(PC) Rivera v. Rodriguez

District Court, E.D. California·Decided October 4, 2021·No. 1:21-cv-01147·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JUAN RIVERA, Case No. 1:21-cv-01147-HBK 12 Plaintiff, ORDER TO ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 14 SERGEANT P. RODRIGUEZ, FAILURE TO PROSECUTE1

15 Defendant. FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 16 17 18 This matter comes before the Court upon periodic review. As more fully set forth below, 19 the undersigned recommends this case be dismissed without prejudice due to Plaintiff’s failure to 20 prosecute this action and timely comply with or respond to the Court’s orders. 21 I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff Juan Rivera, a state prisoner, initiated this action by filing a pro se civil rights 23 complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 29, 2021. (Doc. No. 1). No filing fee accompanied 24 Plaintiff’s complaint and he did not move to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (See docket). 25 On July 29, 2021, the Court provided Plaintiff with 30 days to either move to proceed IFP or pay 26 the $402.00 filing fee. (Doc. No. 3). The Court enclosed an application and cautioned Plaintiff 27 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 28 (E.D. Ca. 2019). 1 that his failure to timely comply with the Court’s order would result in this matter’s dismissal. 2 (Id.). On September 7, 2021, after Plaintiff failed to respond to the Court’s July 30, 2021 Order, 3 the Court issued an Order to Show Cause directing Plaintiff to show cause why this case should 4 not be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to pay the filing fee or file an IFP application. (Doc. No. 5 5). Plaintiff was provided 14 days to demonstrate why the Court should not recommend this 6 matter’s dismissal without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this action and his failure 7 to timely comply with the Court’s July 29, 2021 Order. (Id. at 2). The Court again warned 8 Plaintiff that his failure to timely respond to the Order to Show Cause would result in a 9 recommendation that this case be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (Id.). As of the date of these 10 Findings and Recommendations, the time to comply with the Court’s July 29, 2021 and 11 September 7, 2021 Orders has lapsed. Plaintiff has not: (1) paid the filing fee, (2) applied to 12 proceed in forma pauperis, or (3) responded to the Order to Show Cause. (See docket). 13 II. APPLICABLE LAW 14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits courts to involuntarily dismiss an action 15 when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to prosecute or comply with a court order. See 16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 17 2019) (citations omitted); Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 18 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he consensus among our sister circuits, with which we agree, is that courts 19 may dismiss under Rule 41(b) sua sponte, at least under certain circumstances.”). Local Rule 110 20 similarly permits courts to impose sanctions on a party who fails to comply with a court order. 21 Further, the procedural rules that govern this Court are to be “construed, administered and 22 employed by the court . . . to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 23 action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. 24 When “an IFP application is submitted with the complaint in lieu of the filing fee, and the 25 application is thereafter denied, the district court will be free to dismiss the complaint if the fee is 26 not paid within a reasonable time following the denial.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 27 1228 (9th Cir. 2015). Involuntary dismissal is a harsh penalty, but it “is incumbent upon the 28 Court to manage its docket without being subject to routine noncompliance of litigants.” 1 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002). Before dismissing an action under Fed. 2 R. Civ. P. 41, the court must consider: (1) the public interest in expeditious resolution of 3 litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage a docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendant; (4) 4 public policy favoring disposition on the merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. 5 See Applied Underwriters, 913 F.3d at 889 (noting that these five factors “must” be analyzed 6 before a Rule 41 involuntarily dismissal) (emphasis added); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 7 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (reviewing five factors and independently reviewing the record 8 because district court did not make finding as to each); but see Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 9 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000) (listing the same, but noting the court need not make explicit 10 findings as to each) (emphasis added); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) 11 (affirming dismissal of pro se § 1983 action when plaintiff did not amend caption to remove “et 12 al” as the court directed and reiterating that an explicit finding of each factor is not required by 13 the district court). 14 III. ANALYSIS 15 The undersigned considers the above-stated factors and concludes they favor dismissal of 16 this case. The expeditious resolution of litigation is deemed to be in the public interest. Yourish 17 v. California Amplifier, 191 F.2d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1999). Turning to the second factor, the 18 Court’s need to efficiently manage its docket cannot be overstated. This Court has “one of the 19 heaviest caseloads in the nation,” and due to unfilled judicial vacancies, which is further 20 exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, operates under a declared judicial emergency. See 21 Amended Standing Order in Light of Ongoing Judicial Emergency in the Eastern District of 22 California. The Court’s time is better spent on its other matters than needlessly consumed 23 managing a case with a recalcitrant litigant. Indeed, “trial courts do not have time to waste on 24 multiple failures by aspiring litigants to follow the rules and requirements of our courts.” 25 Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 644 (Trott, J., concurring in affirmance of district court’s involuntary 26 dismissal with prejudice of habeas petition where petitioner failed to timely respond to court 27 order and noting “the weight of the docket-managing factor depends upon the size and load of the 28 docket, and those in the best position to know what that is are our beleaguered trial judges.”). 1 Delays have the inevitable and inherent risk that evidence will become stale or witnesses' 2 memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a defendant, thereby satisfying the third 3 factor. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968).

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