(PC) Rodriguez v. Xiong

District Court, E.D. California·Decided September 13, 2021·No. 2:21-cv-01332·Unknown

Opinion

ANDREW T. RODRIGUEZ, No. 2:21-cv-1332-EFB P Plaintiff, v. ORDER DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition to filing a complaint (ECF No. 1), he has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2). Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis The court has reviewed plaintiff’s application and finds that it makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, by separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) and (2). Screening Standards Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8, its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Screening Order Plaintiff alleges he contracted COVID-19 in December of 2020 and became “deathly sick” while confined to the Rio Consumes Correctional Center (“RCCC”). ECF No. 1 at 3. He claims that infected inmates were moved from pod to pod and allowed to serve food to other inmates. Id. He claims generally that the Sheriff’s Department and medical staff failed to follow the safety guidelines issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”). Id. For example, he claims that his pod was packed to capacity, that there was no social distancing, no hand sanitizer or disinfectant for common areas, and either no masks or inadequate masks. Id. Plaintiff seeks $50 million in damages and claims he should have been released to handle his court proceedings from the safety of his own home.1 Id. at 6. The complaint identifies the following defendants: the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, Medical Staff, and Scott Jones, Sheriff. Id. at 1-2. For the following reasons, the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. First, unidentified “medical staff” is not a proper defendant. The inclusion of such “Doe” defendants is generally disfavored in the Ninth Circuit. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Unknown persons cannot be served with process until they are identified by their real names and the court will not investigate the names and identities of unnamed defendants. Second, defendants Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department and Sacramento County Sheriff Scott Jones in his official capacity are the equivalent of a single defendant: Sacramento County. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); Ctr. for Bio—Ethical Reform v. Los Angeles County Sheriff Dep't, 533 F.3d 780, 786 (9th Cir. 2008) (official capacity suit against county sheriff equivalent to suit against county). To state a claim against a local governmental entity (i.e. Sacramento County), plaintiff must allege that a specific “policy or custom” of the agency was the “moving force” causing the alleged constitutional violation. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A local governmental entity may not be held liable under a respondeat superior theory premised on the individual conduct of its subordinates. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. To the extent that plaintiff’s theory of liability as to any claim rests on the existence of a county policy or custom, he must allege what the policy is and how it caused the violation of his rights. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) ///// 1 The court infers from this allegation that plaintiff was confined to the county jail as a pretrial detainee. (requiring “a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”). Third, the complaint fails to specify who was responsible for the challenged conditions at RCCC and how those conditions deprived him of his rights. The rights of pretrial detainees are grounded in the Due Process Clause. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008). To the extent plaintiff wishes to state a claim for deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment, he must allege facts showing (1) the defendant(s) made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions of plaintiff’s confinement; (2) those conditions exposed plaintiff to a “substantial risk of serious harm”; (3) defendant(s) did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk invo

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

(PC) Rodriguez v. Xiong, (E.D. Cal. 2021).

(PC) Rodriguez v. Xiong ((PC) Rodriguez v. Xiong) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Scheuer v. Rhodes
416 U.S. 232 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Bell v. Wolfish
441 U.S. 520 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Kentucky v. Graham
473 U.S. 159 (Supreme Court, 1985)
City of Canton v. Harris
489 U.S. 378 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Richard E. Loux v. B. J. Rhay, Warden
375 F.2d 55 (Ninth Circuit, 1967)
Johnson v. Duffy
588 F.2d 740 (Ninth Circuit, 1978)
Gillespie v. Civiletti
629 F.2d 637 (Ninth Circuit, 1980)
United States v. Vincent Anthony Perdue
8 F.3d 1455 (Tenth Circuit, 1993)
Pierce v. County of Orange
526 F.3d 1190 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Jonathon Castro v. County of Los Angeles
833 F.3d 1060 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)