(PC) Martin v. Longardener

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: December 5, 2023
• Docket: 1:22-cv-01001
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JARED ANDREW MARTIN, No. 1:22-cv-1001 NODJ GSA (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS MATTER SHOULD NOT 13 v. BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 14 KATHERINE LONGARDENER, et al., PLAINTIFF’S SHOWING OF CAUSE DUE 15 Defendants. JANUARY 3, 2024 16 17 Plaintiff, a county jail inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed this civil 18 rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States 19 Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 20 For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff will be ordered to show cause why this matter 21 should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 22 I. RELEVANT FACTS 23 On August 11, 2022, Plaintiff’s complaint was docketed. ECF No. 1. One week later, 24 Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 4. Eventually, the motion 25 was granted. ECF No. 5. 26 Plaintiff raises three claims in the complaint. See ECF No. 1 at 3-5. The claims stem 27 from events that occurred while Plaintiff was housed at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”). ECF 28 No. 1 at 3-5. 1 In the complaint, when Plaintiff is asked whether he exhausted his administrative 2 remedies prior to filing his complaint in this Court, he states that he has not. See id. When then 3 asked to explain why he did not submit his claims to the highest level prior to filing in federal 4 court, Plaintiff states that he did not do so because he was not required to given that he had been 5 transferred out of that prison. See id. 6 II. DISCUSSION 7 A. Applicable Law 8 The claims of inmates who challenge their conditions of confinement are subject to the 9 Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “The PLRA mandates that 10 inmates exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing ‘any suit challenging prison 11 conditions,’ including, but not limited to, suits under [Section] 1983.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 12 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (brackets added) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006)). 13 “Under § 1997e(a), the exhaustion requirement hinges on the ‘availab[ility]’ of 14 administrative remedies: An inmate . . . must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust 15 unavailable ones.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (brackets in original). In discussing 16 availability in Ross, the Supreme Court identified three circumstances in which administrative 17 remedies were unavailable: (1) where an administrative remedy “operates as a simple dead end” 18 in which officers are “unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved 19 inmates;” (2) where an administrative scheme is “incapable of use” because “no ordinary prisoner 20 can discern or navigate it;” and (3) where “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking 21 advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross, 22 136 S. Ct. at 1859-60. “[A]side from [the unavailability] exception, the PLRA’s text suggests no 23 limits on an inmate’s obligation to exhaust – irrespective of any ‘special circumstances.’ ” Id. at 24 1856. “[M]andatory exhaustion statutes like the PLRA establish mandatory exhaustion regimes, 25 foreclosing judicial discretion.” Id. at 1857. 26 B. Analysis 27 Plaintiff’s fails in his complaint to provide adequate facts to support an acceptable excuse 28 for not having exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. His unexplained 1 statement/assertion that he was not required to exhaust his claims that arose at KVSP because he 2 is no longer housed there is factually insufficient for the Court to make an initial determination on 3 the duty to exhaust administrative remedies. A transfer from an institution in which a cause of 4 action arises does not necessarily excuse the requirement that an inmate must exhaust his 5 administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court. See, Howard v Baca, 2011 US Dist 6 Lexis 132553; Jacobsen v Curren, 2018 US Dist Lexis 59222; See also, e.g., Medina-Claudio v. 7 Rodriguez-Mateo, 292 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2002); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199- 8 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Medina-Claudio, 292 F.3d at 36); Flourney v. Navarro, 2008 US Dist 9 Lexis 120742, No. CV 05-7708 PA (FFM), 2008 WL 4184650 at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2008) 10 (citations omitted) (“[T]he fact that plaintiff was no longer in the Jail’s custody at the time she 11 brought this suit does not exempt her from the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Plaintiff was 12 ‘confined in [a] . . . prison . . . “ at the time she filed the Complaint, and she brought a suit 13 relating to ‘prison conditions’.”). 14 More exactly, Plaintiff has not set forth facts stating: 1- when the alleged violations of his 15 constitutional rights occurred, or when he was put on notice that his rights were allegedly 16 violated, 2-the exact date he was physically transferred out of Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP), 17 and 3- all locations and the dates in sequential order where he has been transferred subsequent to 18 his leaving KVSP. 19 Presently therefore Plaintiff’s proffered excuse, without more, does not explain why he 20 failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing his complaint in this Court. As a result, 21 he will be ordered to show cause why this matter should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust. 22 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 23 1. Plaintiff shall show cause why this matter should not be dismissed for failure to 24 exhaust administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 25 2. Plaintiff’s showing of cause shall be filed no later than January 3, 2024. 26 27 IT IS SO ORDERED. 28 1 Dated: December 4, 2023 /s/ Gary S. Austin 2 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 3

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