(PC) Lake v. Diaz

District Court, E.D. California·Decided November 5, 2020·No. 2:20-cv-02077·Unknown

Opinion

JOHN LAKE, No. 2:20-cv-2077 DB P Plaintiff, v. ORDER RALPH DIAZ, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the court are plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and plaintiff’s complaint for screening. For the reasons set forth below, this court grants plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and finds plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claims for relief. Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). I. Legal Standards for Civil Rights Complaints The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). II. Analysis A. Allegations of the Complaint Plaintiff labels his complaint “Emergency Complaint, Preliminary TRO, Injunctive Relief, Mail Room Violations, Release, Covid-19 Pandemic.” Plaintiff is incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”). He identifies the following defendants: (1) Ralph Diaz, Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”); (2) Warden Patrick Covello; (3) Parole Board John Does 1-10; (4) Dr. S.H. Wong-Do; and (5) “AW/ADA” Weiss. Plaintiff checks the boxes for a litany of claims, including denial of basic necessities and medical care and denial of his rights to exercise his religion and access the courts. In the body of his complaint, however, plaintiff states only that his liberty interest in a parole date under Proposition 57 has been violated. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) In an attachment to the complaint, which appears to be a letter from plaintiff to “ATTORNEY GENERAL,” plaintiff complains that there is a conspiracy at MCSP to deprive him of his legal property, durable medical equipment, personal property, legal mail, and access to the courts. He states that he saw an officer opening numerous boxes of his legal property in the rain and the officer also returned books plaintiff had received from the LDS Church. He further complains that in November 2019, in a prior suit filed in this court, Magistrate Judge Newman ordered Deputy Attorney General Monica Anderson to attempt to locate and return to plaintiff his legal property, but he has still not received it. (ECF No. 1 at 17-18.) Plaintiff also attaches a letter to Ms. Anderson that appears to be on similar subjects, including an allegation that plaintiff has only been able to examine 15 of 44 boxes of his legal materials. He seeks an injunction requiring Ms. Anderson and the MCSP litigation coordinator to meet with him to go to the property room to locate his leg

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