(PC) Pina v. Ysusi

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedApril 1, 2025
Docket1:20-cv-01735
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Pina v. Ysusi ((PC) Pina v. Ysusi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Pina v. Ysusi, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PABLO P. PIÑA, Case No. 1:20-cv-01735-BAM (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT GONZALES’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 13 v. JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 14 YSUSI, et al., (ECF No. 41) 15 Defendants. 16 17 I. Background 18 Plaintiff Pablo P. Piña (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights 19 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint 20 against Defendant Ysusi for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment and against 21 Defendant J. Gonzales for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. All parties have 22 consented to United States Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 36, 39.) 23 On April 18, 2022, Defendant Gonzales (“Defendant”) filed a motion for summary 24 judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies for his 25 claims in this action before filing suit.1 (ECF No. 41.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on July 13, 26 2022. (ECF No. 49.) Defendant filed a reply on July 26, 2022. (ECF No. 50.)

27 1 Concurrent with this motion, Plaintiff was provided with notice of the requirements for opposing a motion for summary judgment. See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012); Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th 28 Cir. 1988); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411–12 (9th Cir. 1988). (ECF No. 41-11.) 1 The motion for summary judgment is deemed submitted.2 Local Rule 230(l). 2 II. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 3 A. Statutory Exhaustion Requirement 4 Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provides that “[n]o action 5 shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal 6 law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 7 administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is 8 required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the 9 process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and the exhaustion requirement applies to 10 all prisoner suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 11 The failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and the defendants bear the burden of 12 raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007); Albino, 13 747 F.3d at 1166. “In the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, 14 a defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. Otherwise, 15 the defendants must produce evidence proving the failure to exhaust, and they are entitled to 16 summary judgment under Rule 56 only if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most 17 favorable to the plaintiff, shows they failed to exhaust. Id. 18 Defendant must first prove that there was an available administrative remedy and that 19 Plaintiff did not exhaust that available remedy. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th 20 Cir. 2015) (citing Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172) (quotation marks omitted). The burden then shifts to 21 Plaintiff to show something in her particular case made the existing and generally available 22 administrative remedies effectively unavailable to her. Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191 (citing Albino, 23 747 F.3d at 1172) (quotation marks omitted). The ultimate burden of proof on the issue of 24 exhaustion remains with Defendant. Id. (quotation marks omitted). 25 /// 26 /// 27 2 This motion was dropped inadvertently by the Court’s CM/ECF reporting/calendaring system resulting in the 28 prolonged delay in resolution. 1 B. Summary Judgment Standard 2 Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall grant summary judgment 3 if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 4 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (quotation marks omitted); Albino, 5 747 F.3d at 1166; Wash. Mut. Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each 6 party’s position, whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by 7 (1) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, 8 documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the 9 presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible 10 evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The Court may 11 consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, although it is not required to do 12 so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 13 2001); accord Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). 14 The defendant bears the burden of proof in moving for summary judgment for failure to 15 exhaust, Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166, and must “prove that there was an available administrative 16 remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy,” id. at 1172. If the defendant 17 carries their burden, the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff “to come forward with 18 evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and 19 generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. “If undisputed 20 evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant 21 is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56.” Id. at 1166. However, “[i]f material facts are 22 disputed, summary judgment should be denied, and the district judge rather than a jury should 23 determine the facts.” Id. 24 III. Discussion 25 A. Summary of CDCR’s Administrative Review Process 26 At the relevant time, “[t]he California prison grievance system ha[d] three levels of 27 review; an inmate exhausts administrative remedies by obtaining a decision at each level.” Reyes 28 v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b) (repealed 1 June 1, 2020) & Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 2010)). See also Cal. Code Regs. 2 tit.

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Booth v. Churner
532 U.S. 731 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Porter v. Nussle
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Jones v. Bock
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Harvey v. Jordan
605 F.3d 681 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz.
609 F.3d 1011 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Barton v. Clancy
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Earnest Woods, II v. Tom Carey
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Bowie v. Gonzales
433 F. Supp. 2d 24 (District of Columbia, 2006)
Burch v. Regents of the University of California
433 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (E.D. California, 2006)
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Bluebook (online)
(PC) Pina v. Ysusi, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-pina-v-ysusi-caed-2025.