(PC) Robertson v. Garcia

District Court, E.D. California·Decided May 9, 2022·No. 1:17-cv-01022·Unknown

Opinion

WAYNE JEROME ROBERTSON, Case No. 1:17-cv-01022-DAD-BAM (PC) Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION v. FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO GARCIA, et al., EXHAUST AVAILABLE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES Defendants. (ECF No. 36) FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE I. Background Plaintiff Wayne Jerome Robertson (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint against Defendants Garcia and Jones for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. On January 4, 2019, Defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing this action as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, as to Defendant Jones entirely, and as to the allegations of excessive force other than the use of OC spray by Defendant Garcia. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 968 (2014). (ECF No. 36.) Plaintiff filed a timely opposition on January 4, 2019. (ECF No. 37.) After finding that Defendants failed to include a Rand warning with the motion, the Court issued a second informational order providing Plaintiff with notice of the requirements for opposing a motion for summary judgment and permitted Plaintiff an opportunity to file a supplemental opposition. See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012); Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1988); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411–12 (9th Cir. 1988). (ECF No. 41.) Plaintiff filed a supplemental opposition on May 6, 2019. (ECF No. 42.) Defendants filed a reply on May 13, 2019. (ECF No. 43.) The motion for summary judgment is deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(l). II. Legal Standards A. Statutory Exhaustion Requirement Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and the exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). The failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and the defendants bear the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. “In the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, a defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. Otherwise, the defendants must produce evidence proving the failure to exhaust, and they are entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56 only if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, shows he failed to exhaust. Id. Defendant must first prove that there was an available administrative remedy and that Plaintiff did not exhaust that available remedy. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172) (quotation marks omitted). The burden then shifts to Plaintiff to show something in his particular case made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to her. Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191 (citing Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172) (quotation marks omitted). The ultimate burden of proof on the issue of exhaustion remains with Defendant. Id. (quotation marks omitted). B. Summary Judgment Standard Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (quotation marks omitted); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166; Wash. Mut. Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each party’s position, whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by (1) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The Court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, although it is not required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). The defendant bears the burden of proof in moving for summary judgment for failure to exhaust, Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166, and he must “prove that there was an available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy,” id. at 1172. If the defendant carries his burden, the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff “to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. “If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56.” Id. at 1166. However, “[i]f material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied, and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts.” Id. /// III. Discussion A. Summary of CDCR’s Administrative Review Process At the relevant time, “[t]he California prison grievance system ha[d] three levels of review; an inmate exhausts administrative remedies by obtaining a decision at each level.” Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b) (repealed June 1, 2020) & Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 2010)). See also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7(d)(3) (“The third level review constitutes the decisi

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

(PC) Robertson v. Garcia, (E.D. Cal. 2022).

(PC) Robertson v. Garcia ((PC) Robertson v. Garcia) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Booth v. Churner
532 U.S. 731 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Porter v. Nussle
534 U.S. 516 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Jones v. Bock
549 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Harvey v. Jordan
605 F.3d 681 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz.
609 F.3d 1011 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Oscar W. Jones v. Lou Blanas County of Sacramento
393 F.3d 918 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
Earnest Woods, II v. Tom Carey
684 F.3d 934 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Juan Albino v. Lee Baca
747 F.3d 1162 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
J. Wilkerson v. B. Wheeler
772 F.3d 834 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Lonnie Williams, Jr. v. Daniel Paramo
775 F.3d 1182 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
David Reyes v. Christopher Smith
810 F.3d 654 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)