(PC) Muniz v. Pfeiffer

District Court, E.D. California·Decided November 22, 2022·No. 1:19-cv-00233·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CELINA MUNIZ, et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-00233-JLT-CDB

12 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 13 v. MOTION FOR DISCOVERY EXTENSION; GRANTING EXTENSION 14 C. PFEIFFER, et al., IN TIME TO OPPOSE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 15 Defendants. (ECF No. 80) 16 17 18 INTRODUCTION 19 This is an action by the estate of Daniel Muniz (the decedent) and his mother Celina 20 Muniz against staff from the Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP). On November 14, 2022, 21 Plaintiffs filed the instant motion seeking a 120-day extension in the time to complete fact 22 discovery, and a corresponding four-month extension in the time to oppose Defendants’ motion 23 for summary judgment. (Doc. 80). In the motion, Plaintiffs first contend that they need 24 additional time to depose two named defendants and a percipient witness. Next, Plaintiffs argue 25 they need additional time to discover the identities of custodial officers who were on duty during 26 the shift that turned over at 6:00 a.m. on the day of the incident. Finally, Plaintiffs seek a 27 corresponding extension in time to oppose Defendants’ pending motion for summary judgement 28 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) so that they can incorporate in their anticipated 1 opposition papers the information learned during the requested discovery extension. By their 2 motion, Plaintiffs also seek leave to amend the complaint to add as-yet identified Defendants. 3 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 4 Plaintiffs raise a series of civil rights and negligence claims against Defendants stemming 5 from another inmate’s alleged killing of the decedent on or about March 24, 2018. The 6 Defendants named in the operative, Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 25, filed October 15, 7 2019) are Christian Pfeiffer (warden), Ralph Diaz, D. Goss (assistant warden), Jeremy Custer, J. 8 Fitzpatrick, M. Faulkner, A. Diaz-Albarran, R. Calderon, and Marques Jones. 9 In their initial Joint Scheduling Report filed November 26, 2019, the parties estimated that 10 fact discovery would require 11 months to complete. (Doc. 31 at Par. II(D)(1)). Plaintiffs 11 represented that during fact discovery, they would depose “[a]ll named defendants.” (Id. at Par. 12 II(B)(i)). Plaintiffs also committed to filing any amended pleadings four-and-a-half months prior 13 to the close of fact discovery. (Id. at Par. III). 14 The proceedings were stayed in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. That stay 15 was lifted on June 3, 2021. (Doc. 59). Thereafter, the parties submitted a proposal for 16 rescheduled discovery dates, which the Court approved in its updated Scheduling Order. (Doc. 17 62). Among other things, the parties estimated that fact discovery would require eight additional 18 months to complete – by February 25, 2022. 19 On October 25, 2021, the parties filed their Joint Mid-Discovery Conference Report. 20 (Doc. 63). Plaintiffs represented that they still intended to depose the named defendants, 21 including D. Goss, and that they did not expect “any of the depositions [to] take very long.” (Id. 22 at Par. I(c))). Plaintiffs also represented that they intended to propound interrogatories. (Id. at 23 Par. I(b)). Finally, the parties represented that they had prepared a proposed protective order that 24 they expected to file shortly. (Id. at Par. I(d)). Both parties represented that they had no 25 discovery disputes and neither party identified any impediment to completing fact discovery 26 within the Court-ordered timeframe. 27 On February 15, 2022 – almost four months later and with only ten days left within which 28 to complete fact discovery – the parties filed a stipulation seeking, among other things, a 90-day 1 extension in the time to finish fact discovery. (Doc. 69). The parties represented that the 2 additional time was not being requested and would not be used for additional written discovery, 3 but rather, was needed to “complete the outstanding written discovery responses and document 4 production.” (Id. at Par. 7). The parties again reported that they had prepared a stipulated 5 protective order (presumably, the same protective order the parties already had prepared and 6 reported to the Court almost four months earlier), and that the protective order “will be filed 7 within five days of the date of this stipulation.” (Id. at Par. 4). In fact, as explained below, the 8 protective order would not be filed until four months later. 9 On June 3, 2022, the parties filed a stipulation seeking another extension in the time to 10 finish fact discovery. (Doc. 71). The parties repeated representations they had made in the earlier 11 stipulation: that a protective order had been prepared and would be filed within five days, and 12 that the requested 120-day extension would not be used to propound additional written discovery, 13 but to complete ongoing discovery. The parties newly reported that they would notice 14 depositions of the named parties during the week of July 18, 2022. 15 On August 29, 2022, the parties filed a stipulation seeking another extension in the time to 16 finish fact discovery. (Doc. 75). The parties represented that an additional 90 days was necessary 17 to complete ongoing discovery and take depositions of the named parties “in September and/or 18 October.” 19 In none of the aforementioned joint reports or stipulations for discovery extensions did 20 either party identify to the Court any dispute concerning discovery. On November 8, 2022, 21 Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 79). 22 LEGAL STANDARD 23 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, a scheduling order “may be modified only for 24 good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “Rule 16(b)'s ‘good cause’ 25 standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. 26 Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). If the moving party is unable to 27 reasonably meet a deadline despite acting diligently, the scheduling order may be modified. Id. 28 If, however, the moving party “‘was not diligent, the inquiry should end’ and the motion to 1 modify should not be granted.” Zivkovic v. So. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2 2002) (quoting Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609). 3 Separately the Court may deny a motion for leave to amend if permitting an amendment 4 would, among other things, cause an undue delay in the litigation or prejudice the opposing party. 5 Courts have found amendments to be prejudicial when leave to amend is requested as a discovery 6 deadline nears or has already passed. See, e.g., Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at 1087; Lockheed Martin 7 Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999). Prejudice is inherent where the 8 requested leave to amend is made shortly before discovery closes with a looming trial date and 9 pending dispositive motions. 10 ANALYSIS 11 In their motion and supporting declaration and during a status conference on the motion 12 held November 21, 2022 (Doc. 84), Plaintiffs argue that the period for engaging in fact discovery 13 should be continued for four additional months.

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