(PC) Morgan v. Brown

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedSeptember 29, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-01433
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Morgan v. Brown ((PC) Morgan v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Morgan v. Brown, (E.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 ARSENIO RUSSHON MORGAN, No. 2:20-cv-1433-EFB P 11 Plaintiff, 12 v. ORDER 13 MICHAEL BROWN, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. 17 § 1983, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 2. 18 Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 19 Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). 20 Accordingly, by separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect 21 and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915(b)(1) and (2). 23 Screening Requirements 24 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 25 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 26 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 27 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 28 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 1 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 2 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 3 Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 4 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Jackson v. Arizona, 5 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation and internal quotations omitted), superseded by statute 6 on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Neitzke, 490 7 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, 8 has an arguable legal and factual basis. Id. 9 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 10 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 11 what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 12 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 13 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more 14 than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 15 allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citations 16 omitted). “[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that 17 merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (alteration in original) 18 (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d 19 ed. 2004)). 20 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 21 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 22 Corp., 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 23 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 24 misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint 25 under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, 26 Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trs., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), as well as construe the pleading 27 in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. 28 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 1 Screening Order 2 Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) includes the following allegations: On November 21, 3 2018, Dr. Michael Brown of the Sonoma Valley Hospital performed surgery on plaintiff’s right 4 knee. Id. at 3. Prior to the surgery, Dr. Brown noted the presence of a “metallic fragment” that 5 was “just anterior to the distal femur,” and could “conceivably . . . lead to pain.” Id. Plaintiff, 6 who now lives in “constant pain,” alleges that it was “professional negligence to deliberately 7 engage [in] surgery without removing the metallic fragment . . . .” Id. Plaintiff claims that 8 despite physical therapy and medication, his pain is not going away. Id. at 5. He alleges that his 9 primary care provider at California State Prison, Solano, Dr. Jaime Cortes, has subjected him to 10 cruel and unusual punishment by failing to order the removal of the metal. Id. Plaintiff asserts 11 Eighth Amendment claims of deliberate indifference to medical needs against Drs. Brown and 12 Cortes. As discussed below, the allegations are not sufficient to survive screening. 13 “Prison officials are indifferent to prisoners’ serious medical needs when they deny, delay, 14 or intentionally interfere with medical treatment.” Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th 15 Cir. 1992). To establish deliberate indifference with respect to a physician’s treatment decision, a 16 plaintiff must allege that “the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable 17 under the circumstances, and the plaintiff must show that they chose this course in conscious 18 disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th 19 Cir. 1996) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Mere differences of medical opinion 20 are insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. See Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th 21 Cir. 1989) (“At most, Sanchez has raised a difference of medical opinion regarding his treatment. 22 A difference of opinion does not amount to a deliberate indifference to Sanchez’ serious medical 23 needs.”). 24 Here, the allegations demonstrate nothing further than a difference of opinion between 25 plaintiff and his medical providers. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Brown viewed the metallic fragment 26 as “conceivably” leading to pain. There are no allegations suggesting that proceeding with the 27 surgery was medically unacceptable under those circumstances or posed an excessive risk to 28 plaintiff’s health. Similarly, plaintiff’s allegations against Dr.

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Jenkins v. McKeithen
395 U.S. 411 (Supreme Court, 1969)
Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital
425 U.S. 738 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N. A.
550 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Richard E. Loux v. B. J. Rhay, Warden
375 F.2d 55 (Ninth Circuit, 1967)
Harry Franklin v. Ms. Murphy and Hoyt Cupp
745 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Eric Sanchez v. Duane R. Vild
891 F.2d 240 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)
Dennis Hamilton v. Roger v. Endell
981 F.2d 1062 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
George v. Smith
507 F.3d 605 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Johnson v. Duffy
588 F.2d 740 (Ninth Circuit, 1978)

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Bluebook (online)
(PC) Morgan v. Brown, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-morgan-v-brown-caed-2020.