(PC) King v. Leahy

District Court, E.D. California·Decided August 4, 2023·No. 1:23-cv-00823·Unknown

Opinion

PAUL KING, No. 1:23-cv-00823-SAB (PC) Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE v. TO THIS ACTION J. LEAHY, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF THE Defendant. ACTION (ECF No. 9) Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint in this action was filed on May 26, 2023. (ECF No. 1.) On June 1, 2023, the Court screened the complaint, found that Plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim for relief, and granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise respond to the June 1, 2023 order. Therefore, on July 11, 2023, the Court issued an order for Plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff has failed to respond to the order to show cause and the time to do so has now passed. Accordingly, dismissal of the action is warranted. I. The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Individuals proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. II. The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in his complaint as true only for the purpose of the screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff told sergeant J. Leahy that he had safety concerns and could not be on the yard. Leahy told Plaintiff to go back and pack his property at which point Plaintiff was assaulted by another inmate. A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is a condition precedent to filing a civil rights claim. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006); see also McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Congress could have written a statute making exhaustion a precondition to judgment, but it did not. The actual statute makes exhaustion a precondition to suit.” (citations omitted)). The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Further, the nature of the relief sought by the prisoner or the relief offered by the prison's administrative process is of no consequence. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). And, because the PLRA's text and intent requires “proper” exhaustion, a prisoner does not satisfy the PLRA's administrative grievance process if he files an untimely or procedurally defective grievance or appeal. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93. A prisoner need not plead or prove exhaustion. Instead, it is an affirmative defense that must be proved by defendant. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). A prison's internal grievance process, not the PLRA, determines whether the grievance satisfies the PLRA exhaustion requirement. Id. at 218. However, courts may dismiss a claim if failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). Based on the face of the complaint, it appears that Plaintiff may not have exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing this case. On the form complaint, Plaintiff acknowledges that there is an administrative remedy process available at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison, but he does not indicate whether he filed a grievance and whether it was exhausted at the highest level of review. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff is forewarned that if he commenced this action before exhausting his administrative remedies, the action is subject to dismissal, without prejudice. B. Failure to Protect The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 832. In particular, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Id. at 833; Cortez v. Skol, 776 F. 3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1980). The failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates or from dangerous conditions at the prison violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Id. at 837. A prisoner may state a § 1983 claim under the Eighth Amendment against prison officials only where the officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to the threat of serious harm or injury to an inmate by another

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