(PC) Martinez v. Davey

District Court, E.D. California·Decided February 7, 2020·No. 1:16-cv-01658·Unknown

Opinion

RICARDO MARTINEZ, CASE No. 1:16-cv-1658-AWI-JLT (PC) Plaintiff, ORDER VACATING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND ORDER APPOINTING v. LIMITED PURPOSE COUNSEL; ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT D. DAVEY, et al., SERVICE DOCUMENTS; FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS Defendants. NON-COGNIZABLE CLAIMS Plaintiff has filed a fourth amended complaint asserting claims against government employees. (Doc. 48.) The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). I. Pleading Standard Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who deprives an individual of federally guaranteed rights “under color” of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), but nevertheless, the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting the plausibility standard, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. II. Relevant Procedural Background Plaintiff initiated this action on June 20, 2016, in the Northern District of California asserting claims arising under the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments based on conduct occurring at California State Prison in Corcoran, California. Plaintiff named D. Davey, the CSP Warden; the unidentified Chief Medical Officer at CSP; and approximately 27 Doe Defendants. Upon review of the allegations asserted in the complaint, the case was transferred to this Court on November 2, 2016. (Doc. 7.) On January 4, 2017, the previously-assigned magistrate judge dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim after concluding that the bare allegations in the complaint were insufficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng also declined to review the 150 pages of attachments to determine if they included facts giving rise to a cognizable cause of action. (Doc. 11.) The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend and provided the applicable pleading criteria for what appeared to be his intended Eighth and First Amendment claims. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint that was shorter and more succinct, totaling thirty- six pages. (Doc. 17.) The Court screened this first amended complaint on April 7, 2017. The Court dismissed it because it included many claims that did not arise from the same or related transaction. (Doc. 20.) In addition, the Court dismissed plaintiff’s allegations against Warden Davey, Dr. Lewis, and the Federal Receiver for failure to link those defendants to any deprivation of plaintiff’s rights. (Id.) Plaintiff then filed his second amended complaint, which the Court dismissed again for failure to comply with Rule 8’s brevity requirements and for failure to state a cognizable claim. (Doc. 23.) The Court granted plaintiff one last opportunity to submit a complaint: Here, the Court is unable to conduct the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, because Plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and (d)(1). Plaintiff will be given one last chance to file an amended complaint (a third amended complaint) that is a short and plain statement of what each named Defendant did, and when he did it, that violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and how doing so harmed Plaintiff. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). He should do this in plain, simple English, with a separate paragraph for each claim against each Defendant. Attaching exhibits rarely helps and in this case has clearly hindered Plaintiff’s ability to state his claims properly. Plaintiff should omit exhibits from his next pleading (Doc. 31 at 6-7.) On May 21, 2018, plaintiff filed his third amended complaint, and the Court found it did not state any cognizable claims. (Docs. 36, 47.) Because plaintiff attempted in good faith to comply with the Court’s previous directives, he was granted one final opportunity to amend. Plaintiff dutifully filed a fourth amended complaint on February 1, 2019. (Doc. 48.) On review of that pleading, the Court appointed counsel for plaintiff for the limited purpose of drafting a fifth amended complaint. (Doc. 51.) Counsel was directed to file an amended pleading within 120 days of the date of that order. When that deadline passed, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why sanctions should not be imposed for plaintiff’s failure to file a timely pleading. Counsel has now responded, noting the futility of filing a fifth amended complaint. In addition, he has submitted a declaration explaining his failure to timely comply with the Court’s Order. Good cause appearing, the Order to Show Cause will be vacated. The Court will now turn to screening the fourth amended complaint. III. Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff’s claims arose while he was incarcerated at California Substantive

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