(PC) Kambon v. County of Sacramento

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 24, 2025
• Docket: 2:23-cv-01765
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THEON KAMBON, No. 2:23-CV-1765-DC-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 16.1 19 Plaintiff has filed an opposition, ECF No. 19. Defendants have filed a reply, ECF No. 22. 20 In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of 21 material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The 22 Court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer 23 v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 24 738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All 25 ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 26 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by factual 27 1 Defendants filed this motion to dismiss before the Court conducted initial 28 screening pursuant to 28 U.S. C. §1915A. 1 allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). In 2 addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. See 3 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement 5 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair 6 notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 7 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order 8 to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain 9 more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 10 allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555-56. The 11 complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 12 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 13 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 14 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but 15 it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting 16 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 17 defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement 18 to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 19 In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court generally may not consider materials 20 outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998); 21 Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court may, however, consider: (1) 22 documents whose contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no 23 party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454; (2) documents whose authenticity is not in question, 24 and upon which the complaint necessarily relies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see 25 Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials 26 of which the court may take judicial notice, see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 27 1994). 28 / / / 1 Finally, leave to amend must be granted “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no 2 amendment can cure the defects.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per 3 curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 4 5 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 6 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) County of Sacramento; (2) Jim 7 Cooper, Sheriff for Sacramento County; (3) Venessa Vaden, Captain at Sacramento County Main 8 Jail (SCMJ); and (4) Edward Yee, a Captain at Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center (RCCC). See 9 ECF No. 1, pg. 2. Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fifth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Ninth 10 Amendment, Tenth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and the “Mays Decree.” Id. at 4. 11 Plaintiff’s first claim is that he suffered an injury due to an unsafe environment 12 when he was held at RCCC, “around May 2023 or June 2023.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff states that he 13 notified three different deputies (not named as defendants in this action) “that the urinals and 14 toilets were leaking onto the bathroom floor making huge puddles causing a safety and sanitation 15 hazard for us inmates.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that he was told by the deputies that they put a 16 maintenance request in, but the problem persisted for at least a week. Id. According to Plaintiff, 17 the wet floor caused him to fall three different times and the third instance he “hit [his] face on a 18 urinal receiving a tiny gash on [his] nose that resulted in bleeding and headaches that [he] still 19 suffer[s] from over a month later.” Id. Plaintiff contends that “but for the failures of the above- 20 mentioned deputies and their supervisors to maintain a safe and healthy environment. . . I would 21 have never slipped and fell due to the water on the floor.” Id. 22 In Plaintiff’s second claim, he asserts that during his time at SCMJ and RCCC, he 23 was “denied [his] special dietary needs based on [his] numerous allergies.” Id. at 4. At SCMJ, 24 Plaintiff claims he was “serve[d] repeatedly food that [he] is allergic to.” Id. According to 25 Plaintiff, after he complained about being served this food, he “would be denied a meal 26 altogether.” Id. When Plaintiff did receive meals, he claims the “food would be obviously very 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 old with mildewed [sic)] rice and rotten fruit that would be ice cold.” Id. 2 As to his time at RCCC, Plaintiff states:

3 4 times a week I would have to beg the deputies to get them to notify the kitchen staff that I had not received my special diet . . . or that it arrived 4 containing food that [he is] allergic to. Somedays after begging deputies to get [him] a lunch [Plaintiff] would not get anything. This was very 5 humiliating. 6 Id. at 4-5. 7 Plaintiff asserts that this caused him to suffer injury:

8 [D]ue to the deliberate indifference of [SCMJ] and [RCCC] staff and their superiors [he] was in pain for 5 days due to stomach issues, [he has] 9 missed numerous meals and have gone hungry on occasions and been humiliated begging staff repeatedly to bring me food that arrives very later 10 or inedible or at times not at all.

11 Id. at 4-6. 12 Plaintiff’s third claim is that he was “forced to live with pain, discomfort, and 13 stress for over 8 months” because of “the actions and failures of the medial staff and deputies of 14 [SCMJ] and R.C.C.C.” Id. at 7. According to Plaintiff, he is an “ADA inmate” because when he 15 arrived at SCMJ, he had “complete and partial tears to the ligaments around [his] knee.” Id. 16 Plaintiff listed eleven instances where he did not “receive proper medical care,” as follows:

17 . . .1. Not providing me with the proper knee brace per doctors (sic) order. 2. Giving me pain killers that I’m not supposed to take due to my high 18 blood pressure. 3. Failing to respond to medical request in timely manner if at all. 4. Denying me adequate physical therapy sessions. 5. Denying me 19 adequate and timely visits to specialist 6. Denying me a M.R.I. for months. 7. Forcing me to travel to medical appointments for 30 to 40 20 minutes in a cage that required me to bend my knee in manner that cause me pain for 30 to 40 minutes to get there and 30 to 40 minutes to get back. 21 8. Not allowing me the knee surgery I want an (sic) need so I can state my rehabilitation. 9. Failure to properly document my injuries at the doctor 22 visits and examinations I had while in the [SCMJ] and [RCCC]. 10. Failure to respect the extent of my injury. 11. Failure to take my 23 complaints about my injuries seriously enough to properly document them. 24 Id. at 7-8. 25 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Plaintiff’s final claim is that both SCMJ and RCCC failed to provide him 2 “adequate and consistent” mental health care. Id. at 9. According to Plaintiff, “the supervisors 3 over the medical staff and deputies at these two facilities have a duty to ensure that their 4 subordinates are actually providing proper health care.” Id. Plaintiff listed eight examples of this 5 alleged “fail[ure] in their duties,” as follows:

6 1. They have failed and refused to respond to mental health request (sic) in a timely manner if at all. 7 2. Failure to properly document my mental health issues. 3. Not providing a confidential space to discuss my mental health issues. 8 4. Failure to respond to mental health grievances. 5. Omitting very relevant information in my medical file. 9 6. Failure to do wellness check-ups. 7. Failure to follow the guidelines of the ‘Mays Decree.’ 10 8. Failure [to] supervise subordinates.

11 Id. at 9-10. 12 Plaintiff asserts that, due to the above actions or inactions, he is “suffering, unable 13 to sleep, stressed, filled with anxiety, thinking negative, rubbing [his] skin raw, having bad 14 dreams, wetting the bed and losing hope daily.” Id. at 10. 15 Before Defendant responded to the complaint by way of the pending motion to 16 dismiss, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, ECF No. 14, requesting an injunction. Plaintiff 17 asserted that his civil rights continue to be violated and listed twelve instances of such alleged 18 violations, all of which had occurred since Plaintiff’s initial complaint.2 See id. at 2-4. 19 / / / 20 / / / 21 / / / 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25

2 The Court construes this pleading as a supplemental complaint under Federal Rule 26 of Civil Procedure 15(d). Though this pleading was filed without leave of court, and Defendants 27 challenge the sufficiency of Plaintiff's initial pleading, Rule 15(d) permits a supplemental complaint despite a defective underlying pleading. The Court also notes that Defendants' motion 28 to dismiss addresses the allegations in both the original complaint and supplemental complaint. 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue: (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust 3 administrative remedies; (2) Plaintiff fails to allege a causal link between the alleged deprivation 4 of civil rights and the named defendants; (3) Plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to support 5 municipal liability under Monell; (4) Plaintiff’s supplemental pleading fails to provide fair notice 6 of claims for relief against Defendants; and (5) Plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary injunction. 7 See ECF No. 16, pgs. 1-2. 8 A. Exhaustion 9 Prisoners seeking relief under § 1983 must exhaust all available administrative 10 remedies prior to bringing suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This requirement is mandatory 11 regardless of the relief sought. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (overruling 12 Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999)). The Supreme Court addressed the exhaustion 13 requirement in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), and held: (1) prisoners are not required to 14 specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in the complaint because lack of exhaustion is an 15 affirmative defense which must be pleaded and proved by the defendants; (2) an individual 16 named as a defendant does not necessarily need to be named in the grievance process for 17 exhaustion to be considered adequate because the applicable procedural rules that a prisoner must 18 follow are defined by the particular grievance process, not by the PLRA; and (3) the PLRA does 19 not require dismissal of the entire complaint if only some, but not all, claims are unexhausted. 20 The defendant bears burden of showing non-exhaustion in the first instance. See Albino v. Baca, 21 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014). If met, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the 22 grievance process was not available, for example because it was thwarted, prolonged, or 23 inadequate. See id. 24 Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies 25 because, in Plaintiff’s complaint he states, “by law I don’t have to.” See ECF No. 16, pg. 5 26 (quoting ECF No. 1, pgs. 3, 4, 7, 10). The Court does not agree because “[f]ailure to exhaust 27 under the PLRA is ‘an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.’” Albino v. Baca, 28 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007)). Courts 1 may address exhaustion at the pleading stage only if failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the 2 complaint, and otherwise should decide exhaustion in the context of a motion for summary 3 judgment. See id. Here, Plaintiff stated he did not believe he needed to file grievances about 4 these issues but that is not to say that Plaintiff did not file such grievances. Indeed, in Plaintiff’s 5 complaint, he states “none of my ‘grievances’ got responded to.” ECF No. 1, pg. 4. Accepting the 6 allegations in the complaint as true, as the Court must, his contention indicates that Plaintiff did in 7 fact file grievances. Thus, from the face of the original complaint, it is not clear that Plaintiff 8 failed to exhaust. See Hannah v. Ramirez, 2020 WL 39196, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2020), report and 9 recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 475297 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (finding, where the plaintiff wrote 10 grievances but did not clearly exhaust administrative remedies, that the failure to exhaust was not 11 clear from the face of the complaint); cf. Bradnax v. Cal., 2020 WL 3961656 (E.D. Cal. 2020) 12 (holding that failure to exhaust was clear on the face of the complaint when the plaintiff alleged 13 he had “bypassed” the inmate grievance system); Wynn v. Escarcega, 2021 WL 3539709, at *1 14 (E.D. Cal. 2021) (holding that failure to exhaust was clear on the face when the plaintiff alleged 15 that he “filed his complaint prior to exhausting”). Further, in Plaintiff’s reply to Defendants’ 16 motion to dismiss, Plaintiff explained that he did file grievances and attached copies of multiple 17 grievances he filed. See ECF No. 19, pg. 3; pgs. 12-25 (Exhibit B). 18 Given that exhaustion is an affirmative defense, and prisoners are not required to 19 demonstrate exhaustion in the original complaint, dismissal is not appropriate on that basis. See 20 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). Once Defendants raised the issue of exhaustion, Plaintiff 21 provided sufficient evidence in his opposition brief to show he did file such grievances. See ECF 22 No. 19, pgs. 12-25 (Exhibit B). Finally, while many of the attached grievances are illegible, the 23 Court is able to discern dates in those documents which were before Plaintiff filed his complaint, 24 and explanations that addressed the issues raised in Plaintiff’s complaint. See ECF No. 19, pgs. 25 12-25 (Exhibit B). Thus, the Court recommends that Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis 26 of exhaustion be denied. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 B. Causal Link 2 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 3 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See 4 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 5 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 6 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 7 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 8 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 9 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 10 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 11 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 12 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 13 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 14 employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no 15 respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional 16 violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. 17 Supervisory personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation 18 of constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may be liable even 19 where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. Cnty of San 20 Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). A supervisory defendant may also be 21 liable where he or she knew of constitutional violations but failed to act to prevent them. See 22 Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; see also Starr v. Baca, 633 F.3d 1191, 1209 (9th Cir. 2011). 23 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 24 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 25 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 26 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in 27 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 28 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 1 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 2 662, 676 (2009). 3 Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff “fails to link any named defendant to an act 4 or omission leading to a cognizable civil rights violation.” ECF No. 16, pg. 7. The Court agrees. 5 Plaintiff alleges that named Defendants Cooper, Vaden, and Lee are responsible for ensuring their 6 employees protect the inmates’ constitutional rights. See ECF No. 19, pgs. 5-6. However, 7 Plaintiff does not allege that any one of them participated in or directed the violations, 8 implemented a policy that is the force behind the constitutional violations, or knew about the 9 violations and failed to prevent them. Because Plaintiff does not allege any facts relating any of 10 the alleged constitutional violations to the Defendants in this way, the named Defendants should 11 be dismissed for lack of a causal link to Plaintiff’s claim. 12 The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff attached a declaration from a fellow inmate 13 to his opposition which indicates that Defendant Cooper was aware of the issue of leaking toilets 14 at RCCC and did nothing to resolve the issue. See ECF No. 19, pgs. 27-28. While such facts 15 could be sufficient to show a causal link between Defendant Cooper and the alleged constitutional 16 violation, the declaration was attached to a reply and the Court can only consider the complaint 17 when assessing a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Court will recommend that Defendants' 18 motion to dismiss, which is based on the lack of allegations supporting a causal link, be granted, 19 and that Plaintiff be directed to file an amended complaint that includes sufficient facts to support 20 a causal link between the named defendants and the alleged constitutional violations. 21 C. Municipal Liability 22 Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to 23 whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 24 Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. 25 at 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local 26 government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials 27 under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 28 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of 1 the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the 2 plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or 3 custom of the municipality. See id. 4 Defendants argue that “Plaintiff identifies no County of Sacramento policy which 5 was a moving force behind Plaintiff’s alleged injuries at the two jail facilities.” ECF No. 16, pg. 6 8. Further, Defendants assert that “the ‘Mays Decree’ is not a pleading shortcut for plaintiffs to 7 assert a blanket “bad policy,” circumventing Monell and general pleading requirements.” ECF 8 No. 22, pg. 5. The Court agrees. Plaintiff asserts that “the County is in violation of the ‘Mays 9 Decree’” and argues that by violating this policy, the County is subject to municipal liability. 10 ECF No. 19, pg. 9. But finding municipal liability requires that the County’s policy, custom, or 11 practice is what gives rise to the alleged constitutional violations. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. 12 Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Plaintiff alleges the opposite – that the County’s policy is to 13 protect inmates’ constitutional rights and SCMJ and RCCC are not abiding by that policy. See 14 ECF No. 19, pg. 9. While the findings in the monitoring reports, as required by the Mays Decree, 15 have been relied on to show a custom of not providing sufficient staffing which caused 16 constitutional violations, Plaintiff here does not make such a claim. See No. 12-1304 (E.D. Cal. 17 Jan. 25, 2024), ECF No. 19. Thus, the Court will recommend that Defendants' motion to dismiss 18 under Monnell be granted and that Plaintiff be directed to file an amended complaint that includes 19 sufficient facts to show a county policy, custom, or practice that resulted in the alleged 20 constitutional violations. 21 D. Preliminary Injunction 22 Plaintiff agrees with Defendants that, because he was moved from SCMJ, his 23 demand for a preliminary injunction is now moot. The Court will therefore recommend dismissal 24 of Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Il. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends as follows: 3 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 16, be granted in part and denied 4 || in part as explained herein. 5 2. Plaintiffs original complaint and supplemental complaint be dismissed 6 || with leave to amend. 7 3. Plaintiff be directed to file a first amended complaint. 8 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 9 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days 10 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 11 || objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of 12 | objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See 13 | Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 14 15 | Dated: January 24, 2025 Ss..c0_, 16 DENNIS M. COTA 17 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1]