAY RUIZ, Case No. 1:17-cv-00709-AWI-HBK 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS BE GRANTED

14 R. MOBERT, Official Regular at CSATF (Doc. No. 57) Corcoran Prison, 15 OBJECTION PERIOD TWENTY-ONE DAYS Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff Rogelio May Ruiz (“Plaintiff” or “Ruiz”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and 19 in forma pauperis, initiated this action by filing a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 20 1983 on December 23, 2016. (Doc. Nos. 1, 11). Ruiz is proceeding on his Second Amended 21 Complaint (Doc. No. 43, “SAC”) as screened which alleges an Eighth Amendment excessive use 22 of force claim against Defendant Mobert. (Doc. Nos. 44, 48, 49). Pending is Defendant Mobert’s 23 Motion to Dismiss filed November 19, 2020, seeking dismissal of the SAC pursuant to Fed. R. 24 Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the basis that the claim is barred by claim preclusion. (Doc. No. 57, 25 “Motion”). Ruiz did not timely file a response to the Motion. (See docket). On April 7, 2021, in 26 an abundance of caution, the Court sua sponte granted pro se Plaintiff a twenty-one-day extension 27 of time to file an opposition, if any, to the Motion. (Doc. No. 59). That additional time has 28 1 expired, and Ruiz elected not to file an opposition. (See docket). Based upon the facts in the 2 record and governing law, the undersigned recommends Defendant’s Motion be granted and this 3 action be dismissed with prejudice. 4 I. APPLICABLE LAW 5 A motion filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency 6 of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal of the complaint, or 7 any claim within it, “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 8 sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 9 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a 10 complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it 11 must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 12 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 13 Because Ruiz is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than 14 those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court has an 15 obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1 (9th 16 Cir. 1985) (en banc), however, a liberal interpretation of a pro se complaint does not require the 17 court to supply essential elements of the claim that were not pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. 18 of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th 19 Cir. 1992) 20 A motion to dismiss on the basis of claim preclusion or res judicata is properly brought 21 under Rule 12(b)(6) if the defense does not raise any disputed issues of fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 22 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989); Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984). When a 23 claim was or could have been raised in a prior action, it cannot subsequently be brought in a 24 separate matter. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Clements v. Airport Auth. 25 of Washoe County, 69 F.3d 321, 327 (9th Cir. 1995); W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 26 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 1997). Claim preclusion “applies when there is (1) an identity of claims; (2) 27 a final judgment on the merits; and (3) identity or privity between the parties.” Jacobsen v. 28 Rushmore Loan Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 831 F. App'x 353, 354 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal 1 quotation marks omitted). While courts are typically constrained to the operative complaint when 2 evaluating a motion to dismiss, they are permitted to take judicial notice of “matters of public 3 record.” Beverly Oaks Physicians Surgical Ctr., LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Illinois, 983 4 F.3d 435, 439 (9th Cir. 2020). 5 II. FACTS AND ANALYSIS 6 A. Judicial Notice 7 Defendant requests the Court to take judicial notice of the proceedings in Ruiz v. Curry, et 8 al., No. 1:17-cv-01407-DAD-SKO (E.D. Cal.). (Doc. No. 57-2). This Court may “judicially 9 notice” facts and documents that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 10 accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). This encompasses other 11 court proceedings “if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United States 12 ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) 13 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 14 2011). 15 Defendant submits the Eight Amendment claim in the SAC stems from the same incident 16 that formed the claim in another case already adjudicated on the merits. See Ruiz v. Curry, et al., 17 No. 1:17-cv-01407-DAD-SKO (E.D. Cal.). For the Court to evaluate the validity of Defendant’s 18 argument, the Court must examine the related case file to determine whether Ruiz’s present claim 19 mirrors or arises from this other cause of action. The documents of which Defendant requests the 20 Court to take judicial notice – the docket and select filings in a separate case within this Court – 21 are documents whose accuracy is self-evident. Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the 22 docket in Ruiz v. Curry, et al., No. 1:17-cv-01407-DAD-SKO (E.D. Cal.) and the filings therein. 23 B. Ruiz v. Curry, et al., No. 1:17-cv-01407-DAD-SKO (E.D. Cal.) 24 Plaintiff initiated the case Ruiz v. Curry, et al., No. 1:17-cv-01407-DAD-SKO (E.D. Cal.) 25 on September 26, 2017 in the Northern District of California. (Ruiz v. Curry, et al., No. 1:17-cv- 26 01407-DAD-SKO (E.D. Cal.), Doc. No. 1). The case was transferred to this Court on October 27 18, 2018 because the allegations within Plaintiff’s complaint occurred at California State Prison, 28 Corcoran (“CSP-Corcoran”) which is within this Court’s jurisdiction. (Id. at Doc. Nos. 10, 11). 1 Plaintiff’s original complaint was screened and found deficient because it was written in 2 Spanish. (Id. at Doc. No. 19). Plaintiff was given leave to and filed an amended complaint. (Id. 3 at Doc. Nos. 19, 20). The Court again determined it failed to state a cognizable claim. (Id. at 4 Doc. No. 20). Plaintiff was provided leave to further amend his complaint. (Id.). 5 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint was filed on July 31, 2018. (Id. at Doc. No. 24). In 6 that complaint, Plaintiff alleged that on December 4, 2013, he was “arrested” by R. Mobert and 7 Mobert did not transfer Plaintiff’s personal property when he was moved to a different cell in 8 CSP-Corcoran. (Id. at 3). Plaintiff claimed that an inventory of his property was forged by “J. 9 Curry.” (Id.). Both R. Mobert and J. Curry were named as Defendants. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff 10 requested the Court order Defendants to return his property. (Id.). 11 On January 3, 2019, the Court screened Plaintiff’s second amended complaint and again 12 determined it stated no cognizable claims. (Id. at Doc. No. 28). Because Plaintiff “was provided 13 the applicable pleading requirements and legal standards for his claims in the prior screening 14 order,” the Court concluded further amendments would be futile and thus recommended dismissal 15 with prejudice. (Id.). The Findings and Recommendations were adopted in full on February 25, 16 2019, and judgment was entered against Plaintiff. (Id. at Doc. No. 35). Plaintiff unsuccessfully 17 appealed that judgment to the Ninth Circuit. (Id. at Doc. Nos. 37-41, 43-45). Two subsequent 18 motions for reconsideration were denied by this Court as “frivolous and untimely.” (Id. at Doc. 19 Nos. 46-49). 20 C. Ruiz v. Mobert, No. 1:17-cv-00709-AWI-HBK (E.D. Cal.) 21 Ruiz likewise originally commenced this instant action in the Northern District of 22 California and filed his initial complaint in Spanish. (Doc. Nos. 1, 18). After transfer to this 23 Court on May 23, 2017 (Doc. No. 4), Ruiz filed an amended complaint on November 27, 2017. 24 (Doc. No. 31). The Court appointed Ruiz limited counsel for purposes of filing a First Amended 25 Complaint, which as screened was found to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant 26 Mobert. (Doc. Nos. 41, 42). Nonetheless, Ruiz elected to file a SAC, which is the operative 27 complaint in this matter. (Doc. No. 43). Therein Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that Defendant R. 28 1 Mobert used excessive force against him during his “arrest” on December 3, 20131 when he 2 dragged Plaintiff’s hand across the ground, causing a “big injury” and considerable bleeding. (Id. 3 at 3). Plaintiff further claims Defendant Mobert filed a false report about the incident which led 4 to Plaintiff’s internal transfer where Plaintiff “lost all my [sic] propertys.” (Id. at 4-5). The Court 5 screened Plaintiff’s SAC and again permitted only the excessive force claim against Defendant 6 Mobert to proceed. (Doc. No. 44). 7 D. Identity of Claims 8 Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment forecloses “successive litigation 9 of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the 10 earlier suit.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001). By “preclud[ing] parties from 11 contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate,” the doctrines of claim 12 preclusion and/or res judicata (i.e. issue preclusion) protect against “the expense and vexation 13 attending multiple lawsuits, conserv[e] judicial resources, and foste[r] reliance on judicial action 14 by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 15 153–154 (1979). 16 In evaluating whether there is identity between the claims the Court considers four factors: 17 “(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired 18 by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in 19 the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether 20 the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.” Turtle Island Restoration 21 Network v. U.S. Dep't of State, 673 F.3d 914, 917-18 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and 22 citations omitted). The “most important” of these four factors is whether the claim stems from 23 the same nucleus of facts. Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 24 1982). The undersigned considers each of the factors in seriatim. 25 i. Rights or Interests 26 The first factor, whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be 27 destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action weighs against claim preclusion. The

28 1 The First Amended Complaint states the action occurred on December 4, 2014. (Doc. No. 41 at 3, ¶ 11). 1 Court notes the present action was technically transferred to this Court a few months before Ruiz 2 v. Curry, et al., No. 1:17-cv-01407-DAD-SKO (E.D. Cal.) was transferred, although the second 3 transferred action proceeded first. However, the Findings and Recommendations were adopted in 4 full and judgment was entered against Plaintiff in the second action on February 25, 2019, well 5 before Ruiz filed his Second Amended Complaint in the instant action on August 26, 2019. 6 Nonetheless, the other action did not broach whether Defendant used excessive force. The 7 Court’s finding that Plaintiff failed to allege a cognizable claim in alleging Defendant Mobert 8 refused to return his property has no bearing on whether Defendant used excessive force. 9 ii. Substantial Evidence 10 The second factor, whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two 11 actions, cuts narrowly against identity of claims. Plaintiff’s SAC alleges Defendant used 12 excessive force against him on December 3, 2013. (Doc. No. 43 at 3-4). It further alleges that, as 13 a result of the incident with Defendant, Plaintiff was sent to “the hole” where he lost his property. 14 (Id. at 4-5). Plaintiff’s complaint in Ruiz v. Curry centers on that loss of property and does not 15 mention Defendant’s alleged excessive force. (Ruiz v. Curry, et al., No. 1:17-cv-01407-DAD- 16 SKO (E.D. Cal.), Doc. No. 24). Thus, while the facts of both complaints stem from the same 17 overarching incident, they focus on different aspects of it – excessive force and loss of property, 18 respectively. 19 iii. Infringement of Same Rights 20 The third factor, whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right, cuts against 21 identity of claims. Based upon the allegations in the SAC, the Court found Ruiz’s claim alleged 22 an Eighth Amendment excessive use of force claim. The Court’s Findings and Recommendations 23 in Ruiz v. Curry concluded Plaintiff filed a non-cognizable claim for Fourteenth Amendment 24 denial of due process against Defendant concerning his property. (Ruiz v. Curry, et al., No. 1:17- 25 cv-01407-DAD-SKO (E.D. Cal.), Doc. No. 28). The Curry Findings and Recommendations did 26 not address Eighth Amendment excessive force because Plaintiff’s complaint in that matter did 27 not raise it. (Id.). 28 /// 1 iv. Same Nucleus of Facts 2 Despite the previous three factors not favoring identity of claims, the Court nonetheless 3 concludes the most important factor – whether the two complaints stem from the same nucleus of 4 facts – demonstrates identity of claims. Plaintiff’s present complaint for excessive force alleges 5 that on or about December 3, 2013, Defendant Mobert injured Plaintiff’s hand during the same 6 “arrest” and then filed a false report about that incident which initiated Plaintiff’s transfer causing 7 his lost property. (Doc. No. 43 at 3-5). Plaintiff’s complaint in Ruiz v. Curry, et al., No. 1:17- 8 cv-01407-DAD-SKO (E.D. Cal.) alleges that on December 3, 2013 Defendant Mobert “arrested” 9 him and then failed to transfer Plaintiff’s personal property when he was moved to a different cell 10 in CSP-Corcoran. It is apparent that both complaints stem from the same incident and dispute. 11 Indeed, both the First Amended Complaint filed in this action and SAC alleged both claims: An 12 Eighth Amendment claim for excessive use of force and a Fourteenth Amendment loss of 13 property claim. (Compare Doc. No. 41 with 43). The Court, however, did not permit the 14 Fourteenth Amendment property claim to proceed, finding it not cognizable. (See Doc. Nos. 42, 15 44, 48, 49). 16 Ruiz clearly recognized that the claims were related but did not raise the excessive force 17 claim in the Curry complaint. However, claim preclusion still applies if the claim “could have 18 been raised” simultaneously with the other claim. Fuller v. Duke, 709 F. App'x 847, 848 (9th Cir. 19 2017). Claim preclusion bars “all claims that could have been asserted in the prior action” in 20 order to further court efficiency and preserve court resources. International Union v. Karr, 994 21 F.2d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir. 1993). There is no reason why Ruiz could not have raised both issues in 22 a single complaint. Because Ruiz’s against Mobert in the present matter and the Curry case arose 23 from the same nucleus of facts, Ruiz should have advanced his excessive use of force claim in the 24 Curry matter. 25 E. Final Judgment on the Merits 26 Next, the court considers whether Plaintiff’s complaint in Ruiz v. Curry, et al., No. 1:17- 27 cv-01407-DAD-SKO (E.D. Cal.) ended in a final judgment on the merits. That case was 28 dismissed for “failure to state a cognizable claim” and judgment was entered against Plaintiff. 1 (Id. at Doc. Nos. 35-36). Subsequent appeals and motions for reconsideration of that judgment 2 were unsuccessful and the case remains closed. (Id. at Doc. Nos. 37-41, 43-49). 3 A “final judgment on the merits is synonymous with dismissal with prejudice.” Hells 4 Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations 5 omitted). A dismissal for failure to state a claim constitutes as a final judgment on the merits. 6 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995); Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 7 957 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s Curry complaint was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state 8 a claim. It thus qualifies as a final judgment on the merits. 9 F. Identity or Privity Between Parties 10 Last, the Court considers whether identity or privity exists between the parties. Identity or 11 privity is present when “there is ‘substantial identity’ between parties, that is, when there is 12 sufficient commonality of interest.” In re Gottheiner, 703 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1983) 13 (citations omitted). The same parties’ involvement in different matters establishes privity or 14 identity between them. In re Miller, 81 F. App'x 89, 90 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended on denial of 15 reh’g (Apr. 29, 2004). The parties in the present matter, Ruiz and Defendant Mobert, were both 16 parties in the Curry matter. Privity or identity between them accordingly exists. 17 III. CONCLUSION 18 Based upon a thorough review of the record and the filings in Case No. 1:17-cv-01407- 19 DAD-SKO (E.D. Cal.) and applying governing law, the undersigned finds Defendant has satisfied 20 all elements required to establish claim preclusion. Ruiz did not file a response in opposition to 21 the Motion, despite being afforded a second opportunity to do so. “A failure to file a timely 22 opposition may also be construed by the Court as a non-opposition to the motion.” Local Rule 23 230(c). Because Plaintiff’s sole claim is precluded, the undersigned recommends that 24 Defendant’s Motion (Doc. No. 57) be granted and this case be dismissed. 25 Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED: 26 1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 57) be GRANTED. 27 2. This matter be dismissed with prejudice 28 1 NOTICE TO PARTIES 2 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 3 | assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one 4 | (21) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 5 || objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 6 | Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be filed within seven (7) 7 | days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within 8 | the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 9 | 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 10 Wl IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: — June 30, 2021 Mile. Wh. foareh Zaskth 13 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA 4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28