(PC) Lewis v. Quinto

Opinion

KEVIN LEWIS, JR., Case No.: 1:22-cv-00628-CDB (PC) Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. (Docs. 56, 57) ALAN QUINTO, et al., 21-Day Deadline Defendants.

Plaintiff Kevin Lewis, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds against Defendants Alan Guinto,1 Bobby Gilbert, and Shannon Brown (collectively, “Defendants”) for violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment, filed November 18, 2024, and November 25, 2024. (Docs. 56, 57). Following the grant of extensions of time, on January 15, 2025, Defendants filed their opposition to the pending motions. (Doc. 64). Plaintiff did not file a reply. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motions for

1 The Court notes that Defendant Alan Guinto may have been misspelled or misidentified as “Alan Quinto” on the docket. Plaintiff raises the misspelling of Defendant Guinto’s name in his motions for summary judgment. (Docs. 56, 57). Defendants identify “Guinto” in their administrative motions for relief. (Docs. 59 at 1, 62 at 1). summary judgment.2 On May 18, 2022, Plaintiff initiated this action with the filing of a complaint. (Doc. 1). Prior to the Court’s screening of the complaint, on May 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed his first motion for summary judgment, which was denied without prejudice on October 25, 2023. (Docs. 13, 20). On July 7, 2023, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint, finding cognizable claims against Defendants Guinto, Gilbert, Brown, and John Hernandez3, and granting leave to amend to the extent Plaintiff wished to remedy deficiencies with other claims. (Doc. 15). On July 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a purported first amended complaint; however, the Court construed the pleading as an election to proceed on the original complaint as screened. (Docs. 17, 21). On October 27, 2023, the Court found service of the complaint appropriate and directed e-service on Defendants. (Doc. 21). Prior to Defendants appearing in the action, on January 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed a second motion for summary judgment, which the Court denied without prejudice as premature on July 31, 2024. (Docs. 33, 39, 54). On March 29, 2024, the Court issued is Discovery and Scheduling Order. (Doc. 51). Therein, the Court set the deadline for filing all dispositive motions (other than a motion for summary judgment to exhaust, which was due July 29, 2024) for February 6, 2025. (Id. ¶ 9). On November 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a one-page document entitled “Motion for Summary Judgment.” (Doc. 56). Plaintiff filed a second, one-page document also entitled “Motion for Summary Judgment” on November 25, 2024. (Doc. 57). Defendants timely opposed the pending motions on January 15, 2025. (Doc. 64). Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Washington 2 On August 9, 2024, upon the parties’ expression of consent to the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge for all further proceedings in this action, including trial and entry of judgment, this action was reassigned to the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (Doc. 55). 3 On July 31, 2024, Defendant John Hernandez was dismissed without prejudice from this action for Plaintiff’s failure to effectuate service of process. (Doc. 54). Mutual Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). An issue of fact is genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party, while a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1422, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). Each party’s position in favor of or opposition to summary judgment must be supported by: (1) citing to particular portions of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). A court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (on summary judgment, “the court has discretion in appropriate circumstances to consider other materials, [but] it need not do so”). Furthermore, “[a]t summary judgment, a party does not necessarily have to produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial.” Nevada Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The focus is on the admissibility of the evidence’s contents rather than its form. Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Arizona, Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2004). “The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 317, 323 (1986)). To meet its burden, “the moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party “to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). The Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). However, the non-moving party is not required to establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. The court must apply standards consistent with Rule 56 to determine whether the moving party has demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that judgment is appropriate as a matter of law. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). “[A] court ruling on a motion for summary judgment may not engage in credibility determinations or the weighing of evidence.” Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). The evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party” and “all justifiable inferences” must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2002); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). In his first single-page motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff seeks to be awarded $4,000,000. (Doc. 56). Plaintiff asserts that he “has been preparing for trial when [he] came across vital information that would alter the case in [his] favor.” (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Guinto “was/is a defendant in a civil case[,]” and cites to “Manago v. Santoro, 2022 U.S. Dist[.] 243299[.]” (Id.). Plaintiff asserts Defendant Guinto’s “position is stated in that case as a registered nurse so [Guinto] not only defauts [sic] but perjurs himself and impersonate[s] state personnel” as a ”CDCR sergeant[.]” (Id.). Plaintiff thus asserts summary judgment in the requested amount is warranted because Defendant Guinto “misspelled his name on his state uniform and state document to conceal [his] true identity of him truly being Alan Guinto with a G and not a Q for Quinto.” (Id.). In his second single-page motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff re-asserts his request for $4 million. (Doc. 57). Plaintiff asserts Defendant Guinto “is in default pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 912” because on February 24, 2020, Defendant Guinto “stepped out his role as registered nurse for Plaintiff again cites to Manago v. Santoro and provides the record citation as “2022 U.S. Dist. Lexis 243299 Case No: 1:21-cv-01616-DAD-BAM [PC].” (Id.). Defendants contend Plaintiff’s motions are procedurally defective because they fail to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules. (Doc. 64). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s motions are not properly supported by record facts as he does not cite to any evidence, nor does he support his position with any documents as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Id. at 3). Defendants contend Plaintiff’s motions fail to comply with Local Rule 260(a) as he failed to include a Statement of Undisputed Facts in connection with both of his motions despite being previously cautioned by the Court of that requirement. (Id. at 4). Defendants argue Plaintiff’s reliance on the Manago case is irrelevant because there is no defendant named “Guinto” in that case. (Id. at 3). Defendants contend there is nothing for them to affirmatively oppose given the motions fail to argue the merits of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants or provide any evidence to support these claims in any way. (Id. at 4). Defendants therefore argue that because Plaintiff’s motions are procedurally defective, they should be denied. (Id.). Defendants request that, to the extent the Court seeks further argument or briefing, they be permitted complete necessary discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) and file a substantive opposition by the existing summary judgment deadline as a standalone document or, if appropriate, as part of a cross-motion for summary judgment.” (Id. at 2). As noted above, the Court denied Plaintiff’s second motion for summary judgment without prejudice as premature on July 31, 2024. (Doc. 54). Relevant here, the Court adopted the February 12, 2024, findings that Plaintiff’s motion was premature and that he could file a motion for summary judgment after obtaining all relevant materials following completion of discovery as contemplated by Rule 56. (Doc. 39 at 4). The undersigned also admonished Plaintiff that his earlier motion failed to comply with Local Rule 260(a), which requires that “[e]ach motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication shall be accompanied by a ‘Statement of Undisputed Facts’ that shall enumerate discretely each of the specific material relied upon in support of the motion and cite the particular portions of any pleading, affidavit, deposition, interrogatory answer, admission, that “[c]ompliance with Local Rule 260(a) is mandatory” and his “failure to include a Statement of Undisputed Facts with his summary judgment motion renders his [ ] motion procedurally defective.” (Id. at 5). Plaintiff was cautioned that “any future motion for summary judgment must include a “Statement of Undisputed Facts” and must otherwise comply with the Local Rules.” (Id.). Here, Plaintiff again has failed to adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules, and the Court’s previous admonishments concerning, among other things, the requirement to support any motion for summary judgment with an appropriate statement of undisputed facts. As to Plaintiff’s citation to Manago v. Santoro, et al., No. 1:21-cv-01616-DAD-BAM (PC), 2022 U.S. Dist. Lexis 243299, 2022 WL 20209064 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2022) (“Manago”), the Court disagrees with Defendants that “there is no defendant named Guinto in that case.” (Doc. 64 at 3). In Manago, the Court, through its screening order, addressed the plaintiff’s allegations, which named 22 defendants, including “(18) A Guinto, registered nurse[.]” Manago, 2022 WL 20209064, at *1. Plaintiff appears to argue that Defendant Guinto “stepped out his role as registered nurse for [NKSP] crisis bed unit and impersonated [a] [NKSP sergeant]” (Doc. 57), and thus “is in default” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 912, which provides: “Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 912. However, that statute is inapplicable here as Defendant Guinto is a state official employed by NKSP, whether as a correctional officer or a registered nurse as in Monago. Further, Plaintiff fails to support his barebone contentions with citations to any evidence produced or discovery in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(c). Nor has Plaintiff addressed whatsoever the merits of his remaining Eighth Amendment claims for the use of excessive force. In short, Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant Guinto impersonated as a correctional officer or to his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law for his claims. In Re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d at 387. Therefore, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment because Plaintiff burden on summary judgment. Because discovery has now closed and the deadline to file dispositive motions has run, the parties will be directed to meet and confer and propose dates of mutual availability to convene for pretrial conference and trial. In the event both parties desire to first convene for a Court-sponsored settlement conference, they also may propose dates for a settlement conference. For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment (Docs. 56, 57) are DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within 21 days of entry of this order, the parties shall file a joint report identifying two dates of mutual availability to convene for pretrial conference and trial. Proposed trial dates shall fall eight weeks after the associated pretrial conference dates. Tr Is SO ORDERED. } ) Bo Dated: _ February 7, 2025 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE