(PC) Jace v. Lirones

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: June 13, 2022
• Docket: 1:22-cv-00419
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICHAEL JACE, Case No.: 1:22-cv-00419-AWI-BAK (BAM) (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 13 v. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 14 MARGARET LIRONES, et al., RESTRAINING ORDER

15 Defendants. (Doc. No. 4)

16 14-DAY DEADLINE

17 18 Plaintiff Michael Jace is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 19 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 Plaintiff initiated this action on April 11, 2022, with the filing of his prisoner civil rights 22 complaint. (Doc No. 1.) That same date, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Order to Show Cause 23 for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining” (Doc. No. 4), which the court construes 24 as a motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. 25 Plaintiff declares that he has been denied access to the law library at his institution 26 through the months of February and March 2022. (Doc. No. 4 at 2.) Plaintiff contends CDCR 27 staff refuse to communicate with him in a timely manner, affecting Plaintiff’s ability to comply 1 plaintiff’s fundamental right to access the court” and “is documented within the enclosed 2 complaint.” (Id.) He contends irreparable harm will result “if not immediately stopped.” (Id.) 3 Plaintiff declares his belief that March 25, 2022, “may be the deadline if the statute of limitations 4 is one-year for a Section 1983 suit in California.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff signed the motion on March 5 24, 2022 and included a notation that the document was “E-filed on April 4, 2022.” (Id. at 3.) 6 II. DISCUSSION 7 A. Applicable Legal Standard 8 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”1 Winter 9 v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). 10 A federal district court may issue emergency injunctive relief only if it has personal 11 jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. See Murphy Bros., 12 Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting that one “becomes a party 13 officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of summons or other 14 authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party must appear to defend”). The 15 court may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before it. See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & 16 Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1916); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 17 1983); see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (injunctive relief must be 18 “narrowly tailored to give only the relief to which plaintiffs are entitled”). Under Federal Rule of 19 Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), an injunction binds only “the parties to the action,” their “officers, 20 agents, servants, employees, and attorneys,” and “other persons who are in active concert or 21 participation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(A)-(C). “When a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief based on 22 claims not pled in the complaint, the court does not have the authority to issue an injunction.” 23 Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 2015). 24 Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the 25 Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires the Court find that the “relief [sought] is narrowly 26 drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal Right, and is the 27 1 “The standard for a [temporary restraining order] is the same as for a preliminary injunction.” Rovio Entm’t Ltd. v. 1 least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal Right.” 2 On the merits, “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is 3 likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 4 preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the 5 public interest.” Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 876 (2015) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. 6 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). “Under Winter, plaintiffs must establish that irreparable 7 harm is likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.” Alliance for the Wild 8 Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 9 B. Analysis 10 Plaintiff’s motion seeks an order restraining Defendants Clark and Lirones from 11 obstructing his right of access to the court. (Doc. No. 4 at 1.) 12 Initially, the Court notes no defendant has been served in this action, nor has any 13 defendant filed an appearance. Thus, the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over 14 Defendants Clark and Lirones and may not act at this time. Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe 15 Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. at 350; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. at 234-35; 16 Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d at 727-28. 17 Moreover, Plaintiff has not established that he is likely to succeed on the merits,2 that he is 18 likely to suffer irreparable harm, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, or that an injunction 19 is in the public interest. 20 1. The Merits 21 Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 22 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration 23 or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from 24 the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. 25

26 2 The Court’s finding relates only to the present motion. The Court has not screened Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Thus, the Court does not express an opinion on whether the factual allegations in the 27 complaint are sufficient to state a cognizable claim that is “plausible on its face,” under the liberal pleading standards for pro se litigants. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 1 Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002). “[T]he injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type 2 of frustrated legal claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Inmates do not enjoy a constitutionally 3 protected right “to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from 4 shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims.” Id. at 355. Rather, the type of legal claim 5 protected is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions such as 6 those brought under section 1983 to vindicate basic constitutional rights. Id. at 354 (quotations 7 and citations omitted). “Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the 8 incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Id. at 355 9 (emphasis in original). 10 Moreover, when a prisoner asserts that he was denied access to the courts and seeks a 11 remedy for a lost opportunity to present a legal claim, he must show: (1) the loss of a non- 12 frivolous or arguable underlying claim; (2) the official acts that frustrated the litigation; and (3) a 13 remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future suit. 14 Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.2007) (citing Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413-414, 15 overruled on other grounds, Hust v. Phillips, 555 U.S. 1150 (2009)). 16 Plaintiff’s motion makes no showing of a loss of a non-frivolous or arguable underlying 17 claim. Plaintiff refers to an inability to access the law library in order to “comply with [the] E- 18 filing program” (Doc. No. 4 at 2), yet Plaintiff’s own handwriting indicates the motion was 19 ultimately E-filed and the motion itself makes no mention of the underlying access to courts 20 claims. And while Plaintiff indicates the acts of Defendants Clark and Lirones have frustrated 21 litigation, Plaintiff fails to show that the remedy he seeks is not otherwise available in a future 22 suit. Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d at 1076. 23 Additionally, “[a]lthough prison officials may not obstruct a prisoner’s access to the 24 courts by unreasonably blocking his access to a law library, prison officials may place reasonable 25 limitations on library access in the interest of the secure and orderly operation of the institution.” 26 Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.3d 136, 138 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 27 545-48 (1979)). “[P]rison law libraries and legal assistance programs are not ends in themselves, 1 of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.” Id., at 351 (internal quotes and citations 2 omitted). Notably, Plaintiff’s motion makes no reference to the reason or reasons for the 3 limitations on Plaintiff’s library access (see Doc. 4 at 2-3) nor does Plaintiff show such 4 limitations were unreasonable. 5 2. Irreparable Harm 6 Plaintiff states that “without access to the law library” Plaintiff “only had access to a 7 borrowed copy of the 6th edition of the jailhouse lawyer’s handbook.” (Doc. No. 4 at 2-3.) 8 Plaintiff states “if [his lack of access] is not immediately stopped [it] will cause plaintiff 9 irreparable harm.” (Id. at 2.) 10 “The equitable remedy is unavailable absent a showing of irreparable injury, a 11 requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the 12 plaintiff will be wronged again—a likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.” 13 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation 14 omitted). 15 This Court has accepted Plaintiff’s complaint for filing and Plaintiff’s complaint will be 16 screened in due course. See 28 U.S.C. 1915A(a). Further, Plaintiff’s application to proceed in 17 forma pauperis was filed (Doc. No. 3) and granted by the Court (Doc. No. 9). The allegations in 18 Plaintiff’s motion do not rule out the possibility that harm will result from a continued inability to 19 access the law library, but the allegations are speculative. A litigant “seeking preliminary relief 20 [must] demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Winter, 555 21 U.S. at 22 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). “Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a 22 possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an 23 extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled 24 to such relief.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff does not make a showing 25 of a likely irreparable injury. 26 3. Balance of Equities & Public Interest 27 Plaintiff makes no showing whatsoever that the balance of equities tips in his favor, nor 1 III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion for a 3 temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 4) be DENIED. 4 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the District Judge assigned to 5 this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(l). Within 14 days of the date of 6 service of these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the 7 Court. The document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 8 Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in waiver of 9 rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 10 Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12

13 Dated: June 13, 2022 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27