(PC) Payne v. Baser

District Court, E.D. California·Decided April 2, 2021·No. 2:20-cv-00553·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAVANCE ROSS PAYNE, No. 2: 20-cv-0553 TLN KJN P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 BASER, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 I. Introduction 18 Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 19 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 20 the grounds that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. (ECF No. 36.) For the 21 reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion be granted. 22 II. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment 23 Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the standard set forth in 24 Federal Rule of Civil procedure 56 is met. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the 25 movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 26 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 27 Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis 28 for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, 1 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate 2 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 3 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting then-numbered Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 56(c)). 5 “Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need 6 only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Nursing 7 Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.), 627 F.3d 376, 8 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory 9 committee’s notes to 2010 amendments (recognizing that “a party who does not have the trial 10 burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot 11 produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact”). Indeed, summary judgment 12 should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 13 make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 14 and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. 15 “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case 16 necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. 17 Consequently, if the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to 18 the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See 19 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to 20 establish the existence of such a factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the 21 allegations or denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 22 form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material in support of its contention that such a 23 dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party 24 must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome 25 of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 26 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 27 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 28 a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 1 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled in part on other grounds, Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 2 1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990). 3 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 4 establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 5 dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 6 trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 7 the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 8 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 9 amendments). 10 In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, 11 answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. 12 Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 13 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be 14 drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences 15 are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual 16 predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. 17 Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to 18 demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 19 some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could 20 not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 21 trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted). 22 By notice provided on November 9, 2020 (ECF No. 32), and December 9, 2020 (ECF No. 23 36-1), plaintiff was advised of the requirements for opposing a motion brought pursuant to Rule 24 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 25 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). 26 Legal Standard for Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 27 Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) provides that “[n]o 28 action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983

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