1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TYREE RAYBON RUFFINS, No. 1:24-cv-01386-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT 13 v. JUDGE TO THIS ACTION 14 S. CERDA, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF 15 Defendants. ACTION 16 (ECF No. 9) 17 18 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42 19 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 Plaintiff’s complaint in this action was filed on September 23, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) 21 On November 18, 2024, the Court screened the complaint, found that Plaintiff failed to 22 state a cognizable claim for relief, and granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. 23 (ECF No. 8.) 24 Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise respond to the November 18, 25 2024 order. Therefore, on January 7, 2025, the Court issued an order for Plaintiff to show cause 26 why the action should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff has failed to respond to the order 27 to show cause and the time to do so has now passed. Accordingly, dismissal of the action is 28 warranted. 1 I. 2 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 3 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 4 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 5 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 6 “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that 7 “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 8 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 9 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 10 pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 11 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 13 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 14 that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. 15 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 16 Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 17 liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 18 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 19 facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that 20 each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. 21 Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 22 unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” 23 falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 24 II. 25 SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS 26 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of the 27 screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 28 On October 19, 2023, while housed at Substance Abuse Treatment Facility, Plaintiff’s 1 Eighth Amendment rights were violated at his committee hearing by counselors S. Cerda and R. 2 Lopez “by knowing the danger & still placing me w[ith] my documented enemy (Wilson #BJ766 3 115 for fighting log #000000007135844) at Lancaster State Prison in B-yard.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.) 4 Plaintiff seeks $30,000 in compensation as relief. 5 III. 6 DISCUSSION 7 A. Deliberate Indifference to Safety 8 The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to 9 guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In particular, 10 prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Id. 11 at 833; Cortez v. Skol, 776 F. 3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 12 1040 (9th Cir. 2005); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982); Gillespie v. 13 Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1980). 14 The failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates or from 15 dangerous conditions at the prison violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are 16 met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is, 17 subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison 18 official is deliberately indifferent if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health 19 or safety by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Id. at 837. 20 A prisoner may state a § 1983 claim under the Eighth Amendment against prison officials 21 only where the officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to the threat of serious harm or injury 22 to an inmate by another prisoner, Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 23 Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989) (deliberately spreading rumor 24 that prisoner is snitch may state claim for violation of right to be protected from violence while in 25 state custody), or by physical conditions at the prison. The official must both be aware of facts 26 from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 27 must also draw the inference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Mere negligent failure to protect an 28 inmate from harm is not actionable under Section 1983. Id. at 835. 1 Here, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for failure to protect him against any of the Defendants 2 because he has not alleged facts showing what Plaintiff or Defendants said or did, showing how 3 they personally acted, and that Defendants knew about a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff but 4 deliberately ignored the risk, causing harm to Plaintiff. More specifically, Plaintiff does not 5 explain his “documented enemy” concerns in the complaint or provide sufficient detail of what 6 exactly Defendants Cerda and Lopez knew, which prevents the Court from determining whether 7 Defendants had sufficient information to alert them to a substantial risk of serious harm to 8 Plaintiff if housed with inmate Wilson. See Williams v. Wood, 223 F. App’x 670, 671 (9th Cir. 9 2007) (“speculative and generalized fears of harm at the hands of other prisoners do not rise to a 10 sufficiently substantial risk of serious harm”).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TYREE RAYBON RUFFINS, No. 1:24-cv-01386-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT 13 v. JUDGE TO THIS ACTION 14 S. CERDA, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF 15 Defendants. ACTION 16 (ECF No. 9) 17 18 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42 19 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 Plaintiff’s complaint in this action was filed on September 23, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) 21 On November 18, 2024, the Court screened the complaint, found that Plaintiff failed to 22 state a cognizable claim for relief, and granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. 23 (ECF No. 8.) 24 Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise respond to the November 18, 25 2024 order. Therefore, on January 7, 2025, the Court issued an order for Plaintiff to show cause 26 why the action should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff has failed to respond to the order 27 to show cause and the time to do so has now passed. Accordingly, dismissal of the action is 28 warranted. 1 I. 2 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 3 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 4 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 5 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 6 “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that 7 “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 8 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 9 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 10 pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 11 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 13 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 14 that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. 15 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 16 Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 17 liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 18 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 19 facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that 20 each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. 21 Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 22 unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” 23 falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 24 II. 25 SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS 26 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of the 27 screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 28 On October 19, 2023, while housed at Substance Abuse Treatment Facility, Plaintiff’s 1 Eighth Amendment rights were violated at his committee hearing by counselors S. Cerda and R. 2 Lopez “by knowing the danger & still placing me w[ith] my documented enemy (Wilson #BJ766 3 115 for fighting log #000000007135844) at Lancaster State Prison in B-yard.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.) 4 Plaintiff seeks $30,000 in compensation as relief. 5 III. 6 DISCUSSION 7 A. Deliberate Indifference to Safety 8 The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to 9 guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In particular, 10 prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Id. 11 at 833; Cortez v. Skol, 776 F. 3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 12 1040 (9th Cir. 2005); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982); Gillespie v. 13 Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1980). 14 The failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates or from 15 dangerous conditions at the prison violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are 16 met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is, 17 subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison 18 official is deliberately indifferent if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health 19 or safety by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Id. at 837. 20 A prisoner may state a § 1983 claim under the Eighth Amendment against prison officials 21 only where the officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to the threat of serious harm or injury 22 to an inmate by another prisoner, Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 23 Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989) (deliberately spreading rumor 24 that prisoner is snitch may state claim for violation of right to be protected from violence while in 25 state custody), or by physical conditions at the prison. The official must both be aware of facts 26 from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 27 must also draw the inference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Mere negligent failure to protect an 28 inmate from harm is not actionable under Section 1983. Id. at 835. 1 Here, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for failure to protect him against any of the Defendants 2 because he has not alleged facts showing what Plaintiff or Defendants said or did, showing how 3 they personally acted, and that Defendants knew about a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff but 4 deliberately ignored the risk, causing harm to Plaintiff. More specifically, Plaintiff does not 5 explain his “documented enemy” concerns in the complaint or provide sufficient detail of what 6 exactly Defendants Cerda and Lopez knew, which prevents the Court from determining whether 7 Defendants had sufficient information to alert them to a substantial risk of serious harm to 8 Plaintiff if housed with inmate Wilson. See Williams v. Wood, 223 F. App’x 670, 671 (9th Cir. 9 2007) (“speculative and generalized fears of harm at the hands of other prisoners do not rise to a 10 sufficiently substantial risk of serious harm”). Further, the Eighth Amendment does not provide 11 prisoners with the right to be housed with a particular security classification. Myron v. 12 Landsberger, 476 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 2007) (“mere act of classification ‘does not amount to 13 an infliction of pain,’ it ‘is not condemned by the Eighth Amendment.’ ”); Abreu v. Jaime, No: 14 1:16–CV–00715–BAM (PC), 2017 WL 5900074, at *3 (Nov. 30, 2017) (“The Constitution does 15 not require that plaintiff be placed in ‘protective custody,’ only that the defendants take 16 reasonably available measures to abate a substantial the risk of harm.”); see also Hall v. Tilton, 17 No. C 07–3233 RMW (PR), 2010 WL 2629914 at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2010) (rejecting a 18 prisoner’s claim that retaining him in a Level III facility when he was a Level II inmate violated 19 his rights under the Eighth Amendment), aff’d 530 Fed. App’x 690 (9th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, 20 Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. 21 IV. 22 FAILURE TO OBEY COURT ORDER AND FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 23 Here, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint, and on November 18, 2024, an order issued 24 providing Plaintiff with the legal standards that applied to his claims, advising him of the 25 deficiencies that needed to be corrected, and granting him leave to file an amended complaint 26 within thirty days. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint or otherwise respond 27 to the Court’s November 18, 2024 order. Therefore, on January 7, 2025, the Court ordered 28 Plaintiff to show cause within fourteen (14) days why the action should not be dismissed. (ECF 1 No. 9.) Plaintiff failed to respond to the January 7, 2025 order and the time to do so has passed. 2 Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with these Rules 3 or with any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions 4 . . . within the inherent power of the Court.” The Court has the inherent power to control its docket 5 and may, in the exercise of that power, impose sanctions where appropriate, including dismissal 6 of the action. Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000). 7 A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, failure to 8 obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 9 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 10 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order to file an amended 11 complaint); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissal for failure to comply 12 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. United 13 States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court 14 order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for lack of 15 prosecution and failure to comply with local rules). 16 “In determining whether to dismiss an action for lack of prosecution, the district court is 17 required to consider several factors: ‘(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; 18 (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public 19 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 20 sanctions.’ ” Carey, 856 F.2d at 1440 (quoting Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423). These factors guide 21 a court in deciding what to do, and are not conditions that must be met in order for a court to take 22 action. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th 23 Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 24 In this instance, the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of the litigation and the 25 Court’s need to manage its docket weigh in favor of dismissal. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) 26 Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d at 1226. Plaintiff was ordered to file an amended complaint 27 within thirty days of November 18, 2024 and has not done so. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with 28 the order of the Court by filing an amended complaint hinders the Court’s ability to move this 1 action towards disposition. This action can proceed no further without Plaintiff’s compliance with 2 the order and his failure to comply indicates that Plaintiff does not intend to diligently litigate this 3 action. 4 Since it appears that Plaintiff does not intend to litigate this action diligently there arises a 5 rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the defendants in this action. In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 6 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1994). The risk of prejudice to the defendants also weighs in favor of dismissal. 7 The public policy in favor of deciding cases on their merits is greatly outweighed by the 8 factors in favor of dismissal. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to move this action forward. In order 9 for this action to proceed, Plaintiff is required to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies 10 in the operative pleading. Despite being ordered to do so, Plaintiff did not file an amended 11 complaint or respond to the order to show cause and this action cannot simply remain idle on the 12 Court’s docket, unprosecuted. In this instance, the fourth factor does not outweigh Plaintiff’s 13 failure to comply with the Court’s orders. 14 Finally, a court’s warning to a party that their failure to obey the court’s order will result 15 in dismissal satisfies the “consideration of alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 16 Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s November 18, 2024, order 17 requiring Plaintiff to file an amended complaint expressly stated: “If Plaintiff fails to file an 18 amended complaint in compliance with this order, the Court will recommend to a district ju6dge 19 that this action be dismissed consistent with the reasons stated in this order.” (ECF No. 8.) In 20 addition, the Court’s January 7, 2025, order to show cause specifically stated: “Plaintiff’s failure 21 to comply with this order will result in a recommendation to dismiss the action for the reasons 22 stated above.” (ECF No. 9.) Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal would result from 23 her noncompliance with the Court’s order. 24 V. 25 ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION 26 The Court has screened Plaintiff’s complaint and directed Plaintiff to file an amended 27 complaint within thirty days. Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court’s order to file an 28 amended and has not responded to the Court’s order to show why the action should not be 1 dismissed. In considering the factors to determine if this action should be dismissed, the Court 2 finds that this action should be dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to obey the November 18, 2024 3 and January 7, 2025 orders, failure to prosecute this action, and failure to state a cognizable claim 4 for relief. 5 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall randomly assign a 6 District Judge to this action. 7 Further, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed for □□□□□□□□□□□ 8 failure to comply with a court orders, failure to prosecute, and failure to state a cognizable claim 9 for relief. 10 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 11 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen 12 | (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 13 | objections with the Court, limited to 15 pages in length, including exhibits. The document should 14 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is 15 || advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights 16 | appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 17 | Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 18 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. DAM Le 21 | Dated: _January 31, 2025 _ ef STANLEY A. BOONE 22 United States Magistrate Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28