1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MAURICE MILES, SR., No. 2:19-cv-01881-MCE-CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 DANIEL GARLAND, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 18 action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local 19 Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Currently pending before the court is plaintiff’s third 20 amended complaint filed on or about August 31, 2020.1 21 I. Screening Requirement 22 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 23 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 24 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 25 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 26 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 27 1 The prison mailbox rule was not applied to this pleading because plaintiff did not provide the 28 date on which it was signed. See ECF No. 30 at 7. 1 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 2 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 3 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 4 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 5 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 6 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 7 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 8 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 9 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 10 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 11 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 12 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 13 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 14 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 15 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 16 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 17 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 18 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 19 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 20 II. Allegations in Third Amended Complaint 21 In a cursory complaint, plaintiff identifies seven individual defendants employed at the 22 California State Prison-Sacramento and the Sacramento County Jail. Plaintiff then spends two 23 sentences identifying his claims for relief against these officers. First, plaintiff alleges that “he 24 did not deserve to be beaten and sent to the hospital with serious injurys” (sic) on May 17, 2016 25 while an inmate at CSP-Sac. ECF No. 30 at 5. Second, plaintiff alleges that defendant Rubenoff 26 attacked him and used a Taser on plaintiff sometime in September 2019 while plaintiff was in 27 custody at the Sacramento County Jail. Id. By way of relief, plaintiff seeks declaratory and 28 injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. Id. at 6. 1 III. Legal Standards 2 First and foremost, plaintiff is advised that he may properly assert multiple claims against 3 a single defendant in a civil action. Fed. Rule Civ. P. 18. In addition, plaintiff may join multiple 4 defendants in one action where “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in 5 the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 6 transactions and occurrences” and “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will 7 arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). However, unrelated claims against different 8 defendants must be pursued in separate lawsuits. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th 9 Cir. 2007). This rule is intended “not only to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim, 10 multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees— 11 for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any 12 prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” Id. 13 The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from inflicting cruel and unusual 14 punishment on inmates which has been defined as “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 15 pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). “[W]henever prison officials stand accused 16 of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the 17 core judicial inquiry is… whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 18 discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7 19 (1992). The court’s inquiry into an excessive force claim focuses on the extent of the prisoner’s 20 injury, the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of 21 force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to 22 temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (1992) (quotation marks and 23 citations omitted). While the absence of a serious injury is relevant to the Eighth Amendment 24 inquiry, it does not end it. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The malicious and sadistic use of force to 25 cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency in violation of the Eighth 26 Amendment. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327. 27 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 28 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 1 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 2 (1976).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MAURICE MILES, SR., No. 2:19-cv-01881-MCE-CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 DANIEL GARLAND, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 18 action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local 19 Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Currently pending before the court is plaintiff’s third 20 amended complaint filed on or about August 31, 2020.1 21 I. Screening Requirement 22 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 23 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 24 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 25 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 26 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 27 1 The prison mailbox rule was not applied to this pleading because plaintiff did not provide the 28 date on which it was signed. See ECF No. 30 at 7. 1 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 2 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 3 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 4 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 5 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 6 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 7 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 8 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 9 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 10 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 11 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 12 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 13 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 14 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 15 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 16 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 17 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 18 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 19 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 20 II. Allegations in Third Amended Complaint 21 In a cursory complaint, plaintiff identifies seven individual defendants employed at the 22 California State Prison-Sacramento and the Sacramento County Jail. Plaintiff then spends two 23 sentences identifying his claims for relief against these officers. First, plaintiff alleges that “he 24 did not deserve to be beaten and sent to the hospital with serious injurys” (sic) on May 17, 2016 25 while an inmate at CSP-Sac. ECF No. 30 at 5. Second, plaintiff alleges that defendant Rubenoff 26 attacked him and used a Taser on plaintiff sometime in September 2019 while plaintiff was in 27 custody at the Sacramento County Jail. Id. By way of relief, plaintiff seeks declaratory and 28 injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. Id. at 6. 1 III. Legal Standards 2 First and foremost, plaintiff is advised that he may properly assert multiple claims against 3 a single defendant in a civil action. Fed. Rule Civ. P. 18. In addition, plaintiff may join multiple 4 defendants in one action where “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in 5 the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 6 transactions and occurrences” and “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will 7 arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). However, unrelated claims against different 8 defendants must be pursued in separate lawsuits. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th 9 Cir. 2007). This rule is intended “not only to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim, 10 multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees— 11 for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any 12 prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” Id. 13 The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from inflicting cruel and unusual 14 punishment on inmates which has been defined as “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 15 pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). “[W]henever prison officials stand accused 16 of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the 17 core judicial inquiry is… whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 18 discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7 19 (1992). The court’s inquiry into an excessive force claim focuses on the extent of the prisoner’s 20 injury, the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of 21 force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to 22 temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (1992) (quotation marks and 23 citations omitted). While the absence of a serious injury is relevant to the Eighth Amendment 24 inquiry, it does not end it. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The malicious and sadistic use of force to 25 cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency in violation of the Eighth 26 Amendment. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327. 27 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 28 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 1 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 2 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a 3 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 4 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 5 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 6 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must 7 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 8 plaintiff's federal rights. 9 IV. Analysis 10 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s third amended complaint and finds that it fails to state a 11 claim upon which relief can be granted under federal law. First and foremost, plaintiff has 12 improperly joined multiple claims against multiple defendants in this single action. The event 13 that occurred at CSP-Sac does not appear related to the incident that occurred years later while 14 plaintiff was incarcerated at the Sacramento County Jail. Plaintiff must file two separate civil 15 actions if he wishes to pursue both of these claims. Additionally, the allegations against specific 16 defendants are entirely conclusory in nature and, as such, are insufficient to state a valid cause of 17 action. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Plaintiff does not 18 provide sufficient detail about either incident involving the use of force against him to be able to 19 determine whether he has stated a valid Eighth Amendment claim for relief. For all these 20 reasons, plaintiff’s third amended complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant 21 leave to file a fourth amended complaint. 22 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 23 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 24 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in 25 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. 26 § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the 27 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory 28 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of 1 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 2 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 3 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 4 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 5 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 6 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 7 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 8 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 9 V. Motion to Dismiss 10 After the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal dismissed plaintiff’s interlocutory appeal, plaintiff 11 filed a motion to dismiss on December 15, 2020. ECF No. 36. Although filed in this court, 12 plaintiff’s motion is directed at dismissing the criminal charges against him in the Sacramento 13 County Superior Court. ECF No. 36. Plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint does not authorize this court 14 to dismiss pending criminal charges against plaintiff in state court. Accordingly, plaintiff’s 15 motion to dismiss is denied. 16 VI. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party 17 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not 18 intended as legal advice. 19 The third amended complaint is being dismissed because it fails to state any cognizable 20 claim for relief against any of the named defendants. You are being given the chance to fix the 21 problems identified in this order. If you choose to file a fourth amended complaint, pay careful 22 attention to the legal standards explained in this order. 23 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 24 1. Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 36) is denied for the reasons indicated herein. 25 2. Plaintiff’s third amended complaint (ECF No. 30) is dismissed. 26 3. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a fourth 27 amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules 28 of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the 1 | docket number assigned this case and must be labeled “Fourth Amended Complaint.” Failure to 2 | file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this 3 | action be dismissed. 4 | Dated: January 13, 2021 fof i, / CAN fu fl. ay CAROLYN K. DELANEY 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 D 12/mile1881.14am.new(3).docx 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28