(PC) Moore v. Mendoza

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedJuly 15, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-01397
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Moore v. Mendoza ((PC) Moore v. Mendoza) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Moore v. Mendoza, (E.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARCUS J. MOORE, No. 2:20-cv-1397 KJN P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MENDOZA, 15 Defendant. 16 17

18 19 Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 20 § 1983, and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This 21 proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 22 Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 23 Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 24 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 25 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in 26 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 27 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 28 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff is obligated to make monthly payments 1 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. These 2 payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the 3 amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1915(b)(2). 5 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 6 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 7 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 8 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 9 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 10 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 11 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 12 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 13 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 14 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 15 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 16 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 17 2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 18 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 19 1227. 20 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 21 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 22 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 23 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 24 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 25 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 26 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. 27 However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the 28 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. 1 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal 2 quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as 3 true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the 4 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 5 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). 6 Plaintiff alleges that on July 5, 2019, defendant placed handcuffs on plaintiff “very 7 forcefully,” and hit plaintiff “very hard on [his] lower back.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) 8 “In its prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ the Eighth Amendment places 9 restraints on prison officials, who may not . . . use excessive physical force against prisoners.” 10 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). “[W]henever prison officials stand accused of 11 using excessive physical force in violation of the [Eighth Amendment], the core judicial inquiry 12 is. . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or 13 maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). 14 When determining whether the force was excessive, the court looks to the “extent of injury 15 suffered by an inmate. . . the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and 16 the amount of force used, the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,’ and ‘any 17 efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (quoting 18 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)). While de minimis uses of physical force generally 19 do not implicate the Eighth Amendment, significant injury need not be evident in the context of 20 an excessive force claim, because “[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force 21 to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. 22 The court finds the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint so vague and conclusory that it is 23 unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief.

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Scheuer v. Rhodes
416 U.S. 232 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Davis v. Scherer
468 U.S. 183 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Whitley v. Albers
475 U.S. 312 (Supreme Court, 1986)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Hudson v. McMillian
503 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
673 F.2d 266 (Second Circuit, 1982)
Harry Franklin v. Ms. Murphy and Hoyt Cupp
745 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Sergio Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino
806 F.3d 1002 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Uriarte v. United States
14 F.2d 164 (E.D. New York, 1926)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

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(PC) Moore v. Mendoza, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-moore-v-mendoza-caed-2020.