1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAMES MUNOZ, Case No. 1:20-cv-01201-HBK (PC)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER TO ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE 13 v. 14 DR. KIRAN TOOR, DR. V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION FOR FAILURE TO MUNUNURI, DR. MONIVIRIN SON, 15 PROSECUTE ACTION1
Defendants. 16 14-DAY DEADLINE
17 18 Plaintiff James Munoz is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 5) in this 19 civil rights action. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the District 20 Court dismiss this action without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this action. 21 BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff Munoz, a former state prisoner, 2 is proceeding pro se on his initial civil rights 23 complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging four distinct medical deliberate indifference claims 24 under the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. No. 1, “Complaint”). On March 6, 2023, the Court issued a 25 screening order finding the Complaint contained misjoined claims and none of the four claims 26
27 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 (E.D. Cal. 2022). 2 Plaintiff initiated this action while incarcerated but filed a change of address indicating he is no longer in 1 stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment medical deliberate indifference claim. (See generally 2 Doc. No. 9). Plaintiff was given three options to exercise within twenty-one (21) days from 3 receipt of the March 6, 2023 Order: (1) file a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”); (2) file a notice 4 that he intends to stand on his initial complaint subject to the undersigned recommending the 5 district court dismiss for reasons stated in the March 6, 2023 Screening Order; or (3) file a notice 6 to voluntarily dismiss this action, without prejudice, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7 41(a)(1) because no defendant had yet been served. (Id. at 10, ¶ 1). The Court expressly warned 8 Plaintiff that if he “fails to timely respond to this Court Order or seek an extension of time to 9 comply,” the undersigned would “recommend the district court dismiss this action for Plaintiff’s 10 failure to comply with this Court Order and prosecute this action.” (Id., ¶ 2). The twenty-one 11 (21) day deadline has lapsed, and Plaintiff has not elected any of the three options or otherwise 12 moved for an extension of time.3 (See generally docket). 13 APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS 14 A. Legal Standard 15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the court to involuntarily dismiss an action 16 when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with other Rules or with a court 17 order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 889 18 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Similarly, the Local Rules, corresponding with Federal Rule 19 of Civil Procedure 11, provide, “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with … any order of 20 the Court may be grounds for the imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions … within the 21 inherent power of the Court.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 110. “District courts have inherent power to control 22 their dockets” and, in exercising that power, may impose sanctions, including dismissal of an 23 action. Thompson v. Housing Auth., City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A 24 court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, obey a court order, 25 or comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) 26 (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order to amend a complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal 27 3 The undersigned further notes that as of the date of these Findings and Recommendations 35 days has passed. Thus, Plaintiff was afforded more than sufficient time (an additional 14 days) to account for delay 1 Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order); 2 Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for failure to prosecute and 3 to comply with local rules). In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must 4 consider several factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the 5 Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public 6 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 7 sanctions. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423; Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 8 B. Analysis 9 The undersigned considers each of the above-stated factors and concludes dismissal is 10 warranted in this case. As to the first factor, the expeditious resolution of litigation is deemed to 11 be in the public interest, satisfying the first factor. Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 12 990-91 (9th Cir. 1999). Turning to the second factor, the Court’s need to efficiently manage its 13 docket cannot be overstated. This Court has “one of the heaviest caseloads in the nation,” and 14 due to unfilled judicial vacancies, which is further exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, 15 operates under a declared judicial emergency. See Amended Standing Order in Light of Ongoing 16 Judicial Emergency in the Eastern District of California. The Court’s time is better spent on its 17 other matters than needlessly consumed managing a case with a recalcitrant litigant. The Court 18 cannot effectively manage its docket if a plaintiff ceases to litigate his case. Thus, the Court finds 19 that both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal. 20 Delays inevitably have the inherent risk that evidence will become stale or witnesses’ 21 memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a defendant, thereby satisfying the third 22 factor. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Thus, the third factor, risk of prejudice 23 to defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the 24 occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 25 524 (9th Cir. 1976). Plaintiff’s inaction amounts to an unreasonable delay in prosecuting this 26 action, weighing in favor of dismissal for a risk of prejudice to defendants. 27 Finally, the fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors 1 “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward 2 disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction,” which is the case 3 here.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAMES MUNOZ, Case No. 1:20-cv-01201-HBK (PC)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER TO ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE 13 v. 14 DR. KIRAN TOOR, DR. V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION FOR FAILURE TO MUNUNURI, DR. MONIVIRIN SON, 15 PROSECUTE ACTION1
Defendants. 16 14-DAY DEADLINE
17 18 Plaintiff James Munoz is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 5) in this 19 civil rights action. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the District 20 Court dismiss this action without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this action. 21 BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff Munoz, a former state prisoner, 2 is proceeding pro se on his initial civil rights 23 complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging four distinct medical deliberate indifference claims 24 under the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. No. 1, “Complaint”). On March 6, 2023, the Court issued a 25 screening order finding the Complaint contained misjoined claims and none of the four claims 26
27 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 (E.D. Cal. 2022). 2 Plaintiff initiated this action while incarcerated but filed a change of address indicating he is no longer in 1 stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment medical deliberate indifference claim. (See generally 2 Doc. No. 9). Plaintiff was given three options to exercise within twenty-one (21) days from 3 receipt of the March 6, 2023 Order: (1) file a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”); (2) file a notice 4 that he intends to stand on his initial complaint subject to the undersigned recommending the 5 district court dismiss for reasons stated in the March 6, 2023 Screening Order; or (3) file a notice 6 to voluntarily dismiss this action, without prejudice, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7 41(a)(1) because no defendant had yet been served. (Id. at 10, ¶ 1). The Court expressly warned 8 Plaintiff that if he “fails to timely respond to this Court Order or seek an extension of time to 9 comply,” the undersigned would “recommend the district court dismiss this action for Plaintiff’s 10 failure to comply with this Court Order and prosecute this action.” (Id., ¶ 2). The twenty-one 11 (21) day deadline has lapsed, and Plaintiff has not elected any of the three options or otherwise 12 moved for an extension of time.3 (See generally docket). 13 APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS 14 A. Legal Standard 15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the court to involuntarily dismiss an action 16 when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with other Rules or with a court 17 order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 889 18 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Similarly, the Local Rules, corresponding with Federal Rule 19 of Civil Procedure 11, provide, “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with … any order of 20 the Court may be grounds for the imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions … within the 21 inherent power of the Court.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 110. “District courts have inherent power to control 22 their dockets” and, in exercising that power, may impose sanctions, including dismissal of an 23 action. Thompson v. Housing Auth., City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A 24 court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, obey a court order, 25 or comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) 26 (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order to amend a complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal 27 3 The undersigned further notes that as of the date of these Findings and Recommendations 35 days has passed. Thus, Plaintiff was afforded more than sufficient time (an additional 14 days) to account for delay 1 Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order); 2 Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for failure to prosecute and 3 to comply with local rules). In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must 4 consider several factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the 5 Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public 6 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 7 sanctions. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423; Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 8 B. Analysis 9 The undersigned considers each of the above-stated factors and concludes dismissal is 10 warranted in this case. As to the first factor, the expeditious resolution of litigation is deemed to 11 be in the public interest, satisfying the first factor. Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 12 990-91 (9th Cir. 1999). Turning to the second factor, the Court’s need to efficiently manage its 13 docket cannot be overstated. This Court has “one of the heaviest caseloads in the nation,” and 14 due to unfilled judicial vacancies, which is further exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, 15 operates under a declared judicial emergency. See Amended Standing Order in Light of Ongoing 16 Judicial Emergency in the Eastern District of California. The Court’s time is better spent on its 17 other matters than needlessly consumed managing a case with a recalcitrant litigant. The Court 18 cannot effectively manage its docket if a plaintiff ceases to litigate his case. Thus, the Court finds 19 that both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal. 20 Delays inevitably have the inherent risk that evidence will become stale or witnesses’ 21 memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a defendant, thereby satisfying the third 22 factor. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Thus, the third factor, risk of prejudice 23 to defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the 24 occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 25 524 (9th Cir. 1976). Plaintiff’s inaction amounts to an unreasonable delay in prosecuting this 26 action, weighing in favor of dismissal for a risk of prejudice to defendants. 27 Finally, the fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors 1 “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward 2 disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction,” which is the case 3 here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th 4 Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Indeed, “trial courts do not have time to waste on multiple failures 5 by aspiring litigants to follow the rules and requirements of our courts.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 6 291 F.3d 639, 644 (9th Cir. 2002) (Trott, J., concurring in affirmance of district court’s 7 involuntary dismissal with prejudice of habeas petition where petitioner failed to timely respond 8 to court order and noting “the weight of the docket-managing factor depends upon the size and 9 load of the docket, and those in the best position to know what that is are our beleaguered trial 10 judges.”). Notably, the Court has already screened the Complaint and found it failed to state a 11 meritorious claim as plead. 12 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in 13 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 14 Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s March 6, 2023 Screening 15 Order expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to comply with the Court’s order would result in 16 a recommendation for dismissal of this action. Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that 17 dismissal could result from his noncompliance. And the instant dismissal is a dismissal without 18 prejudice, which is a lesser sanction than a dismissal with prejudice, thereby addressing the fifth 19 factor. 20 After considering the factors set forth supra and binding case law, the undersigned 21 recommends dismissal, without prejudice, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 and Local Rule 110. 22 Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 23 The Clerk of the Court randomly assign this case to a District Judge. 24 It is further RECOMMENDED: 25 This action be DISMISSED without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to obey court orders 26 and/or failure to prosecute this action. 27 //// 1 NOTICE 2 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 3 | Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within 14 days 4 | of the date of service of these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 5 | objections with the Court. The document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 6 | Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiffs failure to file objections within the specified time 7 | may result in waiver of his rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 8 | 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 9 Dated: __April 11, 2023 Mile. □□□ foareA Hack 11 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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