(PC) Papazian v. Doerer

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAMES MICAHEL PAPAZIAN, Case No. 1:24-cv-01182-JLT-HBK (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 13 v. DISMISS ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE1

14 J. DOERER, 14-DAY DEADLINE 15 Defendant.

16 17 18 Plaintiff John Meza is a federal prisoner previously incarcerated in United States 19 Penitentiary in Atwater (“USP Atwater”) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 20 rights action on his First Amended Complaint. (Doc. Nos. 4, 6). For the reasons set forth below, 21 the undersigned recommends that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice for 22 Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order and prosecute this action. 23 BACKGROUND 24 After Plaintiff’s action was severed (Doc. No. 1), Plaintiff filed a First Amended 25 Complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics2 26

27 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 (E.D. Cal. 2022). 28 2 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 1 (“Bivens”) and the Federal Torts Claim Act (“FTCA”) stemming from a sixty (60) day lockdown 2 at USP Atwater. (See generally Doc. No. 4). Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that during a 60-day 3 institutional lockdown, Plaintiff was confined to his cell for 24 hours a day and did not have 4 access to: (1) administrative grievance forms; (2) courts; (3) communication; (4) mail; (5) 5 medical treatment; (6) personal property; (7) commissary; and (8) cleaning supplies. (See 6 generally, id.). As a result of the lockdown, Plaintiff generally alleged unspecified claims under 7 the FTCA against the United States, and claims against the individual defendants for alleged 8 violations of his First Amendment rights to free speech and access to the courts; Fifth 9 Amendment due process rights; Eighth Amendment rights, asserting that the conditions of 10 confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment and Defendants exhibited deliberate 11 indifference to medical needs; and Fourth Amendment rights against illegal search and seizure. 12 (Id. at 4-10). 13 On April 1, 2025, Court issued a screening order, pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915A finding the 14 First Amended Complaint, as pled, failed to state any viable Bivens or FTCA claims. (Doc. No. 15 20). The Court advised Plaintiff of the applicable law and pleading requirements and afforded 16 Plaintiff three options to exercise before May 15, 2025: (1) file an amended complaint; (2) file a 17 notice that he intends to stand on his initial complaint subject to the undersigned recommending 18 the district court dismiss the First Amended Complaint for reasons stated in the April 1, 2025 19 Screening Order; or (3) file a notice to voluntarily dismiss this action, without prejudice, under 20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) because no defendant had yet been served. (Id. at 8). 21 The Court expressly warned Plaintiff that if he “fails to timely respond to this Court Order or seek 22 an extension of time to comply” the undersigned “will recommend that the district court dismiss 23 this case as a sanction for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order and prosecute this 24 action.” (Id. at 9, ¶ 2). On May 22, 2025. The Court afforded Plaintiff an extension of time until 25 June 27, 2025 to comply the April 1, 2025 Screening Order. (Doc. No. 25). The Court again 26 warned Plaintiff that his failure to timely deliver his response to correctional officials for mailing 27 by June 27, 2025 would result in the recommendation that this action be dismissed, either as a 28 sanction for failure to comply with a court order or for failure to prosecute this action consistent 1 with Local Rule 110. (Id. at 2, ¶ 3). As of the date of this of this Findings and 2 Recommendation, Plaintiff has failed to exercise any of the three options from the Court’s 3 Screening Order, or request an extension of time to comply, and the time to do so has expired.3 4 See docket. 5 APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS 6 A. Legal Standard 7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the court to involuntarily dismiss an action 8 when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with other Rules or with a court 9 order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 889 10 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Similarly, this Court’s Local Rules, which correspond with 11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, provide, “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with … 12 any order of the Court may be grounds for the imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions … 13 within the inherent power of the Court.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 110. “District courts have inherent power 14 to control their dockets” and, in exercising that power, may impose sanctions, including dismissal 15 of an action. Thompson v. Housing Auth., City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). 16 A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, obey a court 17 order, or comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 18 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order to amend a complaint); Malone v. U.S. 19 Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court 20 order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for failure to 21 prosecute and to comply with local rules). In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court 22 must consider the following factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 23 litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; 24 (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less 25 drastic sanctions. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423; Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 26 1988). 27 3 Almost 30 days have passed since the date Plaintiff was deliver his response to the Screening Order to correctional 28 officials for mailing. 1 B. Analysis 2 After considering each of the above-stated factors, the undersigned concludes dismissal 3 without prejudice is warranted in this case. As to the first factor, the expeditious resolution of 4 litigation is deemed to be in the public interest, satisfying the first factor. Yourish v. California 5 Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1999). 6 Turning to the second factor, this Court’s need to efficiently manage its docket cannot be 7 overstated. This Court has one of the heaviest caseloads in the nation, and due to the delay in 8 filling judicial vacancies, which was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, operated 9 under a declared judicial emergency through May 2, 2021. See In re Approval of the Judicial 10 Emergency Declared in the Eastern District of California, 956 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2020). This 11 Court’s time is better spent on its other matters than needlessly consumed managing a case with a 12 recalcitrant litigant. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket when a litigant ceases to 13 litigate his/her case or respond to a court order. Thus, the Court finds that the second factor 14 weighs in favor of dismissal. 15 Delays inevitably have the inherent risk that evidence will become stale or witnesses’ 16 memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a defendant, thereby satisfying the third 17 factor. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Thus, the third factor—risk of prejudice 18 to defendant—weighs in favor of dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the 19 unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 20 1976). Because Plaintiff’s inaction amounts to an unreasonable delay in prosecuting this action, 21 the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 22 The fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors the 23 disposition of cases on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). 24 However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case 25 toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction,” which is 26 the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 27 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Indeed, “trial courts do not have time to waste on 28 multiple failures by aspiring litigants to follow the rules and requirements of our courts.” 1 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 644 (9th Cir. 2002) (Trott, J., concurring in affirmance of 2 district court’s involuntary dismissal with prejudice of habeas petition where petitioner failed to 3 timely respond to court order and noting “the weight of the docket-managing factor depends upon 4 the size and load of the docket, and those in the best position to know what that is are our 5 beleaguered trial judges.”). Further, as set forth in the Screening Order, the Court already 6 determined that the Complaint, as pled, failed to state a claim, so this factor does not weigh in 7 favor of the Plaintiff. 8 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in 9 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 10 Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s May 22, 2025 Order 11 again expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to timely comply with the Court’s order would 12 result in a recommendation of dismissal of this action “either as a sanction for failure to comply 13 with a court order or for failure to prosecute this action consistent with Local Rule 110.” (Doc. 14 25 at 2, ¶ 3). Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal could result from his 15 noncompliance. And the instant dismissal is a dismissal without prejudice, which is a lesser 16 sanction than a dismissal with prejudice, thereby satisfying the fifth factor. 17 After considering the factors set forth supra and binding case law, the undersigned 18 recommends dismissal, without prejudice, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Local Rule 110. 19 Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED: 20 This action be DISMISSED without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to obey a court order 21 and failure to prosecute this action. 22 //// 23 //// 24 NOTICE 25 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 26 Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days 27 of the date of service of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written objections 28 with the Court. The document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 1 | and Recommendations.” A party’s failure to file objections within the specified time may result in 2 | waiver of his rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 3 | Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 4 > | Dated: _ July 25, 2025 Mihaw. □□□ foareA Zacks 6 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA 4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28