(PC) Leeper v. County of Sacramento

District Court, E.D. California·Decided July 8, 2020·No. 2:20-cv-00960·Unknown

Opinion

DALE LEEPER, No. 2:20-cv-0960 AC P Plaintiff, v. ORDER COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., Defendants. I. Introduction Plaintiff Dale Leeper is a Sacramento County prisoner currently incarcerated at Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center. Plaintiff proceeds pro se with a request to proceed in forma pauperis and a putative civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302(c). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned grants plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis and dismisses the complaint with leave to amend. II. In Forma Pauperis Application Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit and prison trust account statement that make the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See ECF No. 2. Accordingly, plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. Plaintiff must nevertheless pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). III. Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint A. Legal Standards The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly at 555). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal at 678 (quoting Twombly at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings shall be so construed as to do justice.”). Additionally, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). B. The Complaint Plaintiff’s complaint seeks 5 million dollars from defendants Sacramento County and Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center on the following grounds: The lawsuit is in reference to COVID-19 and that the CDC recommendations are not being met. Social distancing, masks, uncleanly environment and that I am innocent until proven guilty without any medical testing being done. This is a violation of California Constitution article 1 and 6 being violated especially the 6th 8th and 14th Amendments without due process of law. Subjecting me to cruel and unusual punishment. ECF No. 1 at 3. The complaint contains no other allegations. Plaintiff seeks “damages of five million dollars.” Id. C. Analysis: Failure to State a Cognizable Claim The complaint reflects plaintiff’s generalized concerns that he may be exposed to COVID-19 while incarcerated at Sacramento County’s Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center due to the alleged and/or anticipated failure of correctional officials to adhere to protocols that can reduce such risk. A pretrial detainee’s right to be protected by jail officials is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The following standards apply: The elements of a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment failure- to-protect claim against an individual officer are: (1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved – making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. With respect to the third element, the defendant’s conduct must be objectively unreasonable, a test that will necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (footnote, internal citations and punctuation omitted). To st

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