(PC) Jones v. Placer County Sheriff's Office

District Court, E.D. California·Decided September 28, 2020·No. 2:19-cv-00342·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LLOYD DYLAN JONES, No. 2:19-cv-0342-MCE-EFB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 PLACER COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, et al., 15 Defendants. 16

17 18 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 19 U.S.C. § 1983. The court previously dismissed his complaints with leave to amend because 20 plaintiff had attempted to present his claims in two different filings. ECF No. 12. The court also 21 indicated to plaintiff that he had improperly joined unrelated claims. Id. Plaintiff then filed a 22 second amended complaint and a third amended complaint. ECF Nos. 15, 19. The court 23 screened the third amended complaint and concluded that plaintiff had improperly joined claims, 24 asserted claims barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and stated one potentially 25 cognizable claim against defendant Tredinnick. ECF No. 21. The court allowed plaintiff leave to 26 file a fourth amended complaint to attempt to cure the defects identified in the screening order. 27 Plaintiff has filed fourth amended complaint (ECF No. 25), which is before the court for 28 screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 1 I. Screening Requirement and Standards 2 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 3 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion 5 of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 6 relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 7 relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). 8 A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and 10 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the 11 defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 12 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 13 While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8, 14 its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 15 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 16 To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked 17 assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 18 action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 19 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 20 Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. 21 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 22 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 23 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a 24 claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. 25 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 26 plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 II. Analysis 2 A. Plaintiff’s Allegations 3 Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Devon Bell, Sheriff of Placer County, (2) 4 California Forensic Medical Group, a subcontractor responsible for medical care at the Placer 5 County South Jail (“Jail”), (3) Timothy Gualco, a Placer County Sheriff’s deputy, (4) Derek 6 Tredinnick, a Placer County Sheriff’s deputy, (5) Andrew Lyssand, a Placer County Sheriff’s 7 deputy, (6) Ellis, a Placer County Sheriff’s deputy, (7) Ken Addison, a Placer County Sheriff’s 8 deputy, (8) Ryan West, a Placer County Sheriff’s sergeant, (9) the Placer County Board of 9 Supervisors, (10) the Placer County South Jail, (11) the Placer County Sheriff’s Office, (12) 10 Timothy Huff, and (13) Jane Doe, a nurse at the Jail. 11 Plaintiff alleges that defendants Tredinnick, Gualco, West, and Lyssand arrested him on 12 March 27, 2018. ECF No. 25 at 1, 6. At the time, plaintiff had with him proof of a chemotherapy 13 appointment for the following day and other “doctor’s orders” that plaintiff does not describe. Id. 14 at 6. 15 The deputies transported plaintiff to the Jail, where they interviewed him. Id. Tredinnick 16 asked plaintiff for the names of his prescribed medications and for consent to perform various 17 searches of plaintiff’s property. Id. Plaintiff declined to consent and told the deputies to “get a 18 warrant.” Id. 19 Before his arrest, plaintiff had been undergoing treatment for cancer, including recent 20 chemotherapy and surgical removal of a tumor. Id. At the Jail, Tredinnick came to the holding 21 cell where plaintiff had been placed with bottles of prescriptions for plaintiff’s medical needs. Id. 22 The medications were all current and were contained in pharmacy bottles with plaintiff’s full 23 name. Id. at 7. Tredinnick asked plaintiff to sign an authorization so he could get medical 24 information about the prescriptions. Id. at 6. Plaintiff was suffering from excruciating pain, but 25 Tredinnick and Gualco told him they would withhold all his medications unless he consented to 26 the search and seizure of his firearms and signed a consent for the Sheriff’s Office to speak with 27 his treating physician. Id. at 7. Plaintiff responded that “the information was protected under 28 HIPPA [sic] and consent was already signed for the medical staff only and for doctors only.” Id. 1 Plaintiff would authorize only for doctors to speak with other doctors (presumably for Jail doctors 2 to speak with plaintiff’s treating physicians), because he “does not trust cops.” Id. 3 Tredinnick then ripped up the doctor’s order from plaintiff’s physician and poured all of 4 plaintiff’s pills into his hand. Id. Tredinnick pretended to put the pills into his mouth. Id. The 5 pills were not placed in plaintiff’s property. Id. 6 Tredinnick “had medical staff state” that the sheriff’s office had a policy to deprive 7 detainees of all narcotic pain medications. Id. Medical staff could only prescribe Tylenol 3, 8 which was ineffective for plaintiff’s pain. Id. 9 At plaintiff’s chemotherapy appointment on March 27, 2018, defendant Ellis, on the order 10 of Tredinnick, forced his way into the room without plaintiff’s consent while plaintiff was 11 engaged in a “private medical conversation” with his oncologist. Id. at 8. 12 B. Governing Law 13 In the screening order of March 26, 2020, the court informed plaintiff that his claims 14 challenging his arrest and the conduct of county officials in relation to the investigation and his 15 criminal trial were likely barred by the rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

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