(PC) Reid v. Nash
This text of (PC) Reid v. Nash ((PC) Reid v. Nash) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WALTER R. REID, No. 1:22-cv-00549-KES-EPG 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, DENYING 13 v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 14 BARRY GREEN, Docs. 41, 57 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff Walter Reid is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed 18 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case proceeds on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against 19 defendant Green for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Docs. 23, 24. The 20 matter was referred to a United States magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and 21 Local Rule 302. 22 On November 21, 2023, Green filed a motion for summary judgment. Doc 41. Green 23 argued that (1) there was no evidence that he was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical 24 condition on October 17, 2021, (2) plaintiff lacked evidence to support a claim for punitive 25 damages, and (3) Green was entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 8–13. Plaintiff filed an 26 opposition to the motion on December 11, 2023. Doc. 49. Green filed a reply on December 14, 27 2023. Doc. 50. On July 1, 2024, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings and 28 recommendations, recommending that Green’s motion for summary judgment be denied. 1 Doc. 57. Specifically, the magistrate judge found that there were genuine disputes of material 2 fact as to whether plaintiff was in acute pain, whether plaintiff did in fact have an infection when 3 Green declined to examine plaintiff or provide further pain medication, and whether plaintiff’s 4 “condition at that time did require additional pain medication.” Id. at 10, 11. The magistrate 5 judge also found that “a reasonable jury could find that Defendant Green acted with callous 6 indifference to Plaintiff’s medical condition,” and summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for 7 punitive damages should therefore be denied. Id. at 14. Finally, the magistrate judge concluded 8 that Green is not entitled to qualified immunity, finding that “[i]t is clearly established that a 9 failure to respond to Plaintiff’s pain constitutes deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” 10 Id. at 14–15 (citing Johnson v. Patel, No. CV 14-1598-RGK KK, 2015 WL 3866226, at *24 11 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2015)). 12 The findings and recommendations were served on all parties and contained notice that 13 any objections thereto were to be filed within thirty days after service, and that any response to 14 the objections were due within fourteen days after service of any objections. Id. at 15. Green 15 timely filed objections and plaintiff timely responded to Green’s objections. Docs. 58, 59. 16 In the objections, Green argues that he did provide pain medication to plaintiff, just not 17 the particular medication that plaintiff wanted. Doc. 58 at 3. According to Green, this case is 18 about a different of medical opinion, which is not sufficient to support a claim of deliberate 19 indifference. Id. at 3–5. Green also argues that the magistrate judge erred by considering medical 20 records from the day after Green examined plaintiff, because records from the relevant day 21 indicate that plaintiff had no infection. Id. at 5–6. Finally, Green argues that he is entitled to 22 qualified immunity because in this case, unlike in Johnson, plaintiff did receive some pain relief. 23 Id. at 6–8. 24 In his response to Green’s objections, plaintiff argues that a reasonable jury could find that 25 Green was aware that plaintiff was experiencing pain and intentionally chose to ignore it. Doc. 26 59 at 5. Plaintiff emphasizes that Green failed to examine him to determine whether the catheter 27 may have been affecting him internally. Id. at 6–8. Plaintiff provides a statement of disputed 28 factual issues and his own declaration in support of the position that the findings and 1 recommendations should be adopted. See generally Doc. 59. 2 In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this Court has conducted a de novo review of 3 this case. Having carefully reviewed the file, including defendant’s objections and plaintiff’s 4 response, the Court concludes that the findings and recommendations are supported by the record 5 and proper analysis. 6 To the extent the objections raise the same issues and arguments that were already 7 considered and rejected by the magistrate judge, Green has not identified any error of law or fact, 8 nor has he raised any new or persuasive grounds to warrant departure from the magistrate judge’s 9 well-reasoned analysis. 10 Green’s reliance on Jackson v. Multnomah Cnty., No. 3:12-CV-00764-SI, 2013 WL 11 428456 (D. Or. Feb. 4, 2013), for the proposition that the clearly established law applicable to this 12 case is that “differences of opinion between a doctor and a prisoner over the appropriate 13 medication to be prescribed does not implicate the Eighth Amendment” is not persuasive. In that 14 case, the plaintiff “was seen repeatedly by nurses, medical assistants, and nurse practitioners and 15 was also seen by an orthopedic specialist. He was given multiple xrays. The examinations and x- 16 rays were negative. Despite the negative results, based on his representations of his symptoms,” 17 the plaintiff “was provided with non-narcotic pain medication, a cane, a knee brace, and 18 additional diagnostic examinations.” Jackson, 2013 WL 428456, at *6. As noted in the findings 19 and recommendations, plaintiff’s contention in this case “is that Green should have examined him 20 or inquired further before dismissing his request, and that the examination would have revealed a 21 need for Tylenol 3” to address plaintiff’s pain. Doc. 57 at 10, 14–15. While Green failed to 22 examine plaintiff, when a doctor examined plaintiff the following day the doctor found that he 23 was suffering from an infection and immediately prescribed the heightened pain medication. 24 Jackson is therefore distinguishable. 25 Next, Green’s argument that the findings and recommendations improperly considered 26 evidence of plaintiff’s infection on October 18, 2021, when Nurse Angara noted the previous day 27 that there were no signs of skin infection to the catheter, is also unpersuasive. That evidence is 28 probative of whether plaintiff’s complaints of pain on October 17, 2021, reflected an emergent 1 | and serious medical condition that required treatment. The magistrate judge did not err in 2 | considering subsequent medical findings by a doctor within the following 24 hours as 3 | circumstantial evidence bearing on the seriousness of plaintiff's condition at the time that Green 4 | failed to examine him, and as bearing on whether Green’s earlier failure to treat constituted 5 | deliberate indifference to plaintiffs serious medical needs. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 6 | 1097-98 (9th Cir. 2006) (considering radiology report and summaries made subsequent to the 7 | plaintiffs thumb fracture which “clearly indicate[d], because the fracture did not align upon 8 | healing, [that] the thumb was deformed; [and that] this deformity was inferentially caused by the 9 | delay in referring him to an orthopedist who could have properly set and cast his fractured 10 | thumb.”). Moreover, while Nurse Angara’s notation arguably supports a finding that plaintiff did 11 | not have any external signs of infection on October 17, 2021, it does not address whether plaintiff 12 | had an internal infection.
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