(PC) Israel v. Shmary

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 25, 2021·No. 2:21-cv-00262·Unknown

Opinion

AKIVA AVIKAIDA ISRAEL, No. 2:21-cv-0262-EFB P Plaintiff, v. ORDER RABBI SHMARY, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, by separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) and (2). Screening Standards Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8, its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Screening Order Plaintiff’s complaint alleges the following: Plaintiff is a “natural-born Jew and a member of a Jewish Organization.” ECF No. 1 at 6. It took approximately 200 days from his initial request for a religious Kosher diet to finally receive it, on January 14, 2021. Id. at 6. As a result, he was made “to consume unclean meals on . . . the Holiest Days in Judaism: Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah.” Id. at 5. Defendant Rabbi Shmary told plaintiff that he would be notified of his eligibility for a religious diet within 30 days of his request, yet “aggressive[ly] refus[ed] to communicate about [plaintiff’s] religious dietary needs at the prison.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff notes that he is a “gay/transgender Jew” and that unlike him, non-Jewish inmates receive timely responses to their requests for religious diets. Id. at 6. Plaintiff asserts claims under the First Amendment, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, and the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 5-7. He seeks declaratory relief and $50,000 in damages. Id. at 8. Liberally construed, plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a potentially cognizable First Amendment freedom of religion claim and an official-capacity RLUIPA claim for declaratory relief only, against defendant Shmary. See Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 902-04 (9th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA neither permits individual capacity suits nor suits for monetary damages). There is, however, no basis for an equal protection claim because plaintiff does not allege that Shmary acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against plaintiff because of his membership in any protected class. See Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2005). The court notes that plaintiff lists additional “Doe” defendants. The use of such Doe defendants in federal court is problematic, see Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980), and ultimately unnecessary. Rather, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not state procedural rules and practice, govern how pleadings may be amended to add new parties in a federal civil action. Here, plaintiff has been able to commence the action using the name of at least one identified defendant - Shmary. Should plaintiff subsequently learn the identities of additional parties whom he wishes to serve, he must move pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to file an amended complaint to add them as defendants. See Brass v. County of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2003). If the timing of his amended complaint raises questions as to the statute of limitations, plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of Rule 15(c), which is the controlling procedure for adding defendants whose identities were discovered after commencement of the action. Additionally, unknown persons cannot be served with process until they are identified by their real names and the court will not investigate the names and identities of unnamed defendants. For these reasons, plaintiff may either proceed only on the potentially cognizable First Amendment and RLUIPA claims against defendant Shmary or he may amend his complaint to attempt to cure the complaint’s deficiencies. Plaintiff is not obligated to amend his complaint. Leave to Amend Plaintiff may file an amended complaint to attempt to cure the deficiencies noted above. Any amended complaint must identify as a defendant only persons who personally participated in a substantial way in depriving him of a federal constitutional right. Johnson

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

(PC) Israel v. Shmary, (E.D. Cal. 2021).

(PC) Israel v. Shmary ((PC) Israel v. Shmary) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Scheuer v. Rhodes
416 U.S. 232 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Richard E. Loux v. B. J. Rhay, Warden
375 F.2d 55 (Ninth Circuit, 1967)
George v. Smith
507 F.3d 605 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Lance Wood v. Keith Yordy
753 F.3d 899 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Hartman v. Duffey
19 F.3d 1459 (D.C. Circuit, 1994)
Gillespie v. Civiletti
629 F.2d 637 (Ninth Circuit, 1980)