(PC) Pruden v. Amador County Jail

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedFebruary 13, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-00402
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Pruden v. Amador County Jail ((PC) Pruden v. Amador County Jail) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Pruden v. Amador County Jail, (E.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DUSTIN JAMES PRUDEN, No. 2:24-cv-0402 KJN P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 AMADOR COUNTY JAIL, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff is a county jail inmate proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983 and requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 19 This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 20 As set forth below, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied as moot, and it is 21 recommended that this action be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies without 22 prejudice to plaintiff’s re-filing of a new and separate civil action after he has fully complied with 23 the exhaustion mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 24 In Forma Pauperis 25 Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 26 (ECF No. 2.) However, because the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed for 27 failing to exhaust administrative remedies, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis should be 28 denied as moot. 1 Screening Standards 2 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 3 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 4 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner raised claims that are legally 5 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 6 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 7 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 8 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 9 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 10 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 11 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 12 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 13 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 14 2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 15 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 16 1227. 17 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 18 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 19 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 20 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 21 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 22 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 23 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. 24 However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the 25 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. 26 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal 27 quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as 28 true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the 1 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 2 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). 3 Pursuant to the initial screening of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court may 4 dismiss an action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Bennett v. King, 293 F.3d 5 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s sua sponte dismissal of prisoner’s complaint 6 because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies). Thereafter, failure to exhaust is an 7 affirmative defense that must be raised and proved by the defendant. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 8 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003). 9 Plaintiff’s Complaint 10 Plaintiff alleges his Eighth Amendment rights are being violated by the housing 11 accommodations at the Amador County Jail, which is severely overcrowded. Since plaintiff’s 12 incarceration, he has been housed in the day room, first on a “boat” (plastic bed), and then moved 13 to one of the six steel beds bolted to the wall in the dayroom. Plaintiff has had to share toilets, 14 showers, and sinks with other inmates. Plaintiff claims that inmates’ civil rights are overlooked 15 causing mental, emotional, and physical stress, the “retaliation or lockdowns are depressing, 16 anger has risen in all matters.” (ECF No. 1 at 2.) As defendants, plaintiff names Amador County 17 Jail “staff,” and he does not identify the relief sought. (ECF No. 1 at 3-4.) 18 Discussion 19 It is obvious from the face of the complaint that plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative 20 remedies prior to bringing this action. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) 21 Plaintiff’s claims challenging his conditions of confinement are subject to the Prison 22 Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “The PLRA mandates that inmates 23 exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing ‘any suit challenging prison 24 conditions,’ including, but not limited to, suits under § 1983.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 25 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006)). The Supreme Court 26 has held that courts may not excuse an inmate’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior 27 to bringing suit under the PLRA, even under “special” circumstances. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 28 1850 (2016).

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Scheuer v. Rhodes
416 U.S. 232 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Davis v. Scherer
468 U.S. 183 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Booth v. Churner
532 U.S. 731 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Woodford v. Ngo
548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden America, Inc.
591 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2009)
Harry Franklin v. Ms. Murphy and Hoyt Cupp
745 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Juan Albino v. Lee Baca
747 F.3d 1162 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Ross v. Blake
578 U.S. 632 (Supreme Court, 2016)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
McKinney v. Carey
311 F.3d 1198 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)

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Bluebook (online)
(PC) Pruden v. Amador County Jail, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-pruden-v-amador-county-jail-caed-2024.