(PC) Kambon v. County of Sacramento

Opinion

THEON KAMBON, No. 2:23-CV-1765-DC-DMC-P Plaintiff, v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 16.1 Plaintiff has filed an opposition, ECF No. 19. Defendants have filed a reply, ECF No. 22. In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The Court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by factual 1 Defendants filed this motion to dismiss before the Court conducted initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S. C. §1915A. allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). In addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555-56. The complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court generally may not consider materials outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court may, however, consider: (1) documents whose contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454; (2) documents whose authenticity is not in question, and upon which the complaint necessarily relies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials of which the court may take judicial notice, see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994). / / / Finally, leave to amend must be granted “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defects.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) County of Sacramento; (2) Jim Cooper, Sheriff for Sacramento County; (3) Venessa Vaden, Captain at Sacramento County Main Jail (SCMJ); and (4) Edward Yee, a Captain at Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center (RCCC). See ECF No. 1, pg. 2. Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fifth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Ninth Amendment, Tenth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and the “Mays Decree.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff’s first claim is that he suffered an injury due to an unsafe environment when he was held at RCCC, “around May 2023 or June 2023.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff states that he notified three different deputies (not named as defendants in this action) “that the urinals and toilets were leaking onto the bathroom floor making huge puddles causing a safety and sanitation hazard for us inmates.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that he was told by the deputies that they put a maintenance request in, but the problem persisted for at least a week. Id. According to Plaintiff, the wet floor caused him to fall three different times and the third instance he “hit [his] face on a urinal receiving a tiny gash on [his] nose that resulted in bleeding and headaches that [he] still suffer[s] from over a month later.” Id. Plaintiff contends that “but for the failures of the above- mentioned deputies and their supervisors to maintain a safe and healthy environment. . . I would have never slipped and fell due to the water on the floor.” Id. In Plaintiff’s second claim, he asserts that during his time at SCMJ and RCCC, he was “denied [his] special dietary needs based on [his] numerous allergies.” Id. at 4. At SCMJ, Plaintiff claims he was “serve[d] repeatedly food that [he] is allergic to.” Id. According to Plaintiff, after he complained about being served this food, he “would be denied a meal altogether.” Id. When Plaintiff did receive meals, he claims the “food would be obviously very / / / / / / old with mildewed [sic)] rice and rotten fruit that would be ice cold.” Id. As to his time at RCCC, Plaintiff states:

4 times a week I would have to beg the deputies to get them to notify the kitchen staff that I had not received my special diet . . . or that it arrived containing food that [he is] allergic to. Somedays after begging deputies to get [him] a lunch [Plaintiff] would not get anything. This was very humiliating. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff asserts that this caused him to suffer injury:

[D]ue to the deliberate indifference of [SCMJ] and [RCCC] staff and their superiors [he] was in pain for 5 days due to stomach issues, [he has] missed numerous meals and have gone hungry on occasions and been humiliated begging staff repeatedly to bring me food that arrives very later or inedible or at times not at all.

Id. at 4-6. Plaintiff’s third claim is that he was “forced to live with pain, discomfort, and stress for over 8 months” because of “the actions and failures of the medial staff and deputies of [SCMJ] and R.C.C.C.” Id. at 7. According to Plaintiff, he is an “ADA inmate” because when he arrived at SCMJ, he had “complete and partial tears to the ligaments around [his] knee.” Id. Plaintiff listed eleven instances where he did not “receive proper medical care,” as follows:

. . .1. Not providing me with the proper knee brace per doctors (sic) order. 2. Giving me pain killers that I’m not supposed to take due to my high blood pressure. 3. Failing to respond to medical request in timely manner if at all. 4. Denying me adequate physical therapy sessions. 5. Denying me adequate and timely visits to specialist 6. Denying me a M.R.I. for months. 7. Forcing me to travel to medical appointments for 30 to 40 minutes in a cage that required me to bend my knee in manner that cause me pain for 30 to 40 minutes to get there and 30 to 40 minutes to get back. 8. Not allowing me the knee surgery I want an (sic) need so I can state my rehabilitation. 9. Failure to properly document my injuries at the doctor visits and examinations I had while in the [SCMJ] and [RCCC]. 10. Failure to respect the extent of my injury. 11. Failure to take my complaints about my injuries seriously enough to properly document them. Id. at 7-8. / / / / / / / / / Plaintiff’s final claim is that both SCMJ and RCCC failed to provide him “adequate and consistent” mental health care. Id. at 9. According to Plaintiff, “the supervisors over the medical staff and deputies at these two facilities have a duty to ensure that their subordinates are actually providing proper health care.” Id. Plaintiff listed eight examples of this alleged “fail[ure] in their duties,” as follows:

1. They have failed and refused to respond to mental health request (sic) in a timely manner if at all. 2. Failure to properly document my mental health issues. 3. Not providing a confidential space to discuss my mental health issues. 4. Failure to respond to mental health grievances. 5. Omitting very relevant information in my medical file. 6. Failure to do wellness check-ups. 7. Failure to follow the guidelines of the ‘Mays Decree.’ 8. Failure [to] supervise subordinates.

Id. at 9-10. Plaintiff asserts that, due to the above actions or inactions, he is “suffering, unable to sleep, stressed, filled with anxiety, thinking negative, rubbing [his] skin raw, having bad dreams, wetting the bed and losing hope daily.” Id. at 10. Before Defendant responded to the complaint by way of the pending motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, ECF No. 14, requesting an injunction. Plaintiff asserted that his civil rights continue to be violated and listed twelve instances of such alleged violations, all of which had occurred since Plaintiff’s initial complaint.2 See id. at 2-4. / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

2 The Court construes this pleading as a supplemental complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d). Though this pleading was filed without leave of court, and Defendants challenge the sufficiency of Plaintiff's initial pleading, Rule 15(d) permits a supplemental complaint despite a defective underlying pleading. The Court also notes that Defendants' motion to dismiss addresses the allegations in both the original complaint and supplemental complaint. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue: (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) Plaintiff fails to allege a causal link between the alleged deprivation of civil rights and the named defendants; (3) Plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to support municipal liability under Monell; (4) Plaintiff’s supplemental pleading fails to provide fair notice of claims for relief against Defendants; and (5) Plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary injunction. See ECF No. 16, pgs. 1-2. A. Exhaustion Prisoners seeking relief under § 1983 must exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to bringing suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This requirement is mandatory regardless of the relief sought. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (overruling Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999)). The Supreme Court addressed the exhaustion requirement in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), and held: (1) prisoners are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in the complaint because lack of exhaustion is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and proved by the defendants; (2) an individual named as a defendant does not necessarily need to be named in the grievance process for exhaustion to be considered adequate because the applicable procedural rules that a prisoner must follow are defined by the particular grievance process, not by the PLRA; and (3) the PLRA does not require dismissal of the entire complaint if only some, but not all, claims are unexhausted. The defendant bears burden of showing non-exhaustion in the first instance. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014). If met, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the grievance process was not available, for example because it was thwarted, prolonged, or inadequate. See id. Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies because, in Plaintiff’s complaint he states, “by law I don’t have to.” See ECF No. 16, pg. 5 (quoting ECF No. 1, pgs. 3, 4, 7, 10). The Court does not agree because “[f]ailure to exhaust under the PLRA is ‘an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.’” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007)). Courts may address exhaustion at the pleading stage only if failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, and otherwise should decide exhaustion in the context of a motion for summary judgment. See id. Here, Plaintiff stated he did not believe he needed to file grievances about these issues but that is not to say that Plaintiff did not file such grievances. Indeed, in Plaintiff’s complaint, he states “none of my ‘grievances’ got responded to.” ECF No. 1, pg. 4. Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, as the Court must, his contention indicates that Plaintiff did in fact file grievances. Thus, from the face of the original complaint, it is not clear that Plaintiff failed to exhaust. See Hannah v. Ramirez, 2020 WL 39196, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 475297 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (finding, where the plaintiff wrote grievances but did not clearly exhaust administrative remedies, that the failure to exhaust was not clear from the face of the complaint); cf. Bradnax v. Cal., 2020 WL 3961656 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (holding that failure to exhaust was clear on the face of the complaint when the plaintiff alleged he had “bypassed” the inmate grievance system); Wynn v. Escarcega, 2021 WL 3539709, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2021) (holding that failure to exhaust was clear on the face when the plaintiff alleged that he “filed his complaint prior to exhausting”). Further, in Plaintiff’s reply to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff explained that he did file grievances and attached copies of multiple grievances he filed. See ECF No. 19, pg. 3; pgs. 12-25 (Exhibit B). Given that exhaustion is an affirmative defense, and prisoners are not required to demonstrate exhaustion in the original complaint, dismissal is not appropriate on that basis. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). Once Defendants raised the issue of exhaustion, Plaintiff provided sufficient evidence in his opposition brief to show he did file such grievances. See ECF No. 19, pgs. 12-25 (Exhibit B). Finally, while many of the attached grievances are illegible, the Court is able to discern dates in those documents which were before Plaintiff filed his complaint, and explanations that addressed the issues raised in Plaintiff’s complaint. See ECF No. 19, pgs. 12-25 (Exhibit B). Thus, the Court recommends that Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of exhaustion be denied. / / / / / / B. Causal Link To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. Supervisory personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may be liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). A supervisory defendant may also be liable where he or she knew of constitutional violations but failed to act to prevent them. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; see also Starr v. Baca, 633 F.3d 1191, 1209 (9th Cir. 2011). When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff “fails to link any named defendant to an act or omission leading to a cognizable civil rights violation.” ECF No. 16, pg. 7. The Court agrees. Plaintiff alleges that named Defendants Cooper, Vaden, and Lee are responsible for ensuring their employees protect the inmates’ constitutional rights. See ECF No. 19, pgs. 5-6. However, Plaintiff does not allege that any one of them participated in or directed the violations, implemented a policy that is the force behind the constitutional violations, or knew about the violations and failed to prevent them. Because Plaintiff does not allege any facts relating any of the alleged constitutional violations to the Defendants in this way, the named Defendants should be dismissed for lack of a causal link to Plaintiff’s claim. The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff attached a declaration from a fellow inmate to his opposition which indicates that Defendant Cooper was aware of the issue of leaking toilets at RCCC and did nothing to resolve the issue. See ECF No. 19, pgs. 27-28. While such facts could be sufficient to show a causal link between Defendant Cooper and the alleged constitutional violation, the declaration was attached to a reply and the Court can only consider the complaint when assessing a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Court will recommend that Defendants' motion to dismiss, which is based on the lack of allegations supporting a causal link, be granted, and that Plaintiff be directed to file an amended complaint that includes sufficient facts to support a causal link between the named defendants and the alleged constitutional violations. C. Municipal Liability Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or custom of the municipality. See id. Defendants argue that “Plaintiff identifies no County of Sacramento policy which was a moving force behind Plaintiff’s alleged injuries at the two jail facilities.” ECF No. 16, pg. 8. Further, Defendants assert that “the ‘Mays Decree’ is not a pleading shortcut for plaintiffs to assert a blanket “bad policy,” circumventing Monell and general pleading requirements.” ECF No. 22, pg. 5. The Court agrees. Plaintiff asserts that “the County is in violation of the ‘Mays Decree’” and argues that by violating this policy, the County is subject to municipal liability. ECF No. 19, pg. 9. But finding municipal liability requires that the County’s policy, custom, or practice is what gives rise to the alleged constitutional violations. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Plaintiff alleges the opposite – that the County’s policy is to protect inmates’ constitutional rights and SCMJ and RCCC are not abiding by that policy. See ECF No. 19, pg. 9. While the findings in the monitoring reports, as required by the Mays Decree, have been relied on to show a custom of not providing sufficient staffing which caused constitutional violations, Plaintiff here does not make such a claim. See No. 12-1304 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2024), ECF No. 19. Thus, the Court will recommend that Defendants' motion to dismiss under Monnell be granted and that Plaintiff be directed to file an amended complaint that includes sufficient facts to show a county policy, custom, or practice that resulted in the alleged constitutional violations. D. Preliminary Injunction Plaintiff agrees with Defendants that, because he was moved from SCMJ, his demand for a preliminary injunction is now moot. The Court will therefore recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. / / / / / / / / / / / / Il. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends as follows: 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 16, be granted in part and denied in part as explained herein. 2. Plaintiffs original complaint and supplemental complaint be dismissed with leave to amend. 3. Plaintiff be directed to file a first amended complaint. These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). Dated: January 24, 2025 Ss..c0_, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 1]