1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAMES E. POTTS, No. 2:22-CV-0628-TLN-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 BENTLEY, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, ECF No. 42. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 7 I. BACKGROUND 8 A. Procedural History 9 This action was initiated with a pro se complaint filed in the Fresno Division of 10 this Court on October 16, 2019. See ECF No. 1. On April 8, 2022, the action was transferred to 11 the Sacramento Division and assigned to the undersigned. See ECF No. 26. Pursuant to the April 12 8, 2022, order, Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint on July 20, 2022. See ECF No. 37. 13 Thereafter, the Court dismissed the second amended complaint with leave to amend. See ECF 14 No. 39. Specifically, the Court stated:
15 Potts alleges that Dr. Bentley replaced effective pain medication prescribed by a pain specialist with ineffective pain 16 medication. ECF No. 37 at 8. Potts was kept on the ineffective pain medication despite meeting with Dr. Bentley multiple times and 17 complaining that the new medication was not working for him. Id. at 9. The claim cannot survive unless Potts pleads facts that show that the 18 alternative medical prescribed by Dr. Bentley was both medically unacceptable under the circumstances and chosen in conscious disregard 19 of an excessive risk to his health. Potts’ and the pain specialist’s mere disagreement with the medication prescribed by Dr. Bentley is 20 insufficient. Plaintiff will be provided an additional opportunity to amend.
21 ECF No. 39, pg. 4. 22 Plaintiff timely filed his third amended complaint on October 19, 2023. See ECF 23 No. 42. 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 2 As with the second amended complaint, Plaintiff continues to name Doctor Jim 3 Bentley (“Defendant”) as the sole defendant. See id. at 7-8. Plaintiff alleges two claims for relief, 4 both of which proceed under the same operative set of facts. See id. at 7-12. 5 In both Claims I and II, Plaintiff makes identical statements in support of his 6 claims. See id. at 7,12. In 2016, Plaintiff had surgery to remove a tumor from his lung and claims 7 to have suffered chronic pain related to that surgery in the following years. See id. at 7. Plaintiff 8 claims to have met with a Dr. Rodriguez on February 17, 2019. See id. At this meeting, Dr. 9 Rodriguez prescribed Gabapentin, which Plaintiff claims relieved him of the chronic pain. See id. 10 On February 19, 2019, Plaintiff was transferred to California State Prison – Solano. See id. On 11 the following day, Plaintiff was informed that Defendant had reviewed Plaintiff’s file and 12 discontinued his prescription for Gabapentin. See id. Plaintiff was later prescribed an alternative 13 medication to handle his pain but claims that the alternative was ineffective in managing his 14 chronic pain. See id. at 8. Plaintiff claims to have expressed his continued pain to Defendant in 15 their later meetings. See id. 16 17 II. DISCUSSION 18 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 19 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 20 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 21 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 22 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 23 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 24 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 25 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 26 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 27 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 28 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 1 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 2 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 3 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 4 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious 5 injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; 6 see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health 7 needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is 8 sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant 9 injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 10 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAMES E. POTTS, No. 2:22-CV-0628-TLN-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 BENTLEY, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, ECF No. 42. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 7 I. BACKGROUND 8 A. Procedural History 9 This action was initiated with a pro se complaint filed in the Fresno Division of 10 this Court on October 16, 2019. See ECF No. 1. On April 8, 2022, the action was transferred to 11 the Sacramento Division and assigned to the undersigned. See ECF No. 26. Pursuant to the April 12 8, 2022, order, Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint on July 20, 2022. See ECF No. 37. 13 Thereafter, the Court dismissed the second amended complaint with leave to amend. See ECF 14 No. 39. Specifically, the Court stated:
15 Potts alleges that Dr. Bentley replaced effective pain medication prescribed by a pain specialist with ineffective pain 16 medication. ECF No. 37 at 8. Potts was kept on the ineffective pain medication despite meeting with Dr. Bentley multiple times and 17 complaining that the new medication was not working for him. Id. at 9. The claim cannot survive unless Potts pleads facts that show that the 18 alternative medical prescribed by Dr. Bentley was both medically unacceptable under the circumstances and chosen in conscious disregard 19 of an excessive risk to his health. Potts’ and the pain specialist’s mere disagreement with the medication prescribed by Dr. Bentley is 20 insufficient. Plaintiff will be provided an additional opportunity to amend.
21 ECF No. 39, pg. 4. 22 Plaintiff timely filed his third amended complaint on October 19, 2023. See ECF 23 No. 42. 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 2 As with the second amended complaint, Plaintiff continues to name Doctor Jim 3 Bentley (“Defendant”) as the sole defendant. See id. at 7-8. Plaintiff alleges two claims for relief, 4 both of which proceed under the same operative set of facts. See id. at 7-12. 5 In both Claims I and II, Plaintiff makes identical statements in support of his 6 claims. See id. at 7,12. In 2016, Plaintiff had surgery to remove a tumor from his lung and claims 7 to have suffered chronic pain related to that surgery in the following years. See id. at 7. Plaintiff 8 claims to have met with a Dr. Rodriguez on February 17, 2019. See id. At this meeting, Dr. 9 Rodriguez prescribed Gabapentin, which Plaintiff claims relieved him of the chronic pain. See id. 10 On February 19, 2019, Plaintiff was transferred to California State Prison – Solano. See id. On 11 the following day, Plaintiff was informed that Defendant had reviewed Plaintiff’s file and 12 discontinued his prescription for Gabapentin. See id. Plaintiff was later prescribed an alternative 13 medication to handle his pain but claims that the alternative was ineffective in managing his 14 chronic pain. See id. at 8. Plaintiff claims to have expressed his continued pain to Defendant in 15 their later meetings. See id. 16 17 II. DISCUSSION 18 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 19 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 20 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 21 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 22 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 23 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 24 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 25 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 26 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 27 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 28 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 1 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 2 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 3 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 4 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious 5 injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; 6 see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health 7 needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is 8 sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant 9 injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 10 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). 11 Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition 12 is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily 13 activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See 14 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 15 The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases 16 than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with 17 medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin, 18 974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to 19 decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 20 1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See 21 Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical 22 treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See 23 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate 24 that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 25 Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give 26 rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a 27 difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate 28 course of treatment does not generally give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. 1 McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). However, a claim involving alternate courses of 2 treatment may succeed where the plaintiff shows: (1) the chosen course of treatment was 3 medically unacceptable under the circumstances; and (2) the alternative treatment was chosen in 4 conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 5 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). 6 In the Court’s prior order, Plaintiff was informed that his claim against Defendant 7 Bentley based on an alternate course of treatment cannot proceed unless Plaintiff alleges facts 8 showing both that the chosen course of treatment is medically unacceptable, and the alternative 9 treatment was chosen in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. See ECF 10 No. 39, pg. 4. In the pending third amended complaint, Plaintiff continues to fail to plead these 11 essential facts. As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s claim amounts to nothing more than a difference 12 of medical opinion concerning the appropriate medication, which is not cognizable. See Jackson, 13 90 F.3d at 332. 14 / / / 15 / / / 16 / / / 17 / / / 18 / / / 19 / / / 20 / / / 21 / / / 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Il. CONCLUSION 2 Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be 3 || cured by amending the complaint further, Plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to 4 || dismissal of the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 5 || banc). 6 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed 7 || for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 8 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 9 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days 10 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 11 || objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of 12 || objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See 13 || Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 14 15 | Dated: May 15, 2024 Ss..c0_, 16 DENNIS M. COTA 17 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28