(PC) Johnson v. Nugent

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 10, 2025
• Docket: 1:24-cv-00949
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHAWN PIERRE JOHNSON, Case No. 1:24-cv-949-JLT-BAM (PC) 12 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED 13 v. COMPLAINT 14 KEVIN NUGENT, et al., (ECF No. 1) 15 Defendants. THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE 16

17 Plaintiff Shawn Pierre Johnson (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 18 forma pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint is 19 currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 1.) 20 I. Screening Requirement and Standard 21 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 22 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 24 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 25 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 26 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 27 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 28 1 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 2 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 3 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 4 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 5 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 6 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 7 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 8 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 9 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 10 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 11 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 12 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 13 Plaintiff is currently housed at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”) in Delano, CA where 14 the events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names as defendants: (1) Pat 15 Horn, Warden at KVSP, (2) Kevin Nugent, chairman, Religious Review Committed, KVSP, (3) 16 Ruben Carriedo, Chief Deputy Warden, KVSP, (4) Jeremy Custer, Associate Warden, KVSP, and 17 (5) J. Moeckly, correctional officer and reviewing officer of appeals. 18 In claim 1, Plaintiff maybe alleging a violation of the First Amendment and the Religious 19 Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Plaintiff alleges as follows. Pat Horn is responsible 20 for supervision and operations at KVSP and neglected the participating Muslims of Ramadan 21 access to practice the Religion of Islam in its totality. Ruben Carriedo is the Chief Deputy 22 Warden who refers pending matters and discrepancies to the Warden. Mr. Carriedo possesses full 23 knowledge of the denial of chapel use during the month of Ramadan. Jeremy Custer is Associate 24 Warden whose decision also led to the denial of chapel use during Ramadan. Keven Nugent, 25 chairman, Religious Review Committee, provided the memorandum denying chapel use during 26 Ramadan with full knowledge of its essential use during Ramadan. J. Moeckly is the reviewing 27 authority of appeal who upon review of the grievance, neglected and denied the claim without 28 proper due diligence and due process. 1 As remedies, Plaintiff seeks an injunction to prevent the denial of future services during 2 the month of Ramadan and seeks monetary damages. 3 III. Discussion 4 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to 5 state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because he is proceeding pro se, Plaintiff will 6 be granted leave to amend his complaint to the extent that he can do so in good faith. To assist 7 Plaintiff, the Court provides the pleading and legal standards that appear relevant to his claims. 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 9 Pursuant to Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 10 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed factual allegations 11 are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must 13 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 14 its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations 15 are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; Moss, 16 572 F.3d at 969. 17 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is short, but it is not a plain statement of his claims showing 18 that he is entitled to relief. Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and do not state what happened, 19 when it happened, or which defendant was involved. General assertions regarding Plaintiff’s 20 appeals are not sufficient, and Plaintiff may not merely state he was denied rights without stating 21 the factual support for denial of those right. Plaintiff must state factual allegations to support his 22 claims. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, it should be a short and plain statement of his 23 claims and must include factual allegations identifying what happened, when it happened and 24 who was involved. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 25 While “much liberality is allowed in construing pro se complaints, a pro se litigant cannot 26 simply dump a stack of exhibits on the court and expect the court to sift through them to 27 determine if some nugget is buried somewhere in that mountain of papers, waiting to be 28 unearthed and refined into a cognizable claim.” Lam v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., No. 1 1:23-CV-01167 BAM PC, 2023 WL 8701254, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2023), report and 2 recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-1167 JLT BAM PC, 2024 WL 201269 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 3 2024). “The Court will not comb through attached exhibits seeking to determine whether a claim 4 possibly could have been stated where the pleading itself does not state a claim. In short, 5 [Plaintiff] must state a claim, not merely attach exhibits.” Stewart v. Nevada, No. 2:09-CV- 6 01063-PMP-GWF, 2011 WL 588485, at *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 9, 2011). Here, the Court has reviewed 7 the exhibits, but did not evaluate whether their contents state a claim on Plaintiff's behalf. 8 Plaintiff cannot Represent Others 9 It is unclear from the allegations, but it appears Plaintiff seeks to represent other inmates 10 who were not permitted chapel during Ramadan. Plaintiff may not do so. A non-attorney 11 proceeding pro se may bring his own claims to court, but he may not represent others. Johns v. 12 County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (constitutional claims are personal; non- 13 attorney has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself); C.E. Pope Equity Trust 14 v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987). A pro se litigant simply cannot “fairly and 15 adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) Therefore, this action will 16 be construed as an individual civil suit brought by Plaintiff. 17 Linkage and Supervisor Liability 18 Most of Plaintiff's allegations fail to assert the requisite causal link between the 19 challenged conduct, a specific defendant, and a clearly identified constitutional violation. Under § 20 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the 21 deprivation of his rights. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676–7, 129 S.Ct. 1937; Ewing v. City of Stockton, 22 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 23 Plaintiff may not attribute liability to a group of defendants, but must “set forth specific facts as to 24 each individual defendant's” deprivation of his rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th 25 Cir. 1988); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 26 Plaintiff fails to link the defendants to the alleged wrongful conduct. Plaintiff fails to 27 allege what each defendant did or did not do which violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. 28 Plaintiff may not simply assert that a deprivation occurred and then accuse a group of defendants 1 of being “responsible” for that deprivation. 2 Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to sue Defendant Warden, Defendant Deputy Warden, or 3 any other defendant, based on his supervisory role, he may not do so. Liability may not be 4 imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the 5 theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77, 129 S.Ct. 1937; Simmons v. Navajo 6 Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 7 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 8 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or 9 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 10 Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 11 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal 12 participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a 13 repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” 14 Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations 15 marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 16 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1970). 17 Here, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant Warden, Defendant Deputy Warden, 18 or other supervisor, participated in or directed any constitutional violation or that he implemented 19 a policy so deficient that it was the moving force of any constitutional violation. 20 First Amendment Free Exercise of Religion 21 A plaintiff asserting a free exercise claim must show that the defendant's actions 22 substantially burden his practice of religion. See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 23 2015). “A substantial burden ... place[s] more than an inconvenience on religious exercise; it must 24 have a tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs or exert 25 substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Id. (internal 26 quotation marks and citations omitted). “[A] prison policy that intentionally puts significant 27 pressure on inmates ... to abandon their religious beliefs ... imposes a substantial burden on [the 28 inmate's] religious practice.” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 889 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal 1 quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the court has also recognized that limitations on 2 a prisoner's free exercise rights arise from both the fact of incarceration and valid penological 3 objectives. See McElyea v. Babbit, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987). For instance, under the 4 First Amendment, the penological interest in a simplified food service has been held sufficient to 5 allow a prison to provide orthodox Jewish inmates with a pork-free diet instead of a completely 6 kosher diet. See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877-79 (9th Cir. 1993). 7 To state a claim under the Free Exercise Clause, an inmate must plausibly allege that a 8 prison official's actions (a) “substantially burden[ed]” the inmate's exercise of a sincerely-held 9 religious belief; and (b) did so in an unreasonable manner—i.e., the official's actions were not 10 “rationally related to legitimate penological interests.” See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 11 342, 348-50 (1987); Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 2015); see Haynes v. 12 Orel, No. 2:19-CV-1988 AC, 2021 WL 4355431, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2021). 13 Plaintiff fails to set forth sufficient facts to support his free exercise of religion claim. 14 Plaintiff merely contends that his requests for access to chapel were denied. Plaintiff had not 15 sufficiently stated a claim because he failed to specifically allege that chapel access is necessary 16 for a “sincerely held” belief that is “rooted in religious belief.” Plaintiff has not alleged facts 17 showing that the chapel service or meeting was necessary to plaintiff's sincerely held belief or 18 religion, that any denial substantially burdened the practice of his religion, or, that any denial was 19 not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests or that he did not have alternative means 20 of practicing his religion. Leave to amend will be granted. 21 RLUIPA 22 A prisoner's ability to freely exercise his religion is also protected by the Religious Land 23 Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). The RLUIPA provides that “[n]o government 24 shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to 25 an institution, ... unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person 26 ... is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest ... and is the least restrictive means of 27 furthering that ... interest.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1(a). “RLUIPA defines ‘religious exercise’ to 28 include ‘any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious 1 belief.’ ” Hartmann v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2013); 2 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7). 3 As with the First Amendment, under the RLUIPA, the government imposes a “substantial 4 burden” on a prisoner when it puts “substantial pressure on [him] to modify his behavior and to 5 violate his beliefs.” Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1125 (citation omitted). RLUIPA is more protective 6 than the First Amendment, in that the availability of alternative means of practicing religion is 7 irrelevant to whether the Act has been violated. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. at 862. With 8 RLUIPA, the “ ‘substantial burden’ inquiry asks whether the government has substantially 9 burdened religious exercise ..., not whether the RLUIPA claimant is able to engage in other forms 10 of religious exercise.” Id. 11 Money damages are not available under RLUIPA against the state or state officials sued in 12 their official capacities, Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 279 (2011), and RLUIPA does not 13 contemplate liability of government employees in their individual capacity. Wood v. Yordy, 753 14 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, a RLUIPA claim may proceed only for declaratory or 15 injunctive relief against defendants acting within their official capacities. 16 It appears that Plaintiff sues each of the individual defendants in their individual capacity 17 for violation of RLUIPA. RLUIPA, however, does not authorize Plaintiff's claim against the 18 individual defendants in their individual capacities. See Wood, 753 F.3d at 904. Leave to amend 19 will be granted. 20 Processing of Appeals 21 To the extent Plaintiff is complaining about the appeal process, Plaintiff is informed that 22 he does not have a constitutionally protected right to have his appeals accepted or processed. 23 Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 24 Cir. 1988). The prison grievance procedure does not confer any substantive rights upon inmates 25 and actions in reviewing appeals cannot serve as a basis for liability under section 1983. See also 26 Givens v. Cal. Dep't of Corrs. & Rehab., No. 2:19-cv-0017 KJN P, 2019 WL 1438068, at *4 27 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2019) (“California's regulations grant prisoners a purely procedural right: the 28 right to have a prison appeal.”) Therefore, prison officials are not required by federal law to 1 process inmate appeals or grievances in a particular way. Consequently, the failure or refusal to 2 process a grievance or the denial, rejection, or cancellation of a grievance does not violate any 3 constitutionally protected right. See Rushdan v. Gear, No. 1:16-cv-01017-BAM (PC), 4 2018 WL 2229259, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2018); Givens, 2019 WL 1438068, at *4; Wright v. 5 Shannon, No. 1:05-cv-01485-LJO-YNP PC, 2010 WL 445203, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2010) 6 (plaintiff's allegations that prison officials denied or ignored his inmate appeals failed to state a 7 cognizable claim under the First Amendment); Valles v. Gamboa, No. 1:22-CV-00355 BAM PC, 8 2022 WL 1294424, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2022) (no claim for failure to comply with timely 9 processing requirements). 10 Injunctive Relief 11 Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief in this action. Federal courts are courts of limited 12 jurisdiction and in considering a request for injunctive relief, the Court is bound by the 13 requirement that as a preliminary matter, it have before it an actual case or controversy. City of 14 Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for 15 Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). If the Court does not have an 16 actual case or controversy before it, it has no power to hear the matter in question. Id. 17 Further, requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of 18 the Prison Litigation Reform Act [“PLRA”], which requires that the Court find the “relief 19 [sought] is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the 20 Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal 21 right.” In cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any injunction “must 22 be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires 23 preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 24 3626(a)(2). Moreover, where, as here, “a plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction that 25 goes beyond maintaining the status quo pendente lite, ‘courts should be extremely cautious’ about 26 issuing a preliminary injunction and should not grant such relief unless the facts and law clearly 27 favor the plaintiff.” Committee of Central American Refugees v. I.N.S., 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th 28 Cir. 1986), quoting Martin v. International Olympic Committee, 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1 1984). 2 Plaintiff’s Declaration re Opened Mail 3 On September 9, 2024, a declaration from Plaintiff was filed stating that he “is receiving 4 mail from this Court opened without [him] being present.” (Doc. 9.) 5 The Court declines to address this issue because it was not included in the complaint. 6 Plaintiff has been granted leave to amend and may consider including this allegation. However, 7 Plaintiff is informed that, under federal law, “legal mail” entitled to First Amendment protection 8 is narrowly defined as confidential correspondence between a prisoner and his attorney. See 9 Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Mail from the courts, as contrasted to mail 10 from a prisoner's lawyer, is not legal mail.”). Non-legal mail may be opened outside of the 11 presence of an inmate. Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1211 (upholding dismissal of claims for opening of 12 non-legal mail). And Plaintiff is cautioned against joining unrelated claims. Plaintiff may not 13 bring unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a single action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2). 14 Plaintiff is further cautioned that he is required to exhaust administrative remedies before being 15 suit under the PLRA. 16 IV. Conclusion and Order 17 As discussed above, the Court finds Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to comply 18 with Rules 8 and fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. Plaintiff will be granted an 19 opportunity to amend to attempt to cure the identified deficiencies, to the extent he is able to do 20 so in good faith. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 21 Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what 22 each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556 23 U.S. at 678-79, 129 S. Ct. at 1948-49. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must 24 be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 25 (citations omitted). 26 Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated 27 claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no 28 “buckshot” complaints). 1 Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 2 Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended 3 complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” 4 Local Rule 220. 5 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 6 1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form; 7 2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a 8 second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order, or file a 9 notice of voluntary dismissal; and 10 3. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the 11 Court will recommend dismissal of this action, with prejudice, consistent with the reasons 12 discussed in this order. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14

15 Dated: January 10, 2025 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16

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