(PC) Rannels v. Smith

District Court, E.D. California·Decided January 27, 2025·No. 1:21-cv-00049·Unknown

Opinion

DANIEL W. RANNELS, Case No. 1:21-cv-00049-KES-SKO (PC)

Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION v. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SMITH, et al., (Doc. 52) Defendants. 14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD Plaintiff Daniel W. Rannels is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims against Defendants Smith and Tortorice. (See Doc. 48.) Defendants filed a summary judgment motion on August 21, 2024. (Doc. 52.) On August 29, 2024, Defendants filed a “Motion to Stay Discovery and to Modify the Discovery and Scheduling Order.” (Doc. 53.) Defendants filed a reply on October 3, 2024. (Doc. 59.) On September 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Motion to the Court to Set Trial Date to Oppose Declaration of Howard E. Mosley to Prove Summary Judgment (Exhaustion).” (Doc. 54.) That same date, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Plaintiff’s Respond Motion for the Court to Proceed with Trial by Jury to Present Factual Evidence that Proves All Exhaustion(s); Have Been Lawfully Secured” (Doc. 55) and a document titled “Plaintiff Response to Rand Warning Regarding Opposing Summary Judgment” (Doc. 56). On September 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Plaintiff’s Notice Opposing Motion to Stay Discovery and to Modify the Discovery and Scheduling Order.” (Doc. 57.) On October 1, 2024, this Court issued its Order Granting Defendants’ Motion To Stay and Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motions Filed September 20, 2024. (Doc. 58.) In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Smith refused to order testing that would have provided Smith with medical information necessary to treat Plaintiff’s condition. Plaintiff contends Smith believed Plaintiff was “seeking to be prescripted a pain medication for enebreation purposes only” and that Plaintiff did not have a “chronic pain medical condition.” Smith refused to provide adequate pain medication and refused to refer Plaintiff to a pain management specialist, causing Plaintiff further harm. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Tortorice believed Plaintiff was “seeking to be intoxicated.” Despite being advised Plaintiff had received prior pain management treatment, Defendant Tortorice refused to refer Plaintiff to a pain management specialist, or to provide adequate pain medication or treatment, causing Plaintiff further harm. (See Doc. 32 at 3-4.) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 52) Defendants allege Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his deliberate indifference claims against Defendant Smith and Tortorice. Defendants contend the relevant grievances did not exhaust Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants because those grievances do not identify Defendants Smith and Tortorice and therefore failed to provide notice and/or did not involve headquarters level review. Plaintiff’s Opposition Plaintiff did not file an opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion; however, the Court considered the substance of his subsequently filed pleadings. In his pleading filed Howard E. Moseley, filed in support of Defendants’ pending motion. (See Doc. 54.) That same date, Plaintiff filed a document stating he “demands the request to present the proof of evidence to insure facts,” construed to be a request for an evidentiary hearing concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. (See Doc. 55.) Defendants’ Reply (Doc. 59) Defendants contend Plaintiff has failed to rebut the evidence submitted in support of the summary judgment motion, has failed to respond to or dispute any material facts, and has not shown the grievance process was unavailable to him. A. Summary Judgment Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party “initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may accomplish this by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or by showing that such materials “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, “the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment … is satisfied.” Id. at 323. B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory and “unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). Inmates are required to “complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 93 (2006). The exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002), regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner or offered by the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, which the defendant must plead and prove. Jones, 549 U.S. at 204, 216. The defendant bears the burden of producing evidence that proves a failure to exhaust; and, summary judgment is appropriate only if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, shows the plaintiff failed to exhaust. Albino v. Baca,

(PC) Rannels v. Smith, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

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