(PC) King v. Biter

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedJune 15, 2020
Docket1:15-cv-00414
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) King v. Biter ((PC) King v. Biter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) King v. Biter, (E.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LARRY DONNELL KING, SR., No. 1:15-cv-00414-NONE-SAB(PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S MARCH v. 14 26, 2020 ORDER

M.D. BITER, et al., 15 (Doc. No. 107)

16 Defendants. 17 18 Plaintiff Larry Donnell King, Sr. is appearing in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 19 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 Currently before the court is plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s 21 March 26, 2020 order denying his request to extend the discovery deadline, filed April 9, 2020. (Doc. 22 No. 107.) Defendants filed an opposition on April 16, 2020, and plaintiff did not file a reply. (Doc. 23 No. 108.) 24 LEGAL STANDARD 25 A district court may refer non-dispositive issues to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. 26 § 636(b)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Local Rule 302(c); Mitchell v. Valenzuela, 791 F.3d 1166, 1168 27 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Pursuant to section 636, magistrate judges may hear and determine nondispositive 28 matters . . . .”). 1 If a party objects to a non-dispositive pretrial ruling by a magistrate judge, then the district 2 court will review or reconsider the ruling under the “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard. 3 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Local Rule 303(f). 4 A magistrate judge’s factual findings or discretionary decisions are “clearly erroneous” when 5 the district court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. 6 Security Farms v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 124 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 1997). However, this standard 7 is significantly deferential, and the district court “may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the 8 deciding court.” Grimes v. City of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991). 9 The “contrary to law” standard “permits independent review of purely legal determinations by 10 the magistrate judge.” F.D.I.C. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 196 F.R.D. 375, 378 (S.D. Cal. 11 2000) (internal citation omitted); see also Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2002) 12 (stating under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), questions of law are reviewed de novo); Anderson v. Equifax 13 Info. Servs. LLC, No. CV 05-1741-ST, 2007 WL 2412249, at *1 (D. Or. 2007) (“Though Section 14 636(b)(1)(A) has been interpreted to permit de novo review of the legal findings of a magistrate judge, 15 magistrate judges are given broad discretion on discovery matters and should not be overruled absent a 16 showing of clear abuse of discretion.”) (internal citation omitted). “An order is contrary to law when 17 it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” Cochran v. Aguirre, 18 No. 1:15-cv-01092-AWI-SAB (PC), 2017 WL 2505230, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2017); Adolph Coors 19 Co. v. Wallace, 570 F. Supp. 202, 205 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (“Thus, while we may review magistral 20 findings of fact, subject only to the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard, we may overturn any conclusions of 21 law which contradict or ignore applicable precepts of law, as found in the Constitution, statutes or case 22 precedent.”). 23 DISCUSSION 24 On March 26, 2020, the magistrate judge denied plaintiff’s second ex parte request to extend 25 the discovery deadline in this case, concluding that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate good cause. 26 (Doc. No. 104 at 3.) The magistrate judge reasoned as follows: 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 First, Plaintiff did not file the instant request until 13 days before the discovery deadline, i.e. March 30, 2020. Second, Plaintiff 2 simply has not shown that he was diligent during the six-month period in which discovery was open. Plaintiff has not 3 demonstrated any efforts to obtain discovery until less than two 4 months before to the expiration of the deadline. (Declaration of Arthur Mark ¶¶ 1-2.) The fact that Plaintiff had other civil 5 matters/deadlines, difficulty communicating with Plaintiff, vacation, and/or lost luggage, are all circumstances which counsel 6 could and should have foreseen at the time the first extension was 7 sought and granted. Indeed, the fact that Plaintiff admits he was busy attending to other matters belies a claim of due diligence. 8 See, e.g., Mondares v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., No. 10-CV-2676- BTM (WVG), 2011 WL 5374613, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2011) 9 (“other trials and a busy schedule do nothing to advance Plaintiff’s 10 burden to show she was diligent in this case. Quite to the contrary, these actually militate against a finding of diligence, as counsel 11 essentially admitted she was not diligent in this case because she was busy litigating other cases.”) (emphasis in original). Third, 12 the fact that this case is not and may not be assigned to a District Judge until the vacancy is filled is of no consequence to the 13 preparation of written discovery or the resolution of discovery as is 14 handled by the magistrate judges. Lastly, Plaintiff cannot now rely on the recent onset of the COVID-19 virus to justify an extension 15 of the deadline when he has not demonstrated due diligence during the prior six-month discovery period. 16

17 (Doc. No. 104 at 3–4.)

18 Plaintiff contends that the magistrate judge’s order denying his request “is based entirely on the 19 … finding that Plaintiff was not diligent for ‘six’ months[,]” which is a mistake and a clearly 20 erroneous finding of fact. (Doc. No. 107 at 4.) Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration must be denied 21 because he has failed to show that the magistrate judge’s decision was clearly erroneous or contrary to 22 law. 23 As an initial matter, on July 16, 2019, the court lifted the previously imposed stay in this action 24 and set a discovery deadline of October 2, 2019, and a dispositive motion deadline of December 2, 25 2019. (Doc. No. 93.) On September 24, 2019, the court approved the parties’ stipulation to extend the 26 discovery deadline to March 30, 2020, and the dispositive motion deadline to June 1, 2020. (Doc. No. 27 96.) On October 16, 2019, the court granted plaintiff’s first ex parte request to the extend the March 28 30, 2020 discovery deadline to written requests as well as depositions. (Doc. No. 99.) This discovery 1 period was in addition to the discovery propounded previously by plaintiff before the appeal and 2 remand in this action. (Doc. No. 108 ¶ 5.) 3 In the instant motion, plaintiff’s counsel essentially argues that he did not get the “file” from 4 his client until late December 2019 and, therefore, did not know what discovery to propound until 5 sometime thereafter. (Doc. No. 107 at 4–7.) However, in evaluating whether plaintiff was diligent, 6 the magistrate judge considered plaintiff’s argument but rejected it, finding that plaintiff made the 7 request for an extension only thirteen days before the expiration of the discovery deadline, negating a 8 finding that the discovery was unduly truncated due to circumstances were beyond his control. (Doc. 9 No.

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Related

Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace
570 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. California, 1983)
Keith Mitchell v. Anthony Hedgpeth
791 F.3d 1166 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Federal Deposit Insurance v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.
196 F.R.D. 375 (S.D. California, 2000)
Grimes v. City of San Francisco
951 F.2d 236 (Ninth Circuit, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
(PC) King v. Biter, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-king-v-biter-caed-2020.