(PC) Mrozek v. Eaton

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 8, 2025
• Docket: 1:24-cv-00664
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRADLEY JAMES MROZEK, No. 1:24-cv-00664-KES-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS 13 v. (ECF No. 28) 14 PATRICK EATON, et al.,

15 Defendants.

16 17 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. 19 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed December 6, 20 2024. 21 I. 22 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 23 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 24 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 25 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 26 “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that 27 “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 28 1 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 2 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 3 pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 4 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 5 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 6 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 7 that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. 8 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 9 Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 10 liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 11 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 12 facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 13 that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss 14 v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 15 has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 16 liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d 17 at 969. 18 II. 19 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 20 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in his complaint as true only for the purpose of 21 the screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 22 Plaintiff was housed at the Sierra Conservation Center and assigned to vocational welding 23 training where he suffered and sustained a head injury and burns by falling metal debris. Plaintiff 24 subsequently filed a report of unsafe work environment and thereafter he was denied access to the 25 vocational welding shop by the instructor in retaliation. Defendant T. Isman also issued a false 26 rules violation report which was dismissed. 27 Defendant denied and interfered with Plaintiff’s request for access to vocational welding 28 to complete his rehabilitative training to provide credit towards his release date. 1 III. 2 DISCUSSION 3 A. Retaliation 4 “Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials and to 5 be free from retaliation for doing so.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) 6 (citing Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009)). “Within the prison context, a 7 viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a 8 state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected 9 conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and 10 (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 11 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). To state a cognizable retaliation claim, Plaintiff must 12 establish a nexus between the retaliatory act and the protected activity. Grenning v. Klemme, 34 13 F.Supp.3d 1144, 1153 (E.D. Wash. 2014). Mere verbal harassment or abuse does not violate the 14 Constitution and, thus, does not give rise to a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 15 Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987). In addition, threats do not rise to the 16 level of a constitutional violation. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). 17 Prisoners do not have a liberty interest in being free from false accusations of misconduct. 18 This means that the falsification of a report, even when intentional, does not alone give rise to a 19 claim under § 1983. Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The prison inmate 20 has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct 21 which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.”); Buckley v. Gomez, 36 F. 22 Supp. 2d 1216, 1222 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that “a prisoner does not have a constitutional right 23 to be free from wrongfully issued disciplinary reports[ ]”). 24 However, there are two ways that allegations that an inmate has been subjected to a false 25 disciplinary report can state a cognizable civil rights claim: (1) when the prisoner alleges that the 26 false disciplinary report was filed in retaliation for his exercise of a constitutional right; and (2) 27 when the prisoner alleges that they were not afforded procedural due process in a proceeding 28 concerning a false report. See Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing 1 retaliation claim against a correctional officer based upon the correctional officer’s false 2 accusations of violating a prison rule); Freeman, 808 F.2d at 951 (holding that the filing of a false 3 disciplinary charge against a prisoner is not actionable under § 1983 if prison officials provide the 4 prisoner with procedural due process protections); Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140-41 5 (7th Cir. 1984) (same). 6 A plaintiff must plead facts that suggest that retaliation for the exercise of protected 7 conduct was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the defendant’s conduct. Action. 8 Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d at 1270 (9th Cir. 2009); Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 9 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Capp v. Cnty. of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th Cir. 10 2019) (“[P]laintiff must show that the defendant’s retaliatory animus was ‘a “but-for” cause, 11 meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff would not have been taken absent the 12 retaliatory motive.’ ”) (citation omitted). A causal connection between the adverse action and the 13 protected conduct can be alleged by an allegation of a chronology of events from which 14 retaliation can be inferred. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d at 1114. The filing of grievances and the 15 pursuit of civil rights litigation against prison officials are both protected activities. Rhodes v. 16 Robinson, 408 F.3d at 567-68. The plaintiff must allege either a chilling effect on future First 17 Amendment activities, or that he suffered some other harm that is “more than minimal.” Watison 18 v. Carter, 668 F.3d at 1114. “[A]n objective standard governs the chilling inquiry; a plaintiff does 19 not have to show that ‘his speech was actually inhibited or suppressed,’ but rather that the adverse 20 action at issue ‘would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment 21 activities.’ ” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d at 1271 (quoting Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d at 568- 22 69). Accordingly, the plaintiff need not allege an explicit, specific threat. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 23 F.3d at 1270. A plaintiff successfully pleads that the action did not reasonably advance a 24 legitimate correctional goal by alleging, in addition to a retaliatory motive, that the defendant’s 25 actions were “arbitrary and capricious” or that they were “unnecessary to the maintenance of 26 order in the institution.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d at 1114. 27 Here, liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to a cognizable 28 retaliation claim against Defendant T. Isman based on the issuance of an alleged false rules 1 violation and denial of access to vocational training because he exercised his rights under the First 2 Amendment. 3 B. Denial of Vocational Training 4 As Plaintiff was previously advised, to the extent Plaintiff contends that he has a legal 5 right to vocational training, Plaintiff is advised that there is no constitutional right to education, 6 rehabilitation, or employment in prison. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) 7 (deprivation of rehabilitation and educational programs does not violate Eighth Amendment); 8 Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 450 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Prisoners have no constitutional right to 9 educational or vocational opportunities during incarceration.”); Beck v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 757, 10 762 (5th Cir.1988) (“[A] state has no constitutional obligation to provide basic educational or 11 vocational training to prisoners.”); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.1985) (no right 12 to vocational course for rehabilitation); Baumann v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 13 846 (9th Cir.1985) (general limitation of jobs and educational opportunities is not considered 14 punishment); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1254–55 (9th Cir.1982) (“there is no 15 constitutional right to rehabilitation”); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir.1977) 16 (state has no obligation to provide prisoners with educational programs); Chapman v. Plageman, 17 417 F.Supp. 906, 907 (9th Cir. 1976) (“[A]n inmate has no constitutional right to any particular 18 job status while incarcerated.”); Harris v. Sivley, 951 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Prisoners have 19 no constitutional right to a prison job.”); Bravot v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., No. CIVS050113-FCD- 20 GGH-P, 2006 WL 47398, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2006) (“Since plaintiff does not have a 21 constitutional right to a prison job, much less to a particular job, he is not entitled to due process 22 procedural protections prior to being deprived of his work, nor is he constitutionally entitled to 23 any back wages for the loss of that job nor to reinstatement in his old position, which 24 reinstatement he has nevertheless apparently attained at this point.”); see also Rainer v. Chapman, 25 513 F. App’x. 674, 675 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the district court properly dismissed the 26 California prisoner-plaintiff’s “due process claims based on his removal from his work 27 assignment and transfer from the facility where his job was located because these allegations did 28 not give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest”); Barno v. Ryan, 399 F. 1 App’x. 272, 273 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that possible loss of a state prison job due to a 2 California state prisoner’s classification as a sex offender did not violate the prisoner’s Fourteenth 3 Amendment or Eighth Amendment rights). 4 C. Equal Protection 5 Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are 6 treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio 7 School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Prisoners are protected from invidious 8 discrimination based on race. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Racial 9 segregation is unconstitutional within prisons save for the necessities of prison security and 10 discipline. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam). Prisoners are also protected 11 from intentional discrimination on the basis of their religion. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 12 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997). Equal protection claims are not necessarily limited to racial and 13 religious discrimination. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 2001) 14 (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim by a disabled plaintiff because the disabled 15 do not constitute a suspect class); see also Tatum v. Pliler, No. CIV S-03-0324 FCD EFB P, 2007 16 WL 1720165 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim based on 17 denial of in-cell meals where no allegation of race-based discrimination was made); Harrison v. 18 Kernan, 971 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying intermediate scrutiny to claim of discrimination 19 on the basis of gender). 20 In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 21 Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acted with intentional 22 discrimination against plaintiff, or against a class of inmates which included plaintiff, and that 23 such conduct did not relate to a legitimate penological purpose. See Village of Willowbrook v. 24 Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that equal protection claims may be brought by a “class 25 of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. 26 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 27 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985). 28 /// 1 Plaintiff states that he was denied equal protection of the law. However, Plaintiff has 2 failed to set forth facts demonstrating any of the Defendants acted with intentional discrimination. 3 Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege that he is a member of a suspect classification under the 4 Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. 5 D. Further Leave to Amend 6 If the court finds that a complaint or claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, 7 the court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Leave to amend should be 8 granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if a 9 plaintiff is pro se. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Cato v. 10 United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be given leave to 11 amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that 12 the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” (citation omitted). 13 However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear that a claim cannot be cured by amendment, 14 the Court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105-06. 15 In light of Plaintiff’s failure to provide additional information about his claims despite 16 specific instructions from the Court, further leave to amend would be futile and the second 17 amended complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend. Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 18 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would 19 be futile.”). For this reason, further leave to amend the complaint should be denied. 20 IV. 21 RECOMMENDATIONS 22 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 23 1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Defendant T. Isman; 24 and 25 2. All other claims and Defendants be dismissed from the action for failure to state a 26 cognizable claim for relief. 27 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 28 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 1 | (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 2 | objections with the Court, limited to 15 pages in length, including exhibits. The document should 3 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is 4 | advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights 5 | onappeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 6 | Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. FA. ee 9 | Dated: _ January 8, 2025 STANLEY A. BOONE 10 United States Magistrate Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28