1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARCELL JONES, No. 2:22-cv-1384 DB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 MICHELLE SHUTE, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 18 § 1983. Before the court are plaintiff’s complaint for screening and plaintiff’s motion to proceed 19 in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, this court grants plaintiff’s motion to proceed 20 in forma pauperis and finds plaintiff states no cognizable claims for relief. The complaint will be 21 dismissed with leave to file an amended complaint. 22 IN FORMA PAUPERIS 23 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. 24 §1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 25 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 26 §§1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 27 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 28 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 1 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 2 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 3 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 4 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 5 1915(b)(2). 6 SCREENING 7 I. Legal Standards 8 The court is required to screen complaints brought by parties proceeding in forma 9 pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 10 2000) (en banc). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the party has raised 11 claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 12 granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 13 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 14 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 15 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 16 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 17 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 18 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 19 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. Rule 8(a)(2) of 20 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim 21 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what 22 the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 23 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 24 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must 25 contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain 26 factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 27 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 28 allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 1 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 2 doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 3 II. Analysis 4 A. Plaintiff’s Allegations 5 Plaintiff is incarcerated at the California Medical Facility (“CMF”). He complains of 6 conduct that occurred there starting in 2019. Plaintiff identifies three defendants: Michelle 7 Shute, a primary care provider; Traci Patterson, “CCHP Chief Executive Officer;” and “CDCR 8 Healthcare Admin, Healthcare Oversight.” 9 Plaintiff alleges the following. In October 2019 he suffered a severe back injury that 10 caused temporary paralysis and a “subsequent knee injury from the fall.” For the next two years, 11 plaintiff complained, apparently to defendant Shute, about progressing pain, numbness and lack 12 of mobility. However, Shute only treated plaintiff’s “non-emergency” knee injury. 13 In August 2021, plaintiff again experienced temporary paralysis from the back injury. An 14 MRI showed several issues which required emergency surgery. Plaintiff is now going through 15 physical rehabilitation and requires a walker. Plaintiff alleges he had complained to CCHP and 16 Healthcare Administration but neither took action to help him. 17 Plaintiff contends the delay in treatment caused his back injury to worsen, requiring 18 surgery. 19 B. Does Plaintiff State Claims for Relief? 20 Several of plaintiff’s allegations may, with more information, state claims under the Civil 21 Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Civil Rights Act provides as follows: 22 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 23 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 24 or other proper proceeding for redress. 25 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 26 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 27 Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 28 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform 2 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 3 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARCELL JONES, No. 2:22-cv-1384 DB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 MICHELLE SHUTE, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 18 § 1983. Before the court are plaintiff’s complaint for screening and plaintiff’s motion to proceed 19 in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, this court grants plaintiff’s motion to proceed 20 in forma pauperis and finds plaintiff states no cognizable claims for relief. The complaint will be 21 dismissed with leave to file an amended complaint. 22 IN FORMA PAUPERIS 23 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. 24 §1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 25 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 26 §§1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 27 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 28 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 1 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 2 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 3 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 4 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 5 1915(b)(2). 6 SCREENING 7 I. Legal Standards 8 The court is required to screen complaints brought by parties proceeding in forma 9 pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 10 2000) (en banc). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the party has raised 11 claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 12 granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 13 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 14 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 15 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 16 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 17 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 18 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 19 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. Rule 8(a)(2) of 20 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim 21 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what 22 the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 23 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 24 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must 25 contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain 26 factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 27 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 28 allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 1 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 2 doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 3 II. Analysis 4 A. Plaintiff’s Allegations 5 Plaintiff is incarcerated at the California Medical Facility (“CMF”). He complains of 6 conduct that occurred there starting in 2019. Plaintiff identifies three defendants: Michelle 7 Shute, a primary care provider; Traci Patterson, “CCHP Chief Executive Officer;” and “CDCR 8 Healthcare Admin, Healthcare Oversight.” 9 Plaintiff alleges the following. In October 2019 he suffered a severe back injury that 10 caused temporary paralysis and a “subsequent knee injury from the fall.” For the next two years, 11 plaintiff complained, apparently to defendant Shute, about progressing pain, numbness and lack 12 of mobility. However, Shute only treated plaintiff’s “non-emergency” knee injury. 13 In August 2021, plaintiff again experienced temporary paralysis from the back injury. An 14 MRI showed several issues which required emergency surgery. Plaintiff is now going through 15 physical rehabilitation and requires a walker. Plaintiff alleges he had complained to CCHP and 16 Healthcare Administration but neither took action to help him. 17 Plaintiff contends the delay in treatment caused his back injury to worsen, requiring 18 surgery. 19 B. Does Plaintiff State Claims for Relief? 20 Several of plaintiff’s allegations may, with more information, state claims under the Civil 21 Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Civil Rights Act provides as follows: 22 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 23 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 24 or other proper proceeding for redress. 25 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 26 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 27 Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 28 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform 2 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 3 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 4 Plaintiff may be able to state a claim that defendants Shute and Patterson were 5 deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. To 6 state that claim, plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that he had a serious medical need 7 and that each defendant responded to that need with deliberate indifference. McGuckin v. Smith, 8 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 9 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 10 A medical need is serious “if the failure to treat the prisoner's condition could result in 11 further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 974 12 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Indications of a serious medical need include 13 “the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities.” Id. 14 at 1059-60. By establishing the existence of a serious medical need, a prisoner satisfies the 15 objective requirement for proving an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 16 825, 834 (1994). 17 If a prisoner establishes the existence of a serious medical need, he must then show that 18 prison officials responded to the serious medical need with deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 19 511 U.S. at 834. In general, deliberate indifference may be shown when prison officials deny, 20 delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or may be shown by the way in which 21 prison officials provide medical care. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th 22 Cir. 1988). 23 Delays in providing medical care may manifest deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. 24 at 104-05. To establish a claim of deliberate indifference arising from delay in providing care, a 25 plaintiff must show that the delay was harmful. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 745-46 (9th 26 Cir. 2002); Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059; 27 Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990); Hunt v. Dental Dep't, 865 F.2d 198, 28 200 (9th Cir. 1989); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1 1985). In this regard, “[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial; however, such would 2 provide additional support for the inmate's claim that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to 3 his needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 4 In his complaint, plaintiff fails to specifically allege what Shute and Patterson knew and 5 did or did not do. Rather, plaintiff generally states that defendant Shute failed to treat his 6 complaints of back pain and defendant Patterson was made aware of plaintiff’s complaints but 7 failed to do anything to help him. Plaintiff must show allege facts showing just how Shute knew 8 about plaintiff’s back problems, when plaintiff was treated by Shute, and what Shute said or did 9 regarding plaintiff’s complaints about his back. 10 With respect to defendant Patterson, plaintiff must explain how Patterson was made aware 11 of plaintiff’s back problems and of Shute’s failure to address them. Plaintiff must then explain 12 how Patterson could have helped him. If plaintiff is alleging Patterson denied plaintiff’s 13 administrative appeals, plaintiff is advised that, generally, denying a prisoner’s administrative 14 appeal does not cause or contribute to the underlying violation. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 15 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007); Hernandez v. Cate, 918 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1018 (C.D. Cal. 2013). A 16 defendant who reviewed plaintiff’s appeals is only liable if plaintiff demonstrates that the 17 defendant denying the appeal had the ability to help plaintiff and that denial of the appeal caused 18 him further injury. 19 Finally, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s “Health Care 20 Administration” is not an appropriate defendant. The Health Care Administration is not a person. 21 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides for suit only against a “person” 22 acting “under color of” state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. 23 Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2011) Plaintiff must identify a person in the Health Care 24 Administration who took actions, or failed to take actions, that violated his Eighth Amendment 25 rights. 26 CONCLUSION 27 Above, this court finds plaintiff fails to state any claims for relief. Plaintiff will be given 28 an opportunity to amend the complaint. 1 In an amended complaint, plaintiff must address the problems with his complaint that are 2 explained above. Plaintiff is advised that in an amended complaint he must clearly identify each 3 defendant and the action that defendant took that violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The 4 court is not required to review exhibits or other filings to determine what plaintiff’s charging 5 allegations are as to each named defendant. Plaintiff must include ALL claims he wishes to 6 pursue in one amended complaint. In the present order, as a one-time courtesy to plaintiff, this 7 court has reviewed all of plaintiff’s filings to attempt to determine his claims. The court is not 8 required to do so and this court will only consider the amended complaint next time. 9 Plaintiff must identify as a defendant only persons who personally participated in a 10 substantial way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional right. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 11 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right if 12 he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act he is legally required to do 13 that causes the alleged deprivation). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation 14 in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 15 1982) (citations omitted). 16 In an amended complaint, the allegations must be set forth in numbered paragraphs. Fed. 17 R. Civ. P. 10(b). Plaintiff may join multiple claims if they are all against a single defendant. Fed. 18 R. Civ. P. 18(a). If plaintiff has more than one claim based upon separate transactions or 19 occurrences, the claims must be set forth in separate paragraphs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). 20 Plaintiff may not bring claims against different defendants that are not related to each 21 other. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). “[M]ultiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A 22 against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated 23 claims against different defendants belong in different suits.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 24 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Simply alleging a “conspiracy” does not transform 25 unrelated claims into related claims. 26 The federal rules require a simple description of a party’s claims. Plaintiff’s claims must 27 be set forth in short and plain terms, simply, concisely and directly. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 28 //// 1 | N.A., 534 US. 506, 514 (2002) (“Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, 2 | which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 3 An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. 4 | E.D. Cal. R. 220. Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading is superseded. 5 | By signing an amended complaint, plaintiff certifies he has made reasonable inquiry and has 6 | evidentiary support for his allegations, and for violation of this rule the court may impose 7 | sanctions sufficient to deter repetition by plaintiff or others. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 8 For the foregoing reasons, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as 9 | follows: 10 1. Plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted. 11 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 12 | is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 14 | Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently 15 | herewith. 16 3. Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed with leave to amend. 17 4. Plaintiff is granted sixty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 18 | complaint that complies with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 19 | Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned this case 20 | and must be labeled “First Amended Complaint.” Failure to file an amended complaint in 21 | accordance with this order may result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed. 22 5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the prisoner complaint 23 | form used in this district. 24 | Dated: August 30, 2022 25 26 27 || DLB:9/DB prisoner inbox/civil rights/S/jone1384.scrn LTA □□ □□ ea the nPAGISTRATE TUDGE 28