1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM ERIK MONROE, No. 2:19-CV-2218-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 G. MORTELL, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1). 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 8 Plaintiff names six defendants: (1) G. Mortell, (2) N. Dordon, (3) C. Cervantes, (4) 9 M. Knedler, (5) Marion E. Spearman, and (6) T. Thompson. Plaintiff claims defendants violated 10 his First Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by their actions, or 11 lack thereof, relating to defendant Mortell repeatedly harassing plaintiff. 12 Defendant Mortell is alleged to have repeatedly used derogatory, discriminatory, 13 and racist language towards plaintiff intending to threaten, provoke, and humiliate him. 14 Defendant Mortell also allegedly retaliated against plaintiff for a grievance he filed against 15 Mortell and for plaintiff seeking mental health treatment. Defendant Mortell told his colleagues 16 that he intended to harass plaintiff until he “got the response he desired.” ECF 1 at 6. On May 17 13, 2019, defendant Mortell verbally sexually harassed plaintiff with the intention of humiliating 18 and threatening plaintiff. On May 24, 2019, defendant Mortell ordered another unidentified 19 correctional officer to destroy plaintiff’s new mattress without justification or cause. On August 20 27, 2019, defendant Mortell removed plaintiff’s T.V. antenna without justification or cause. 21 Plaintiff alleges he received multiple 115 rule violations by defendant Mortell in retaliation for 22 filing grievances against defendant Mortell. As punishment for the retaliatory 115 rule violations, 23 plaintiff alleges defendant Dordon authorized defendant Mortell’s request to have plaintiff move 24 housing units on multiple occasions to be under defendant Mortell’s supervision and continued 25 harassment. Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendant Mortell ordered plaintiff’s status to change 26 for 60 days, prohibiting him from working his job assignment and thereby losing his employment. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 On May 13, 2019, plaintiff informed defendant Dordon he was sexually harassed 2 by defendant Mortell. As supervisor, defendant Dordon allowed defendant Mortell to continue 3 harassing plaintiff, and authorized housing changes at defendant Mortell’s request. Similarly, 4 plaintiff alleges defendants Cervantes, Knedler, and Spearman are liable insofar as a general 5 failure to act in their roles as supervisors. However, only defendant Spearman officially 6 acknowledged defendant Mortell harassing plaintiff by correspondence dated July 24, 2019. 7 8 II. DISCUSSION 9 Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to state cognizable claims of verbal harassment, 10 discrimination, and retaliation against defendant Mortell, violating plaintiff’s Eighth, Fourteenth, 11 and First Amendment rights respectively. Plaintiff also states a cognizable Eighth Amendment 12 claim against defendant Dordon, Mortell’s supervisor. The Court, however, does not find that 13 plaintiff has alleged sufficient factual allegations to state cognizable claims against defendants 14 Cervantes, Knedler, Thompson, or Spearman. 15 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 16 employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no 17 respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional 18 violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The 19 Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on 20 knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government 21 officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct 22 and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory 23 personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 24 constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be 25 liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. 26 Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 2 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 3 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 4 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in 5 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 6 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 7 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676. 8 Plaintiff merely alleges defendants Cervantes, Knedler, Thompson, and Spearman 9 could have prevented defendant Mortell’s harassing behavior, which is insufficient.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM ERIK MONROE, No. 2:19-CV-2218-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 G. MORTELL, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1). 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 8 Plaintiff names six defendants: (1) G. Mortell, (2) N. Dordon, (3) C. Cervantes, (4) 9 M. Knedler, (5) Marion E. Spearman, and (6) T. Thompson. Plaintiff claims defendants violated 10 his First Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by their actions, or 11 lack thereof, relating to defendant Mortell repeatedly harassing plaintiff. 12 Defendant Mortell is alleged to have repeatedly used derogatory, discriminatory, 13 and racist language towards plaintiff intending to threaten, provoke, and humiliate him. 14 Defendant Mortell also allegedly retaliated against plaintiff for a grievance he filed against 15 Mortell and for plaintiff seeking mental health treatment. Defendant Mortell told his colleagues 16 that he intended to harass plaintiff until he “got the response he desired.” ECF 1 at 6. On May 17 13, 2019, defendant Mortell verbally sexually harassed plaintiff with the intention of humiliating 18 and threatening plaintiff. On May 24, 2019, defendant Mortell ordered another unidentified 19 correctional officer to destroy plaintiff’s new mattress without justification or cause. On August 20 27, 2019, defendant Mortell removed plaintiff’s T.V. antenna without justification or cause. 21 Plaintiff alleges he received multiple 115 rule violations by defendant Mortell in retaliation for 22 filing grievances against defendant Mortell. As punishment for the retaliatory 115 rule violations, 23 plaintiff alleges defendant Dordon authorized defendant Mortell’s request to have plaintiff move 24 housing units on multiple occasions to be under defendant Mortell’s supervision and continued 25 harassment. Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendant Mortell ordered plaintiff’s status to change 26 for 60 days, prohibiting him from working his job assignment and thereby losing his employment. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 On May 13, 2019, plaintiff informed defendant Dordon he was sexually harassed 2 by defendant Mortell. As supervisor, defendant Dordon allowed defendant Mortell to continue 3 harassing plaintiff, and authorized housing changes at defendant Mortell’s request. Similarly, 4 plaintiff alleges defendants Cervantes, Knedler, and Spearman are liable insofar as a general 5 failure to act in their roles as supervisors. However, only defendant Spearman officially 6 acknowledged defendant Mortell harassing plaintiff by correspondence dated July 24, 2019. 7 8 II. DISCUSSION 9 Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to state cognizable claims of verbal harassment, 10 discrimination, and retaliation against defendant Mortell, violating plaintiff’s Eighth, Fourteenth, 11 and First Amendment rights respectively. Plaintiff also states a cognizable Eighth Amendment 12 claim against defendant Dordon, Mortell’s supervisor. The Court, however, does not find that 13 plaintiff has alleged sufficient factual allegations to state cognizable claims against defendants 14 Cervantes, Knedler, Thompson, or Spearman. 15 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 16 employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no 17 respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional 18 violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The 19 Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on 20 knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government 21 officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct 22 and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory 23 personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 24 constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be 25 liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. 26 Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 2 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 3 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 4 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in 5 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 6 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 7 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676. 8 Plaintiff merely alleges defendants Cervantes, Knedler, Thompson, and Spearman 9 could have prevented defendant Mortell’s harassing behavior, which is insufficient. Plaintiff 10 states that only defendant Spearman actually had knowledge of defendant Mortell’s treatment of 11 plaintiff, but acquiescence on his part is still insufficient. Id. Plaintiff never provides factual 12 allegations claiming defendants Cervantes, Knedler, Thompson, and Spearman implemented any 13 policy encouraging or condoning defendant Mortell’s unconstitutional treatment of plaintiff. 14 15 III. CONCLUSION 16 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 17 amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 18 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an 19 amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 20 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the 21 prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An 22 amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 23 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the 24 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 25 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 26 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 27 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 28 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). WOU 2 LUV LOOMIS MUU OPI ee AY VI
1 Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended 2 | complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and 3 || recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such 4 | further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims. 5 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff may file a first amended 6 | complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. 7 8 9 | Dated: June 12, 2020 Ssvcqo_ 10 DENNIS M. COTA 11 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28