1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DAVOOD KHADEMI, Case No. 2:23-cv-2743-DC-JDP (P) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 GAVIN NEWSOME, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, a state inmate proceeding pro se, alleges in his first amended complaint that 19 Placer County Jail and unidentified prison officials in the South Placer County Jail violated his 20 Eighth Amendment right to have access to adequate food and water. ECF No. 13. Plaintiff fails 21 to state a claim. Plaintiff may, if he chooses, file an amended complaint that addresses the 22 deficiencies noted herein. 23 Screening and Pleading Requirements 24 A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed 25 in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and 26 dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 27 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 28 relief. Id. 1 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 3 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 4 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 5 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 6 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 7 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 8 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 9 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 10 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 11 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 12 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 13 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 14 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 15 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 16 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 17 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 18 Analysis 19 Plaintiff brings his first amended complaint against two named defendants—Placer 20 County Jail and unidentified South Placer County Jail officials. ECF No. 13 at 1-2. Plaintiff 21 alleges that on or about April 2024, Placer County Jail, South Placer County Jail, and Auburn Jail 22 changed their food menu from bologna sandwiches to turkey sandwiches. Id. at 3. He alleges 23 that the switch to turkey sandwiches was “bad,” inmates refused to each the sandwiches, and 24 ultimately, on November 20, 2024, the turkey sandwiches provided to the inmates caused 25 widespread sickness, impacting plaintiff and other inmates. Id. According to plaintiff, after 26 inmates became ill, on November 23, 2024, the jails stopped providing turkey sandwiches, 27 allegedly due to the inmate grievances filed based on the food. Id. He also alleges that unnamed 28 officials know the water in South Placer County Jail and Auburn Jail has a metallic taste, and that 1 he believes the water is impacting his kidney health. Id. at 4. He alleges that he filed a grievance 2 related to the water conditions and that correctional officers in his unit began taunting him 3 regarding his complaint, and that officials know inmates are not receiving adequate water in the 4 jail and are not taking appropriate actions. Id. Plaintiff purports to bring these claims under 42 5 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 402 6 U.S. 388 (1971), and states that he wants to bring the suit as a class action. Id. at 1. He seeks 7 monetary damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. Id. at 5. 8 Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a cognizable claim. To the extent plaintiff purports to 9 bring his claims under Bivens, such claim fails because Bivens actions address misconduct 10 performed by federal actors, not state actors. See Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 11 (2001) (“The purpose of Bivens is to deter individual federal officers from committing 12 constitutional violations.” (emphasis added)); see also Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 13 (2006) (“[A] Bivens action is the federal analog to suits brought against state officials under . . . 14 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). Because plaintiff only makes claims against state actors, he cannot bring 15 this action under Bivens. Additionally, while plaintiff seeks to bring his complaint as a class 16 action, he is not qualified to do so. See C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 17 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Although a non-attorney may appear in propria persona in his own behalf, 18 that privilege is personal to him. He has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than 19 himself.” (citations omitted)). 20 Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against Placer County Jail also fail to state a claim 21 because a § 1983 claim for monetary damages can only be brought against a person acting under 22 color of state law, and a state and its entities are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983. Will v. 23 Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989); Bank of Lake Tahoe v. Bank of America, 318 24 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against 25 Placer County Jail similarly fail because “[l]ocal law enforcement departments . . . are not proper 26 defendants under § 1983.” Sims v. San Diego Cnty. Jail Med., No. 24-cv-1489-LL-DDL, 2025 27 WL 360360, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2025); see also Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 28 993, 996 (N.D. Cal 1996) (“[T]he term ‘persons’ does not encompass municipal departments.”). 1 Finally, to the extent plaintiff attempts to raise a claim under Monell v. Department of Social 2 Services, 436 U.S. 658
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DAVOOD KHADEMI, Case No. 2:23-cv-2743-DC-JDP (P) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 GAVIN NEWSOME, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, a state inmate proceeding pro se, alleges in his first amended complaint that 19 Placer County Jail and unidentified prison officials in the South Placer County Jail violated his 20 Eighth Amendment right to have access to adequate food and water. ECF No. 13. Plaintiff fails 21 to state a claim. Plaintiff may, if he chooses, file an amended complaint that addresses the 22 deficiencies noted herein. 23 Screening and Pleading Requirements 24 A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed 25 in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and 26 dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 27 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 28 relief. Id. 1 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 3 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 4 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 5 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 6 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 7 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 8 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 9 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 10 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 11 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 12 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 13 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 14 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 15 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 16 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 17 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 18 Analysis 19 Plaintiff brings his first amended complaint against two named defendants—Placer 20 County Jail and unidentified South Placer County Jail officials. ECF No. 13 at 1-2. Plaintiff 21 alleges that on or about April 2024, Placer County Jail, South Placer County Jail, and Auburn Jail 22 changed their food menu from bologna sandwiches to turkey sandwiches. Id. at 3. He alleges 23 that the switch to turkey sandwiches was “bad,” inmates refused to each the sandwiches, and 24 ultimately, on November 20, 2024, the turkey sandwiches provided to the inmates caused 25 widespread sickness, impacting plaintiff and other inmates. Id. According to plaintiff, after 26 inmates became ill, on November 23, 2024, the jails stopped providing turkey sandwiches, 27 allegedly due to the inmate grievances filed based on the food. Id. He also alleges that unnamed 28 officials know the water in South Placer County Jail and Auburn Jail has a metallic taste, and that 1 he believes the water is impacting his kidney health. Id. at 4. He alleges that he filed a grievance 2 related to the water conditions and that correctional officers in his unit began taunting him 3 regarding his complaint, and that officials know inmates are not receiving adequate water in the 4 jail and are not taking appropriate actions. Id. Plaintiff purports to bring these claims under 42 5 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 402 6 U.S. 388 (1971), and states that he wants to bring the suit as a class action. Id. at 1. He seeks 7 monetary damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. Id. at 5. 8 Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a cognizable claim. To the extent plaintiff purports to 9 bring his claims under Bivens, such claim fails because Bivens actions address misconduct 10 performed by federal actors, not state actors. See Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 11 (2001) (“The purpose of Bivens is to deter individual federal officers from committing 12 constitutional violations.” (emphasis added)); see also Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 13 (2006) (“[A] Bivens action is the federal analog to suits brought against state officials under . . . 14 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). Because plaintiff only makes claims against state actors, he cannot bring 15 this action under Bivens. Additionally, while plaintiff seeks to bring his complaint as a class 16 action, he is not qualified to do so. See C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 17 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Although a non-attorney may appear in propria persona in his own behalf, 18 that privilege is personal to him. He has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than 19 himself.” (citations omitted)). 20 Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against Placer County Jail also fail to state a claim 21 because a § 1983 claim for monetary damages can only be brought against a person acting under 22 color of state law, and a state and its entities are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983. Will v. 23 Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989); Bank of Lake Tahoe v. Bank of America, 318 24 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against 25 Placer County Jail similarly fail because “[l]ocal law enforcement departments . . . are not proper 26 defendants under § 1983.” Sims v. San Diego Cnty. Jail Med., No. 24-cv-1489-LL-DDL, 2025 27 WL 360360, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2025); see also Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 28 993, 996 (N.D. Cal 1996) (“[T]he term ‘persons’ does not encompass municipal departments.”). 1 Finally, to the extent plaintiff attempts to raise a claim under Monell v. Department of Social 2 Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), plaintiff fails to state a claim because he did not plead Placer 3 County as a defendant, and he has not alleged that any constitutional deprivation he suffered was 4 caused either by the implementation or execution of a policy adopted and promulgated by the 5 County or by a final decision-maker for the County. 6 Plaintiff is left with claims for monetary damages and injunctive and declaratory relief 7 against unnamed South Placer Jail officials. For purposes of screening, plaintiff sufficiently 8 alleges a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim alleging inadequate water. 9 Inhumane conditions of confinement can violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 10 against cruel and unusual punishment. See Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 11 2006). Inhumane conditions can take many forms, and the deprivation of “minimal civilized 12 measure of life’s necessities” such as adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or safety can 13 violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 834; Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). To 14 establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of 15 something sufficiently serious, and that the deprivation occurred with a deliberate indifference to 16 the plaintiff’s health or safety. Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2009). 17 There is no question that “[a]dequate food is a basic human need protected by the Eighth 18 Amendment.” Kennan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996), amended on denial of reh’g, 19 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). While food need not be “tasty or aesthetically pleasing,” food 20 must be adequate to maintain inmate health. LeMaire v. Mass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 21 1993). Additionally, adequate water is an Eighth Amendment concern. Minifield v. Butikofer, 22 298 F. Supp. 2d 900, 904 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Spoiled food and “foul” water are inadequate to 23 maintain inmate health. Kennan, 83 F.3d at 1091. 24 Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that he was denied adequate food and water to maintain his 25 health. See id. However, plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim alleging inadequate food fails to 26 state a cognizable claim because he does not allege that the unnamed jail officials acted with 27 deliberate indifference. See Foster, 554 F.3d at 812. Based on plaintiff’s allegations, once prison 28 officials realized that the food was inadequate and made plaintiff sick, the officials stopped 1 serving the food, see ECF No. 13 at 3, meaning the officials were not deliberately indifferent to 2 his health, see Foster, 554 F.3d at 812. 3 Plaintiff’s water-related claim does not suffer from the same deficiency. Plaintiff 4 sufficiently alleged the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his health. According to 5 plaintiff, after he complained about the water and officials began taunting him about it, showing 6 that the officials knew about the issue and did not take corrective action. See Farmer v. Brennan, 7 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (defining deliberate indifference as an official “know[ing] of and 8 disregard[ing] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety”). As such, plaintiff alleges a 9 cognizable Eighth Amendment claim relating to his access to adequate water. 10 Nevertheless, plaintiff does not identify the specific prison officials responsible for the 11 alleged wrongdoing, and I cannot serve unnamed “John Doe” defendants until he or she is 12 identified. Accordingly, within 30 days of this order, plaintiff must file a second amended 13 complaint identifying the “Doe” defendants. Plaintiff should also take care to add specific factual 14 allegations against each defendant. If plaintiff decides to file an amended complaint, the 15 amended complaint will supersede the current one. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 16 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). This means that the amended complaint will need to be 17 complete on its face without reference to the prior pleading. See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 220. Once 18 an amended complaint is filed, the current one no longer serves any function. Therefore, in an 19 amended complaint, as in the original, plaintiff will need to assert each claim and allege each 20 defendant’s involvement in sufficient detail. The amended complaint should be titled “Second 21 Amended Complaint” and refer to the appropriate case number. If plaintiff does not file an 22 amended complaint, I will recommend that this action be dismissed. 23 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 24 1. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, ECF No. 13, is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 25 2. Within thirty days from service of this order, plaintiff shall file either (1) a second 26 amended complaint or (2) notice of voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice. 27 28 1 3. Failure to timely file either an amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal may 2 | result in the imposition of sanctions, including a recommendation that this action be dismissed 3 | with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 4 4. The Clerk of Court shall send plaintiff a complaint form with this order. 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: _ March 7, 2025 q-—— 8 JEREMY D. PETERSON 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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