1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANSAR EL MUHAMMAD, No. 2:19-cv-01289-KJM-CKD-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 F. ORR, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 19 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 20 Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Since plaintiff has submitted a 21 declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), his request will be granted. 22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 23 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the 24 initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. 25 Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding 26 month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by 27 the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account 28 exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 1 I. Allegations in the Complaint 2 As an initial matter, the court notes that plaintiff did not sign the complaint. Rule 11(a) of 3 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires every pleading to be signed. See also Local Rule 4 131(b). Plaintiff’s unsigned complaint fails to comply with Rule 11. The court cannot consider 5 unsigned filings and the complaint shall be stricken from the record for that reason. Fed. R. Civ. 6 P. 11; Local Rule 131. Plaintiff has thirty days to file a signed complaint. Because plaintiff is 7 proceeding pro se, the court has identified the appropriate legal standards governing the 8 allegations in the complaint and identified potential defects. Plaintiff is advised to heed these 9 standards when preparing a new, signed complaint. 10 While the court is unable to screen plaintiff’s unsigned complaint, a brief review of the 11 complaint demonstrates that it contains allegations that various correctional officers and health 12 care workers at Mule Creek State Prison were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious 13 medical needs between August 28, 2018 through September 25, 2018 in violation of the Eighth 14 Amendment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (identifying the grounds for dismissal when the court 15 screens a complaint brought by a prisoner seeking “redress from a governmental entity or officer 16 or employee of a governmental entity”). 17 II. Legal Standards 18 There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 19 connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 20 362, 371, 376 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). “Vague and 21 conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. 22 Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 23 Additionally, “[t]here is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.” Taylor v 24 List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). “A defendant may be held liable as a 25 supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the 26 constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful 27 conduct and the constitutional violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) 28 (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) ). A supervisor may be liable for the 1 constitutional violations of his subordinates if he “knew of the violations and failed to act to 2 prevent them.” Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. Finally, supervisory liability may also exist without 3 any personal participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is 4 a repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” 5 Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotation 6 marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 7 Denial or delay of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a 8 violation of the prisoner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 9 97, 104-05 (1976). An individual is liable for such a violation only when the individual is 10 deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.; see Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 11 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez v. 12 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000). 13 In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. Jett, 439 14 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other 15 grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). First, the 16 plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s 17 condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 18 pain.’” Id., citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. “Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he 19 existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 20 comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 21 individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Lopez, 203 F. 3d 22 at 1131-1132, citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60. 23 Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 24 indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This second prong is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act 25 or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 26 indifference. Id. Under this standard, the prison official must not only “be aware of facts from 27 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but that person 28 “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANSAR EL MUHAMMAD, No. 2:19-cv-01289-KJM-CKD-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 F. ORR, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 19 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 20 Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Since plaintiff has submitted a 21 declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), his request will be granted. 22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 23 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the 24 initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. 25 Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding 26 month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by 27 the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account 28 exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 1 I. Allegations in the Complaint 2 As an initial matter, the court notes that plaintiff did not sign the complaint. Rule 11(a) of 3 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires every pleading to be signed. See also Local Rule 4 131(b). Plaintiff’s unsigned complaint fails to comply with Rule 11. The court cannot consider 5 unsigned filings and the complaint shall be stricken from the record for that reason. Fed. R. Civ. 6 P. 11; Local Rule 131. Plaintiff has thirty days to file a signed complaint. Because plaintiff is 7 proceeding pro se, the court has identified the appropriate legal standards governing the 8 allegations in the complaint and identified potential defects. Plaintiff is advised to heed these 9 standards when preparing a new, signed complaint. 10 While the court is unable to screen plaintiff’s unsigned complaint, a brief review of the 11 complaint demonstrates that it contains allegations that various correctional officers and health 12 care workers at Mule Creek State Prison were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious 13 medical needs between August 28, 2018 through September 25, 2018 in violation of the Eighth 14 Amendment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (identifying the grounds for dismissal when the court 15 screens a complaint brought by a prisoner seeking “redress from a governmental entity or officer 16 or employee of a governmental entity”). 17 II. Legal Standards 18 There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 19 connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 20 362, 371, 376 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). “Vague and 21 conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. 22 Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 23 Additionally, “[t]here is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.” Taylor v 24 List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). “A defendant may be held liable as a 25 supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the 26 constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful 27 conduct and the constitutional violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) 28 (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) ). A supervisor may be liable for the 1 constitutional violations of his subordinates if he “knew of the violations and failed to act to 2 prevent them.” Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. Finally, supervisory liability may also exist without 3 any personal participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is 4 a repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” 5 Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotation 6 marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 7 Denial or delay of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a 8 violation of the prisoner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 9 97, 104-05 (1976). An individual is liable for such a violation only when the individual is 10 deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.; see Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 11 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez v. 12 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000). 13 In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. Jett, 439 14 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other 15 grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). First, the 16 plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s 17 condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 18 pain.’” Id., citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. “Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he 19 existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 20 comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 21 individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Lopez, 203 F. 3d 22 at 1131-1132, citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60. 23 Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 24 indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This second prong is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act 25 or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 26 indifference. Id. Under this standard, the prison official must not only “be aware of facts from 27 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but that person 28 “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This “subjective 1 approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was.” Id. at 839. A 2 showing of merely negligent medical care is not enough to establish a constitutional violation. 3 Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106. A 4 difference of opinion about the proper course of treatment is not deliberate indifference, nor does 5 a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials over the necessity for or extent of medical 6 treatment amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 7 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, mere delay of 8 medical treatment, “without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical 9 indifference.” Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 10 Where a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the 11 prisoner must show that the delay caused “significant harm and that Defendants should have 12 known this to be the case.” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 745-46; see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 13 To state a claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must plead specific facts 14 showing an agreement or meeting of minds between the defendants to violate his constitutional 15 rights. Woodrum v. Woodward Cty., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff must also 16 show how an actual deprivation of his constitutional rights resulted from the alleged conspiracy. 17 Id. “‘To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, 18 but each participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.’” Franklin v. 19 Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United Steel Workers of Am. V. Phelps Dodge 20 Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1541 (9th Cir. 1989) ). 21 III. Amending the Complaint 22 When filing a new complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions complained 23 of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 24 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, plaintiff must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is 25 involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link 26 or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 27 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil 28 rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 1 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 2 | make plaintiff's new complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 3 | complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 4 | amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th 5 | Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a new complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any 6 | function in the case. Therefore, in a new complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and 7 | the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 8 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 9 1. Plaintiffs request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted. 10 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. All fees 11 | shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California 12 | Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith. 13 3. Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) is stricken from the docket because it is unsigned. 14 4, Within 30 days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall file a signed complaint that 15 | complies with the legal standards identified in this order. 16 5. The Clerk of Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the civil rights complaint 17 | form. 18 6. Plaintiff is warned that his failure to comply with this order will result in a 19 || recommendation that this action be dismissed. 20 | Dated: February 28, 2020 Ci ide f | fe 71 CAROLYN K. DELANEY : 22 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 24 25 26 12/muha1289.unsigned.docx 27 28