(PC) Rabb v. Figueroa

District Court, E.D. California·Decided April 4, 2024·No. 1:23-cv-00843·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DAMEN D. RABB, No. 1:23-cv-00843-JLT-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ 13 v. EXHAUSTION MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 14 ESTEVEN FIGUEROA, et al., (ECF No. 32) 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Isaiah J. Petillo is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 18 action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 19 Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment for failure to 20 exhaust the administrative remedies, filed February 20, 2024. 21 I. 22 RELEVANT BACKGROUND 23 This action is proceeding against Defendants Figueroa and Chavez for failure to protect 24 under the Eighth Amendment and retaliation under the First Amendment. 25 Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the time he filed the instant complaint. (ECF No. 26 1.) 27 Defendants filed an answer to the complaint on August 28, 2023. (ECF No. 16.) 28 On October 16, 2023, Plaintiff’s attorney moved to withdraw as counsel. (ECF No. 22.) 1 Defendants did not oppose the motion. (ECF No. 25.) On October 20, 2023, the Court granted 2 Plaintiff’s attorney’s motion for leave to withdraw as counsel. (ECF No. 26.) 3 On October 30, 2023, the Court issued the operative Amended Scheduling Order. (ECF 4 No. 27.) The Court set the deadline for amending the pleadings as January 30, 2024, and the 5 deadline for filing motions for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 6 as February 29, 2024. (Id. at 3.) 7 On February 5, 2024, Plaintiff lodged a first amended complaint (FAC) with the Court. 8 (ECF No. 28.) On February 8, 2024, the Court returned the proposed FAC to Plaintiff and 9 instructed him that he needed to file a motion for leave to amend the complaint or obtain 10 Defendants’ consent to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 29.) 11 On February 16, 2024, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the grounds that he 12 exhausted available administrative remedies. (ECF No. 30.) On February 20, 2024, the Court 13 issued findings and recommendations recommending that Plaintiff’s motion for summary 14 judgment be denied. (ECF No. 31.) 15 Later that day, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that 16 Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.1 (ECF No. 32.) 17 On February 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for leave to amend the complaint. 18 (ECF No. 33.) Plaintiff’s motion was not accompanied by a proposed amended complaint, but on 19 March 14, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a proposed amended complaint which is the same proposed 20 complaint constructively filed on January 30, 2024.2 (ECF No. 36.) Defendants filed an 21 opposition on March 4, 2024. (ECF No. 35.) On March 25, 2024, Findings and 22 Recommendations were issued to deny Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint. (ECF 23 No. 39.)

24 1 The motion was accompanied by a Rand warning, pursuant to Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012), Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998), and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988), as well as the 25 requirements for filing an opposition pursuant to Local Rule 260. (ECF No. 32-2.)

26 2 Under the “mailbox rule,” when a pro se inmate gives prison authorities a pleading to mail to court, the Court deems the pleading constructively “filed” on the date it is signed. Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th 27 Cir. 2010); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating the “mailbox rule applies to § 1983 suits filed by pro se prisoners”). 28 1 Plaintiff did not file an opposition and the time to do so has passed. Local Rule 230(l). 2 Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is deemed submitted for review. (Id.) 3 II. 4 LEGAL STANDARD 5 A. Statutory Exhaustion Requirement 6 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1995, requires that prisoners exhaust “such 7 administrative remedies as are available” before commencing a suit challenging prison 8 conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638 (2016) (“An 9 inmate, that is, must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones.”). 10 Exhaustion is mandatory unless unavailable. “The obligation to exhaust ‘available’ remedies 11 persists as long as some remedy remains ‘available.’ Once that is no longer the case, then there 12 are no ‘remedies … available,’ and the prisoner need not further pursue the grievance.” Brown v. 13 Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 14 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). 15 This statutory exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, Porter 16 v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (quotation marks omitted), regardless of the relief sought by 17 the prisoner or the relief offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. at 741, and 18 unexhausted claims may not be brought to court, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (citing 19 Porter, 534 U.S. at 524). 20 The failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and the defendants bear the burden of 21 raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216; Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 22 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). “In the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear from the face of 23 the complaint, a defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Albino, 747 F.3d at 24 1166. Otherwise, the defendants must produce evidence proving the failure to exhaust, and they 25 are entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56 only if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the 26 light most favorable to the plaintiff, shows he failed to exhaust. Id. 27 /// 28 /// 1 B. Summary Judgment Standard 2 Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall grant summary judgment 3 if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 4 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (quotation marks omitted); Albino, 5 747 F.3d at 1166; Washington Mut. Inc. v. U.S., 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each 6 party’s position, whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by (1) 7 citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, 8 documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the 9 presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible 10 evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The Court may 11 consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, although it is not required to do 12 so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 13 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Simmons v.

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