(PC) Jacques v. Fererkins

District Court, E.D. California·Decided June 28, 2022·No. 2:21-cv-00144·Unknown

Opinion

MICHAEL E. JACQUES, No. 2: 21-cv-0144 KJM KJN P Plaintiff, v. ORDER B. FERERKINS, et al., Defendants. I. Introduction Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court are plaintiff’s motion to compel (ECF No. 50) and plaintiff’s motion requesting a copy of her deposition transcript (ECF No. 51). For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff’s motions are denied. II. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel A. Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Motion Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to request for production of documents nos. 5- 9 (ECF No. 50 at 1.) In the opposition, defendants argue that plaintiff’s motion to compel, filed April 18, 2022, is not timely. (ECF No. 52 at 3-4.) Defendants state that the discovery deadline was November 29, 2021. (See ECF No. 25 (discovery and scheduling order).) For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff’s motion to compel is denied as untimely. Defendants requested an extension of time until November 15, 2021, to respond to plaintiff’s discovery requests, including the at-issue request for production of documents. (ECF No. 29.) In her notice of non-opposition to defendants’ request for extension of time, plaintiff requested a modification of the scheduling order. (ECF No. 28.) Plaintiff requested additional time to serve further discovery requests, depending on defendants’ responses to her pending discovery requests. (Id.) On October 28, 2021, the undersigned granted defendants’ request for extension of time until November 15, 2021, to respond to plaintiff’s discovery requests. (ECF No. 30.) The undersigned denied plaintiff’s request to modify the scheduling order because plaintiff’s claim that she may need additional time to serve additional discovery requests was not good cause to modify the scheduling order. (Id.) The undersigned advised plaintiff that if she determined that she required additional discovery after reviewing defendants’ responses, she could file a renewed motion to extend the discovery deadline. (Id.) In the pending motion to compel, plaintiff requests that the court modify the scheduling order to deem her motion to compel timely. (ECF No. 50 at 2.) However, plaintiff fails to address why she waited over four months after the discovery deadline to file the pending motion to compel. Plaintiff also does not address why she failed to file a motion for extension of time to file a motion to compel after receiving defendants’ responses to her request for production of documents. In the reply to defendants’ opposition, plaintiff contends that in her notice of non- opposition to defendants’ request for extension of time to respond to her discovery requests, she sought an extension of time to file a motion to compel. (ECF No. 57.) This was not clear to the undersigned when reviewing plaintiff’s statement of non-opposition. Moreover, the court’s alleged misunderstanding of the grounds of plaintiff’s request to modify the scheduling order in her notice of non-opposition does not explain why plaintiff waited over four months after the discovery deadline to file the pending motion to compel. //// In the reply, plaintiff offers other explanations for her failure to file a timely motion to compel: 10. Plaintiff as a mistake, due to massive outbreaks in Mule Creek State Prison COVID-19 could not access the law library physically. Plaintiff could have mistaken and thought she refiled a motion to compel. Plaintiff is also litigating 5 additional 42 U.S.C. § 1983’s. Plaintiff also was transferred to administrative segregation and doesn’t have full access to her legal property. The law library is still closed due to COVID-19. 11. Plaintiff has filed multiple motions with the courts (i.e., motions for appointment of counsel, substitution of parties, declarations, non- oppositions, etc.). Plaintiff honestly thought she filed a renewal of a motion to compel. Plaintiff is not intentionally being defiant to the court’s orders, nor looking for special treatment. A mistake is unfortunate, not intentional Plaintiff has been timely throughout the litigation of this entire case. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff suggests that denial of full access to her legal property and the law library prevented her from filing a timely motion to compel. However, plaintiff filed the pending motion despite allegedly being subject to these conditions. Plaintiff also suggests that she mistakenly believed that she previously filed a motion to compel. Plaintiff suggests that this mistaken belief was caused by her litigating multiple civil rights actions and filing multiple pleadings in the instant action. These circumstances are not good cause to deem the pending motion to compel timely. Based on plaintiff’s failure to show good cause for the delay in filing the motion to compel, plaintiff’s motion to compel is denied as untimely. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (scheduling orders may be modified on a showing of good cause); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9thCir. 1992) (the focus of the good cause inquiry is on the “moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.”) In the opposition, defendants also address the merits of plaintiff’s motion to compel. In an abundance of caution, the undersigned also addresses the merits of plaintiff’s motion. For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff’s motion to compel is denied on the merits. //// //// B. Merits of Motion To Compel In the motion to compel plaintiff seeks further responses to request for production of documents nos. 5-9. (ECF No. 50 at 3.) In the reply to defendants’ opposition, plaintiff states that she is “not concerned any longer” with request nos. 5-6. (ECF No. 57 at 7.) Plaintiff states that she is “only focused” on request nos. 7-9. (Id.) Accordingly, the undersigned herein addresses only request nos. 7-9. Legal Standard for Motion to Compel The scope of discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) is broad. Discovery may be obtained as to “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. The court, however, may limit discovery if it is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;” or if the party who seeks discovery “has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery;” or if “the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). “The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its request satisfies the relevancy requirements of Rule 26(b)(1).” Bryant v. Ochoa, 2009 WL 1390794, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2009) (citations omitted). “Thereafter, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that the discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of clarifying, explaining or supporting its objections.” Id. The opposing party “has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed…” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Plaintiff’s Claims This act

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