(PC) Kirkland v. Smith

District Court, E.D. California·Decided June 17, 2025·No. 1:23-cv-00602·Unknown

Opinion

TREVON R. KIRKLAND, Case No.: 1:23-cv-00602-JLT-CDB Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY DEFENDANT D. SMITH SHOULD NOT BE v. DISMISSED FROM THIS ACTION FOR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE D. SMITH, et al., SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO Defendants. EFFECTUATE SERVICE

30-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Trevon R. Kirkland is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action has a complicated history concerning service of process. On December 30, 2024, the Court issued its Order Finding Service Appropriate, directing that service be effected on Defendants E. Bucato and D. Smith under the Court’s e-service pilot program. (Doc. 19.) Following a brief extension of time (see Docs. 25 & 27), on February 21, 2025, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) filed its Amended1 Notice of E- Service Waiver, indicating Defendants Bucato and Smith intended to waive personal service. (Doc. 29.) Thereafter, on March 10, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to substitute Defendant L. Moore for a Doe defendant (Doc. 31) and ordered service be effected on Defendant L. Moore the following day (Doc. 32). On March 24, 2025, Defendants Bucato, Moore, and Smith filed a Waiver of Service of Summons. (Doc. 35.) On April 21, 2025, Defendants Bucato, Moore, and Smith filed an Ex Parte Application for Extension of Time to File a Responsive Pleading. (Doc. 36.) The Court granted the extension of time, extending the deadline to May 22, 2025. (Doc. 38.) Thereafter, on April 28, 2025, CDCR filed another Amended Notice of E-Service Waiver, indicating Defendant Bucato intended to waive personal service, but that personal service could not be waived for Defendant Smith because “Don E. Smith” was “[n]o longer employed by CDCR and cannot be located. Unable to accept service.” (See Docs. 39 & 40.)2 In response to the conflicting filings regarding Defendant Smith, the Court issued its Minute Order of May 2, 2025, directing defense counsel to file a status report “indicating whether he still intends to appear on behalf of Defendant Smith by filing a responsive pleading on or before 5/22/25” and indicating that if defense counsel did not intend to do so, counsel should “explain the inconsistent filings of 2/21/25 …, 3/24/25 …, and 4/28/25.” (See Doc. 41.) On May 9, 2025, Defendants Bucato and Moore filed their “Status Report and Notice of Filing of Amended Waiver of Service.” (Doc. 43.) It states “CDCR erroneously included Defendant Smith in their [February 21, 2025] filing,” that CDCR had no authority to file a notice of intent on Smith’s behalf, and that the “Attorney General’s Office unknowingly compounded CDCR’s error when it subsequently filed a waiver of service on behalf of all three named Defendants.” (Id. at 1-2.) The status report further states that despite several attempts “to contact Smith at his last known address, the AG’s Office has been unable to communicate with him and has no authority to represent Smith or accept service on his behalf.” (Id. at 2.) That same date,

2 and as referenced in the status report, an Amended Waiver of Service of Summons was filed on behalf of Defendants Bucato and Moore. (Doc. 44.) On May 22, 2025, Defendants Bucato and Moore filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. 45.) On June 13, 2025, the United States Marshal filed its USM-285 form, indicating service of process could not be effected on Don E. Smith. (Doc. 47.) The United States Marshall was unable to find or obtain a forwarding address or contact number for Defendant Smith and was unable to otherwise “identify [the] correct named defendant Don Smith.” (Id.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides as follows:

If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court— on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). In cases involving a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis, the U.S. Marshal, upon order of the court, shall serve the summons and the complaint.3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). “[A]n incarcerated pro se plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is entitled to rely on the U.S. Marshal for service of the summons and complaint, and . . . should not be penalized by having his or her action dismissed for failure to effect service where the U.S. Marshal or the court clerk has failed to perform the duties required of each of them . . ..” Puett v. Blandford, 912 F.2d 270, 275 (9th Cir. 1990). “So long as the prisoner has furnished the information necessary to identify the defendant, the marshal’s failure to effect service is ‘automatically good cause . . ..’” Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472

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