1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GLENN O’CONNOR, No. 2:19-cv-1867-WBS-EFB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND 15 REHABILITATION, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this action brought pursuant to 19 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 8, 10) and 20 a motion for extension of time and/or stay (ECF No. 9). 21 Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and Motion for Extension/Stay 22 Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). 23 Accordingly, by separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect 24 and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. 25 § 1915(b)(1) and (2). 26 Further, plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time and/or stay in order to submit a 27 completed in forma pauperis application (ECF No. 9) is denied as unnecessary. 28 ///// 1 Screening Standards 2 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 3 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion 5 of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 6 relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 7 relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). 8 A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and 10 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the 11 defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 12 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 13 While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8, 14 its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 15 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 16 To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked 17 assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 18 action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 19 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 20 678. 21 Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. 22 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 23 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 24 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a 25 claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. 26 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 27 plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 28 ///// 1 Screening Order 2 Plaintiff alleges that Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3006(a) violates his right to due process in 3 violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 Specifically, he claims that the provision against 4 “constructive possession” of dangerous property allows for those who are actually innocent of the 5 offense to be found guilty. Plaintiff claims he had been disciplinary-free for 29 years, and that 6 because of the regulation, he was found guilty of a disciplinary charge (for which he was 7 innocent), which was then relied upon to deny him parole. ECF No. 1 at 7. Plaintiff states that he 8 “has no legal method of demanding that other prisoners obey the laws or prison rules [and] thus[,] 9 remains at risk from every other prisoner who decides he wants to acquire contraband.” Id. at 17. 10 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 11 to strike down the regulation as unconstitutional. Id. at 6. Alternatively, he requests that he be 12 assigned to a single-cell. 13 Plaintiff’s claim is not viable as alleged because the only defendant named is the 14 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). CDCR, however, is a state 15 agency that is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of 16 State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) 17 (per curiam) (holding that prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claims against CDCR for damages and 18 injunctive relief were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. 19 v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state 20 agencies). The proper defendant for injunctive relief in a suit seeking a change of CDCR policy 21 is the CDCR Secretary in his official capacity. Rouser v. White, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1066 22 (E.D. Cal. 2010), 23 Moreover, plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged an interest protected by the due process 24 clause. Plaintiff claims his right to due process was violated because the guilty finding was relied 25 upon in part by the Board of Prison Terms to deny him parole, and that this may occur again in 26 1 Plaintiff also attempts to categorize his claim as an Eighth Amendment violation (ECF 27 No. 1 at 16). But even so characterized, the claim fails because he has not shown that CDCR’s practices deny him “the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities.” See Farmer v. 28 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 1 the future and he is subject to an indeterminate life sentence. ECF No. 1 at 7. It is well- 2 established, however, that “[t]here is no right under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally 3 released before the expiration of a valid sentence, and the States are under no duty to offer parole 4 to their prisoners.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011). Whatever liberty interest in 5 parole is created by state law is a “state interest” that is not substantively enforceable in the 6 federal courts. Id. 7 Leave to Amend 8 Plaintiff may choose to amend his complaint. If plaintiff chooses to amend, he must name 9 as a defendant an individual who can carry out the injunctive relief he requests (i.e., the warden 10 where he is presently housed and/or the current CDCR Secretary).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GLENN O’CONNOR, No. 2:19-cv-1867-WBS-EFB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND 15 REHABILITATION, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this action brought pursuant to 19 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 8, 10) and 20 a motion for extension of time and/or stay (ECF No. 9). 21 Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and Motion for Extension/Stay 22 Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). 23 Accordingly, by separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect 24 and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. 25 § 1915(b)(1) and (2). 26 Further, plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time and/or stay in order to submit a 27 completed in forma pauperis application (ECF No. 9) is denied as unnecessary. 28 ///// 1 Screening Standards 2 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 3 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion 5 of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 6 relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 7 relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). 8 A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and 10 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the 11 defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 12 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 13 While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8, 14 its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 15 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 16 To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked 17 assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 18 action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 19 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 20 678. 21 Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. 22 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 23 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 24 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a 25 claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. 26 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 27 plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 28 ///// 1 Screening Order 2 Plaintiff alleges that Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3006(a) violates his right to due process in 3 violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 Specifically, he claims that the provision against 4 “constructive possession” of dangerous property allows for those who are actually innocent of the 5 offense to be found guilty. Plaintiff claims he had been disciplinary-free for 29 years, and that 6 because of the regulation, he was found guilty of a disciplinary charge (for which he was 7 innocent), which was then relied upon to deny him parole. ECF No. 1 at 7. Plaintiff states that he 8 “has no legal method of demanding that other prisoners obey the laws or prison rules [and] thus[,] 9 remains at risk from every other prisoner who decides he wants to acquire contraband.” Id. at 17. 10 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 11 to strike down the regulation as unconstitutional. Id. at 6. Alternatively, he requests that he be 12 assigned to a single-cell. 13 Plaintiff’s claim is not viable as alleged because the only defendant named is the 14 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). CDCR, however, is a state 15 agency that is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of 16 State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) 17 (per curiam) (holding that prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claims against CDCR for damages and 18 injunctive relief were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. 19 v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state 20 agencies). The proper defendant for injunctive relief in a suit seeking a change of CDCR policy 21 is the CDCR Secretary in his official capacity. Rouser v. White, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1066 22 (E.D. Cal. 2010), 23 Moreover, plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged an interest protected by the due process 24 clause. Plaintiff claims his right to due process was violated because the guilty finding was relied 25 upon in part by the Board of Prison Terms to deny him parole, and that this may occur again in 26 1 Plaintiff also attempts to categorize his claim as an Eighth Amendment violation (ECF 27 No. 1 at 16). But even so characterized, the claim fails because he has not shown that CDCR’s practices deny him “the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities.” See Farmer v. 28 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 1 the future and he is subject to an indeterminate life sentence. ECF No. 1 at 7. It is well- 2 established, however, that “[t]here is no right under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally 3 released before the expiration of a valid sentence, and the States are under no duty to offer parole 4 to their prisoners.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011). Whatever liberty interest in 5 parole is created by state law is a “state interest” that is not substantively enforceable in the 6 federal courts. Id. 7 Leave to Amend 8 Plaintiff may choose to amend his complaint. If plaintiff chooses to amend, he must name 9 as a defendant an individual who can carry out the injunctive relief he requests (i.e., the warden 10 where he is presently housed and/or the current CDCR Secretary). 11 The amended complaint must also contain a caption including the names of all defendants. 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). 13 Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging new, unrelated claims. See 14 George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Nor may he bring unrelated claims against 15 multiple defendants. Id. 16 Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it so that it is complete in itself 17 without reference to any earlier filed complaint. E.D. Cal. L.R. 220. This is because an amended 18 complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is filed, the 19 earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Forsyth v. Humana, 114 20 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (the “‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter 21 being treated thereafter as non-existent.’”) (quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 22 1967)). 23 Any amended complaint should be as concise as possible in fulfilling the above 24 requirements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff should avoid the inclusion of procedural or factual 25 background which has no bearing on his legal claims. He should also take pains to ensure that his 26 amended complaint is as legible as possible. This refers not only to penmanship, but also spacing 27 and organization. Plaintiff should carefully consider whether each of the defendants he names 28 ///// 1 | actually had involvement in the constitutional violations he alleges. A “scattershot” approach in 2 | which plaintiff names dozens of defendants will not be looked upon favorably by the court. 3 Conclusion 4 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 5 1. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 8, 10) is GRANTED; 6 2. Plaintiff shall pay the statutory filing fee of $350. All payments shall be collected in 7 || accordance with the notice to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed 8 || concurrently herewith; 9 3. Plaintiff's request for an extension of time and/or stay (ECF No. 9) is denied as 10 || unnecessary; 11 4. Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed with leave to amend within 30 days 12 | from the date of service of this order; and 13 5. Failure to comply with this order may result in dismissal of this action. 14 | DATED: February 10, 2020. 15 tid, PDEA 16 EDMUND F. BRENNAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28