(PC) Mattis v. Gibbs

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: August 21, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01704
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 JEFFREY D. MATTIS, No. 2:25-cv-01704 SCR P 11 Plaintiff, 12 v. ORDER 13 JUSTIN GIBBS, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 Plaintiff is a former state inmate proceeding pro se with a civil rights action under 42 17 U.S.C. § 1983. He requested leave to proceed without paying the full filing fee for this action, 18 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff’s declaration shows that he cannot afford to pay 19 the entire filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to proceed in 20 forma pauperis is granted. 21 Also pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint for screening. (ECF No. 1.) For the 22 reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 23 granted. Plaintiff will be given leave to file an amended complaint. 24 STATUTORY SCREENING OF PRISONER COMPLAINTS 25 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 26 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In 27 performing this screening function, the court must dismiss any claim that “(1) is frivolous, 28 malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief 1 from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). A claim is legally frivolous 2 when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 3 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless 4 legal theory or factual contentions that are baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical 5 inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and 6 factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989). 7 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 8 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 9 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 10 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 11 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim upon which the 12 court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 13 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 14 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When 15 considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept the allegations as true, 16 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most 17 favorable to the plaintiff, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 18 PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 19 I. Factual Allegations of the Complaint 20 Plaintiff’s complaint concerns his detention in the Glenn County Jail and subsequent 21 transfer to the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). 22 (ECF No. 1.) The complaint names nineteen (19) defendants: (1) Glenn County Sheriff Justin 23 Gibbs; (2) Glenn County Under Sheriff Travis Goodwin; (3) Jail Lt. Deck; (4) Jail Sgt. 24 Melgarejo; (5) Jail Corporal Berleir; (6) Jail Deputy Ayers; (7) Jail Deputy Martinez; (8) Jail 25 Deputy Reynolds; (9) Jail Deputy Sassman; (10) Jail Deputy Perciado; (11) Jail Deputy Sanchez; 26 (12) Jail Deputy R. White; (13) Jail Deputy Peterson; (14) Jail Deputy White; (15) Glenn County 27 Personnel Director Linda Durrer; (16) Glenn County Supervisor Jim Yoder; (17) Glenn County 28 Supervisor Grant Carmon; (18) Glenn County Supervisor Monica Rossman; and (19) Glenn 1 County Supervisor Tom Arnold. (Id. at 2.) 2 Plaintiff alleges that on June 7, 2023, he was booked into the Glenn County Jail. (ECF 3 No. 1 at 4.) Between June 7, 2023, and November 13, 2023, while incarcerated there, he filed 4 several citizens’ complaints pursuant to California Penal Code § 832.1, logged grievances, and 5 filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus (Case #22CR16955).1 All were handwritten by plaintiff. 6 (Id.) Plaintiff filed the legal documents by legal mail and sent them directly to defendants 7 between June 7, 2023, and November 13, 2023. Some of were at different stages of preparation 8 for filing. Plaintiff made handwritten duplicates for his records. (Id.) While incarcerated in 9 Glenn County, plaintiff stored handwritten legal documents in a yellow legal manila envelope 10 clearly marked “legal work” with his full name and case number, #22CR16955. (Id.) 11 Plaintiff further alleges that on the night of November 12, 2023, he was ordered by 12 defendants to booking from A-pod, his assigned housing, to a holding cell with his cellmate W. 13 Deniz. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Defendants then packed all of plaintiff’s personal property into a 14 plastic bag. Plaintiff alleges this was an act of conspiracy to unlawfully confiscate his legal 15 documents. (Id.) Defendants hurriedly rummaged through the legal documents, removing 16 everything from the manila envelopes and taking all handwritten legal documents from plaintiff’s 17 possession prior to his transportation to CDCR custody. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges defendants 18 premeditated this unlawful act. (Id.) 19 Plaintiff was transferred to Butte County Jail on November 13, 2023, for CDCR bus 20 transportation. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges defendants confiscated his legal documents the 21 night before his transport to CDCR to deliberately prevent his access to due process, and that it is 22 unprecedented for an inmate to be ordered to booking and held in a holding cell all night before 23 transport to prison. (Id. at 5-6.) Another inmate scheduled for transport with plaintiff was in 24 booking at 5:00 a.m. or so and defendants did not pack his belongings or confiscate his legal 25 work. (Id. at 6.) When plaintiff was shackled for transport, he was not allowed socks to protect 26 his ankles. The other inmates were allowed socks. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) When plaintiff arrived at 27 1 Plaintiff cites to the documents as exhibits throughout his complaint, but no such exhibits are 28 attached. 1 Butte County, his ankles were bleeding. (Id.) Plaintiff notified medical upon arrival at Wasco 2 State Prison. (Id.) 3 Plaintiff seeks an order directing defendants to provide all legal documents confiscated on 4 November 12, 2023, and produce recordings from the unlawful seizure of his property. (ECF No. 5 1 at 7.) Plaintiff asks that defendants be ordered to put in place training, rules and regulations, 6 procedures, and policies for prevention of these civil rights violations, and be subjected to court 7 oversight. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks to be compensated for his injuries. (Id.) Finally, plaintiff seeks 8 the appointment of counsel due to the scope and complexity of his case. (Id.) 9 LEGAL STANDARDS 10 I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 11 A plaintiff may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress violations of “rights, 12 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws” by a person or entity, 13 including a municipality, acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim 14 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) a defendant acting under color of state law 15 (2) deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. Benavidez v. 16 County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021). 17 II. Linkage 18 Section 1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the 19 defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. 20 Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 21 (1976). Plaintiff may demonstrate that connection by alleging facts showing: (1) a defendant's 22 “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,” or (2) that a defendant set “in motion a 23 series of acts by others” or “knowingly refus[ed] to terminate a series of acts by others, which 24 [the defendant] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a 25 constitutional injury.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks 26 and citation omitted). 27 The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a 28 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 1 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 2 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 3 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). 4 III. Municipal Liability 5 Municipalities are considered “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore may be 6 liable for causing a constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. 691, 694; Long v. County of Los 7 Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). However, municipalities cannot be held 8 vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 9 “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its 10 lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts 11 the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. 12 To properly plead a Monell claim based on an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy, 13 plaintiff must show that the government “had a deliberate policy, custom, or practice that was the 14 moving force behind the constitutional violation [plaintiff] suffered.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. 15 County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 16 Plaintiff must also show that the policy or custom of the government “reflects deliberate 17 indifference” to plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 18 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Unless the challenged 19 policy is in writing, the municipal policy at issue must be the result of a “‘longstanding practice 20 or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.’” 21 Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 22 308 F.3d 968, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted)). 23 DISCUSSION 24 I. Failure to State a Claim 25 Plaintiff’s complaint does not identify the federal statutory or constitutional right allegedly 26 violated by defendants. The undersigned liberally construes the complaint as raising two possible 27 constitutional violations: 28 (1) A violation of plaintiff’s right of access to the courts protected by the First Amendment’s 1 right to petition the government and the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due 2 process, see Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011) (overruled on other 3 ground as recognized in Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015)); 4 and/or 5 (2) A deprivation of his legal property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 6 Fourteenth Amendment, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 (1984) (citing Logan v. 7 Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th 8 Cir. 1985). 9 However, under either theory, plaintiff’s claims fail for inadequate linkage. Although the 10 form portion of the complaint identifies nineteen defendants, its statements of claim do not allege 11 any defendant’s personal participation. The complaint only attributes the alleged violations to 12 “defendants” as a collective. (See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 5 (describing “defendants unlawful act of 13 confiscating my legal documents”; id. at 6 (listing injuries “perpetuated by Defendants”).) Even 14 under a liberal construction of the complaint, the undersigned is left to guess which claims 15 plaintiff intended to allege against whom. Moreover, some of the defendants are Glenn County 16 Supervisors who could not plausibly have participated in the allegedly unlawful acts. A 17 complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 where it fails to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it 19 rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint fails to 20 state any cognizable claims for relief. 21 II. Leave to Amend 22 Having conducted the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court finds that the 23 complaint does not state a valid claim for relief pursuant to the First or Fourteenth Amendments. 24 The complaint fails for inadequate linkage, which means that plaintiff has not pled facts 25 describing any of the defendants’ personal participation in the violation of his rights. Because of 26 these defects, the court will not order the complaint to be served on defendants. 27 Plaintiff may try to fix these problems by filing an amended complaint. The amended 28 complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant violated plaintiff’s rights. 1 | “Defendant #1 did X, Defendant #2 did Y,” and so forth. Plaintiff is advised that “[vJague and 2 || conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. 3 | Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 4 Plaintiff is also informed that the court will not refer to a prior pleading in order to make 5 || his amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 6 || complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 7 || amended complaint supersedes any prior complaints. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 8 | 1967) (citations omitted). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, any previous complaint no 9 || longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 10 | complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 11 CONCLUSION 12 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 13 1. Plaintiffs request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 14 2. Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, see 28 15 | U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and will not be served. 16 3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff may file an 17 | amended complaint that complies with the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal Rules of 18 | Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 19 | number assigned this case, 2:24-cv-01704 SCR, and must be labeled “First Amended 20 | Complaint.” 21 4. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a 22 || recommendation that this action be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 23 || Procedure. 24 5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the prisoner complaint 25 || form used in this district. 26 | DATED: August 21, 2025 md 27 SEAN C. RIORDAN 28 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE